Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application by Dickey, Jeffrey V. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-06
Russian political warfare: origin,
evolution, and application
Dickey, Jeffrey V.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE:  ORIGIN, 




Jeffrey V. Dickey 
Thomas B. Everett 
Zane M. Galvach 
Matthew J. Mesko 




Thesis Advisor:  Hy S. Rothstein 
Second Reader: Stephen J. Blank 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE 
June 2015
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE:  ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND 
APPLICATION 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Jeffrey V. Dickey, Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew 
J.Mesko, Anton V.Soltis 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and subsequent activities in Eastern Ukraine are not isolated 
incidents, but rather a new form of hybrid war, or asymmetric warfare. They are part of a decades-long and continent-
spanning Russian political warfare (PW) campaign. Analysis of the origin, history, and evolution of Soviet/Russian 
PW from 1917 through today reveals that Russia is using PW to assert regional dominance and challenge the 
unipolarity of the United States and the West. A review of events in Ukraine demonstrates Russia is using its latest 
evolution of PW doctrine, the Gerasimov Model, to achieve strategic objectives while remaining below the military 
response threshold of the international community. This paper combines an empirical and case study review of PW, 
with lessons from the Cold War, to propose a conceptual framework and a supporting model for foreign policy 
makers, planners, and practitioners to better understand PW. Furthermore, it recommends the United States adopt a 
proactive PW strategy to support national policy objectives and counter the PW activities of Russia and other rising 
powers. United States Special Operations Forces are well-suited for PW and will play a pivotal role in a U.S. PW 








14. SUBJECT TERMS 
political warfare, unconventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare, Russia, Russian 
Federation, Cold War, foreign policy, national strategy, Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Donbass, Crimea, 
special operations, Gerasimov, Bezmenov, new generation warfare 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
319 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Zane M. Galvach 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., United States Military Academy, 
2004 
 
Matthew J. Mesko 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., Michigan Technological 
University, 2001 
 
Thomas B. Everett 
Major, United States Army 
B.A., North Georgia College and State 
University, 2004 
 
Jeffrey V. Dickey 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., The Citadel, 2009 
 
Anton V. Soltis 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., Clarkson University, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 








Authors: Jeffrey Dickey, Thomas Everett, Zane Galvach, Matthew Mesko, Anton Soltis  
 
 




   Second Reader 
 
John Arquilla 
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 ii




Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and subsequent activities in 
Eastern Ukraine are not isolated incidents, but rather a new form of hybrid war, or 
asymmetric warfare. They are part of a decades-long and continent-spanning Russian 
political warfare (PW) campaign. Analysis of the origin, history, and evolution of Soviet/
Russian PW from 1917 through today reveals that Russia is using PW to assert regional 
dominance and challenge the unipolarity of the United States and the West. A review of 
events in Ukraine demonstrates Russia is using its latest evolution of PW doctrine, the 
Gerasimov Model, to achieve strategic objectives while remaining below the military 
response threshold of the international community. This paper combines an empirical and 
case study review of PW, with lessons from the Cold War, to propose a conceptual 
framework and a supporting model for foreign policy makers, planners, and practitioners 
to better understand PW. Furthermore, it recommends the United States adopt a proactive 
PW strategy to support national policy objectives and counter the PW activities of Russia 
and other rising powers. United States Special Operations Forces are well-suited for PW 
and will play a pivotal role in a U.S. PW strategy that encompasses all elements of 
national power and synchronizes the interagency community. 
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 1
I. INTRODUCTION: RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND 
The rapid annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the current Russian 
unconventional warfare activity in Eastern Ukraine are not isolated incidents. They are 
part of a decades-long and continent-spanning Russian political warfare (PW) campaign. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Western leaders have been unable to clearly identify or 
counteract this campaign and, as a consequence, have incorrectly labeled the events in 
Ukraine. Myopic focus on violent events has propagated debate on the emergence and 
implications of hybrid-war, asymmetric warfare, and new-generation warfare in the 
region. Western responses have been ineffective because analysis was focused on only a 
part of the problem, rather than the entirety of Russia’s protracted strategy. 
Russia’s PW affects U.S. national interests in three ways: it threatens the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it destabilizes the global security status quo, and  
demonstrates that constitutional democracies are vulnerable to PW strategies. NATO’s 
members are guaranteed collective defense against armed aggression, but NATO 
members in Eastern Europe fear that Russia’s current tactics can undermine their 
sovereignty and redraw their borders without triggering an armed NATO response. As 
the quintessential status-quo power, U.S. interests are at stake in maintaining the balance 
of power within, and respect for, the current international system of laws, regulations, 
and traditions. Any revanchist attempt to reshape that system through force and deception 
must be repudiated. 
Finally, Russia is demonstrating the effectiveness of using PW strategies to target 
constitutional democracies. If this trend is not reversed, then it will be repeated in other 
situations by different actors. America must successfully oppose Russian PW to prevent 
it from becoming the strategy of choice for emerging regional or global powers opposed 
to U.S. interests. A broader analysis of Russian PW origins, evolution, and current 
capacity is needed in order to provide U.S. foreign policy makers and executors with 
viable options to address it. 
 2
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this capstone project is four-fold: to define the general principles 
of PW, to understand the specifics of Russian PW, to explore how Russian and, 
previously, Soviet PW has been employed and countered in the past, and to propose ways 
to counter Russian PW in the future. 
1. Research Question: How can the United States use United States 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to Counter Russian-Sponsored 
Political Warfare? 
2. Primary Hypothesis 
USSOF, synchronized with other elements of national power, provide a functional 
platform for the U.S. Department of Defense to support United States Government (USG) 
efforts to conduct U.S. political warfare and undermine or counter Russian political 
warfare. 
The primary hypothesis is reinforced through an additional five supporting 
hypotheses, each examined independently. 
3. Supporting Hypotheses 
 George Kennan’s 1948 definition of PW is valid for use in today’s 
geopolitical reality, as it is prevalent and is being employed in the  
world today. 
 The Soviet Union conducted PW during the Cold War in support of its 
strategic objectives, as did the United States in an attempt to counter 
Soviet efforts and secure its own strategic goals. 
 Russia has renewed its ability to conduct PW since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and is using it to consolidate power domestically, establish 
dominance regionally, and, ultimately, challenge the unipolarity of  
the West. 
 Russia has engaged in and enhanced its PW activities in Ukraine since 
1991 to secure its national objectives and vital interests. 
 Russia’s activity in Ukraine in 2014 is PW rather than crisis activity 
because it is part of a phased plan encompassing nonmilitary and military 
methods to secure Russia’s goals as outlined in Gerasimov’s new 
generation warfare doctrine. 
 3
4. Methodology 
This capstone project answers the research question by testing the hypothesis and 
supporting hypotheses using a case study methodology. Findings related to the supporting 
hypotheses are organized and captured within each chapter for ease of reference. The 
final chapter contains the operational concept that answers the primary research question. 
a. Supporting Hypothesis 1 
This hypothesis is tested in Chapter II by presenting George Kennan’s 1948 
definition of PW. Next, the argument over the validity of this definition is presented and 
a conclusion determines that Kennan’s definition is useful. Examples of PW activity by 
China, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah support the argument that PW is still prolific today. 
The doctrinal origins of Russian PW are explored and traced to the Russian Bolsheviks. 
The early usage of PW by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1950 is 
presented as a case study of how the Soviets employed PW in the post-World War II  
time period. 
b. Supporting Hypothesis 2 
This hypothesis is tested in Chapters III and IV by exploring the Cold War period 
from 1947 to 1991 using the following analytical framework. First, in Chapter III, the 
Soviet Union’s strategic goals during the Cold War period are identified and it is shown 
that Soviet doctrine at the time embraced a comprehensive PW program and implemented 
“active measures” to pursue these objectives. Then, examples of PW activity during the 
Cold War are explored through the lens of the elements of national power, or Diplomatic 
Information Military and Economic (DIME), in order to show that the Soviet Union did, 
in fact, engage in full-spectrum PW during the Cold War. A case study of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, “The Crushing of the Prague Spring,” is presented as an 
example of full-spectrum PW employed by the Soviet Union during this period. Next, in 
Chapter IV, a parallel analysis is presented for the United States to reflect that similar 
methods were employed according to Kennan’s version of PW and augmented by covert 
action. A case study of Poland in the 1980s—the “Solidarity Movement”—is presented 
as an example of well-executed U.S. PW during this time period. 
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c. Supporting Hypothesis 3 
This hypothesis is tested in Chapter V by exploring the evolution of Russian PW 
from 1991 to 2013 through the lens of DIME. It is determined that Russian PW was 
limited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but has since re-evolved to enable Russia 
to challenge the unipolarity of the West, which is central to its grand strategy. It is further 
determined that the solidarity of the Russian identity, the authoritarian nature of Russia’s 
leadership, Russia’s relative military superiority to its neighbors, and its regional 
monopoly of the fossil fuel market were central factors to the resurgence of Russian PW. 
A case study of Georgia in 2008 is presented as evidence that Russia eventually 
redeveloped the ability to conduct PW synchronized across the DIME spectrum. 
d. Supporting Hypothesis 4 
This hypothesis is tested in Chapter VI by analyzing U.S. and Russian actions and 
policies in Ukraine from 1991 through 2013. Each one is a case study in itself, focusing 
on the employment of elements of national power (DIME). This comparative analysis 
provides important aspects related to PW. First, the brief analysis of U.S. objectives and 
interests in Ukraine provides context for the U.S. actions and policies that ensued. Then, 
a more in-depth analysis on Russian national interests, objectives, and PW in Ukraine is 
explored. It is evident the United States’ limited approach is in stark contrast to that of 
Russia, which has conducted PW by Kennan’s definition and advanced its effectiveness 
into the twenty-first century. The unremitting, protracted, contemporary Russian PW in 
Ukraine has synchronized all elements of national power and allowed Russia to dominate 
the Ukrainian political and social landscape. 
e. Supporting Hypothesis 5 
This hypothesis is tested in Chapter VII by identifying the Russian activity during 
the events of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and overlaying them on Gerasimov’s model for new 
generation warfare. It is shown that the majority of Russian activity during the crisis falls 
directly into phases III through V of Gerasimov’s model. This is evidence that Russia’s 
activities during the Ukraine crisis are actually part of a larger plan to achieve Russia’s 
strategic goals. This conclusion also counters arguments that the events in Ukraine in 
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2014 were actually short-term Russian response measures resulting from the political 
instability of Ukraine in 2013 and 2014. Thus, Chapter VII, in its entirety, is a large-scale 
case study of Russian PW in Ukraine in 2014. 
f. Primary Hypothesis 
This hypothesis is presented in Chapter IX in the form of an operational concept, 
which uses information gleaned from five supporting theses to present recommendations 
for countering Russian PW. It proposes that Russia is conducting PW as an asymmetric 
strategy tool to secure strategic objectives without going to war with the West. Russia’s 
current PW methodology is the product of a continuous evolution of PW doctrine since 
its inception during the Russian Revolution, refinement through the Cold War, and 
adaptation to today’s technological and geopolitical environment. 
PW is presented using a model and supporting deductions to depict PW activity 
across the covert-overt and direct-indirect spectrums. These deductions assist in 
categorizing PW activity into four domains: covert-direct methods, covert-indirect 
methods, overt-direct methods, and overt-indirect methods. These domains, visualized on 
a quad-chart, represent a valuable tool to analyze PW methods across the DIME 
spectrum. It can also be used to conceptualize the areas of U.S. agency responsibility, 
areas of responsibility overlap, and the role of USSOF within the interagency. 
General policy recommendations for U.S. PW are proposed, as well as specific 
policy recommendations to enable proactive U.S. PW and counter Russian PW. The 
policy recommendations are founded on the premise that the United States interagency 
community is well-structured to embrace PW. The Department of State and its country 
teams are ideal to take the lead on regional- and country-specific strategies, with all 
members of the interagency community playing critical roles in advancing a strategy that 
spans the entire DIME spectrum. USSOF are particularly well-suited for PW and are 
capable of augmenting interagency efforts across the DIME spectrum. 
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II. POLITICAL WARFARE: ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
On February 27, 2014, following months of unrest in the Ukraine, masked 
Russian soldiers seized government buildings and key infrastructure in Crimea. Russian 
actions leading to this de facto invasion were not a new form of warfare, but an 
expression of a deliberate and long-term political warfare strategy directed at securing 
interests in their near-abroad. This strategy has a direct lineage beginning with Soviet 
political warfare after World War II, developed and evolved throughout the decades of 
the Cold War, and revived by the Russian Federation following the turn towards 
authoritarianism in the 1990s.1 
Scholars, soldiers, reporters, and politicians have referred to the Russian incursion 
in Ukraine by using a host of terms including asymmetric warfare,2 fourth generation 
warfare,3 hybrid warfare,4 irregular warfare,5 psychological warfare,6 and unconventional 
                                                 
1 For analysis of Russia’s return to authoritarianism see: William Zimmerman, Ruling Russia: 
Authoritarianism From the Revolution to Putin (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 
220–266. 
2 Asymmetric: In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities, and 
methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses. Department of 
Defense. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (Joint Publication 1-02). (8 
November 2010 as amended through 15 August 2014), 19. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/
jp1_02.pdf. 
3 Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW): Uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and 
military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either 
unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Thomas X. 
Hannes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 2. 
4 Hybrid War: a fused mix of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular 
tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder 
(some scholars also focus on the use of new or disruptive technologies to aid one or all of these modalities). 
See: Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1, 2009 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/. 
See also:  James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 
Proceedings Magazine, November 2005 Vol. 132/11/1,233 U.S. Naval Institute 
http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf. 
5 Irregular Warfare: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. JP1-02, 134. 
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warfare.7 These terms are applicable to particular facets of the Ukrainian crisis, some 
more so than others, but none of them capture the full scope and intent of the Russian 
strategy and its implications for geo-politics. The chief problem with the liberal 
application of this terminology is that it is almost universally—with the exception of 
“psychological warfare”—focused on a very specific and tactical portion of conflict. 
These specialized terms hone in on the visible techniques, tools, or modes of military 
action, while ignoring the larger and more camouflaged manipulation of civilian 
populations and employment of nonmilitary means. Consequently, this vocabulary 
ignores the broader scope of Russian adversarial intent and thereby fails to capture the 
strategic intentions and implications of their operational art. Russia is employing a whole 
of government strategy and is making full use of its diplomatic, informational, military, 
and economic levers of power. 
While some of the previously defined terminologies are useful for describing 
aspects of the crisis in Ukraine, and more fully separating and examining those aspects in 
depth, they are insufficient to describe it holistically. The term that best captures the 
breadth, depth, scope, and intent of the Russian intervention in Ukraine is political 
warfare. This chapter defines political warfare, discusses opposition to the terminology, 
and further explores the concept. Next, we demonstrate that China, Iran, and Russia are 
currently implementing political warfare strategies throughout the world. Then, we argue 
that current Russian political warfare practice is a direct descendant of Soviet political 
warfare theories and practices that began prior to World War II, evolved throughout the 
Cold War, and have been updated for modern usage by the Russian Federation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 In 2010 the U.S. military changed its doctrinal term from Psychological operation to Military 
Information Support Operations (the definition of the operations themselves remained similar to the 
original term): Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called 
MISO. JP1-02, 167. 
7 Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. JP1-02, 263. 
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A. POLITICAL WARFARE DEFINED 
In May 1948, in the context of the early days of the Cold War, the State 
Department’s director of policy planning, George Kennan, defined political warfare as: 
The employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to 
achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. 
They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic 
measures (as ERP [Economic Recovery Plan i.e. the Marshall Plan], and 
“white” propaganda, to such covert operations as clandestine support of 
“friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even 
encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.8 
Kennan’s reference to “all of the means at a nation’s command” mirrors the 
current understanding of grand strategy. Van de Velde categorized all the means at a 
nation’s disposal into four instruments of statecraft: diplomatic, economic, military, and 
psychological.9 This concept has been adopted by the U.S. military and the psychological 
tool changed to the informational tool. Throughout this report, references to the 
instruments, levers, or tools of national power refer to diplomatic, informational, military, 
and economic means, abbreviated as DIME.10 
Kennan’s understanding of PW was not an original concept. His formative years 
as a Foreign Service Officer in Moscow, Prague, and Berlin had inculcated an intimate 
understanding of both the Nazi and Soviet methods for blurring the lines of conflict.11 In 
response, he drafted the memorandum—“The Inauguration of Organized Political 
Warfare”—containing the above definition, which proposed the establishment of a PW 
directorate within the U.S. government.12 In it, Kennan cited Clausewitz, Marx, and 
Lenin as teachers of PW and maintained that the historical success of the British Empire 
                                                 
8 State Department Policy Planning Staff, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” April 30, 
1948. Box 11A, Lot File 64 D 563, Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Administration, 
College Park, Maryland. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269. 
9 R.W. Van de Velde, “Instruments of Statecraft,” Reprinted from Army 13, no. 5, (December 1962): 1–
6. 
10 JP1-02, 161. 
11 John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 79–
98, 120–200. 
12 State Department, “Inauguration of Political Warfare.”  
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and the rise of Communism in Russia were examples of  
effective PW.13 
Kennan’s citation of Clausewitz referred specifically to the often quoted passage, 
“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means . . . . War is not merely a political 
act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying 
out of the same by other means.”14 This statement of an ancient understanding, that war 
and politics exist on a continuum and that war is the servant of politics, reverberated 
throughout the philosophy and concept of war and warfare in the modern era. This 
aphorism gave rise to the belief that if war is politics, then politics can be warfare. 
Therefore, Kennan wrote, “Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's 
doctrine in time of peace.”15 
Clausewitz’s work has enjoyed a diverse readership. For early communist 
thinkers, the writings of Clausewitz were integral to the understanding of the relationship 
between war and peace.16 Both Engels and Lenin were enthusiastic students of On War. 
Lenin even made extended notes on the treatise in a separate notebook that was published 
by the Soviet government after his death. Stalin was also familiar with the Prussian, 
believing that Clausewitz’s military doctrine was obsolete, but that his intimate 
understanding of the links between politics and war was identical to Marxist theory.17 
“Clausewitz fascinated Lenin and Stalin. Simply put, his doctrines gave them a 
theoretical justification for extending the definition of war to the international theater of 
                                                 
13 State Department, “Inauguration of Political Warfare.” 
14 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, England; New York, N.Y: 
Penguin Books, 1982), 119. 
15 State Department, “Inauguration of Political Warfare.” 
16 For a comparison of Clausewitz and Marx see: John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1993), 12–19. 
17 Byron Dexter, “Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy.” Foreign Affairs (October 1950): 1–4. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70846/byron-dexter/clausewitz-and-soviet-strategy. 
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class struggle.”18 The communist understanding of class struggle as the driver of history, 
in conjunction with their interpretation of Clausewitzian theory, led them to believe that 
warfare against other forms of government could never be over. War was continuous, but 
its intensity waxed and waned with the potential for success. 
The concept of a blurred line between war and peace is the essence of political 
warfare. War and peace are not absolute states of being, but rather, exist on a continuum. 
This idea has been explored by a diverse group of thinkers: from Mao, “Politics is war 
without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed,”19 to Colin Gray, “Peace and 
War are different phases of statecraft—distinctive, but essentially united and permanently 
connected.”20 Political warfare exists in the space between war and peace; it is political 
because it is a strategy that deliberately avoids open war, but it is warfare because it is 
implicitly violent and adversarial in nature. 
Political warfare is difficult to align with Western understandings of war and 
peace; however, the rise of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the proliferation of 
new and cheap communication technologies, have forced America to recognize its utility. 
Historians and foreign policy experts at the think tank Council for Foreign Relations 
called for a reinvigoration of American political warfare agencies to counter malign 
influence and positively shape American objectives in the Middle East.21 Events in 
Ukraine have also served as a reminder of the effectiveness of PW. David Maxwell, 
retired Special Forces Colonel and the Associate Director of the Center for Security 
Studies at Georgetown University, referred to Russian operations in Ukraine as 
                                                 
18 Stephen J. Blank, “Class War on a Global Scale: The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict,” in 
Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions, by Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. 
Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 
1993), 10. http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041016184158/http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Blanketal/ 
Blank_etal.pdf. 
19 Mao Zedong. On Protracted War. 3d rev. ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), section 64. 
20 Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy, Pbk. ed. (Washington, D.C: 
Potomac Books, 2009), 190. 
21 Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and Michael Doran, “Political Warfare: Policy Innovation 
Memorandum No. 33.” June 2013. http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/political-warfare/p30894. 
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“unconventional warfare in support of political warfare,” recognizing that the violence 
above the surface is indicative of deeper machinations.22 
The term “political warfare,” however, is not without its detractors. Senior 
Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University 
Frank Hoffman, formulates a succinct argument against it.23 He first poses the question: 
If all wars are political, in the Clausewitzian sense, then what makes political warfare 
different from other modes of warfare? Hoffman goes on to contend that the term 
“political warfare” is an oxymoron because the word “warfare” refers to the use of 
physical force, “but there is no violence or lethal force in the kinds of political activity 
that Kennan listed.”24 He later asserts that if political warfare is “short of war, then it’s 
not warfare.”25 Hoffman finally argues that in the Kennan definition of PW, the use of 
“all means” extends the meaning beyond the political or diplomatic, and that the PW 
activities listed by Kennan are not things that one only does short of war; they will 
continue into war. Therefore, the term “political warfare” is “resistant to common 
understanding.”26 Hoffman’s larger thesis, that American strategic planners eschew 
thinking about messy, but relevant, forms of warfare in favor of intellectually interesting, 
but unlikely means of conflict, is worth serious consideration. In addition, his argument 
against the term “political warfare” is a useful foil for exploring the concept in greater 
depth.27 In contrast to Hoffman, we contend that PW is short of conventional war, but 
that the word “warfare” in the construct does not confound the concept or definition of 
the term. Violence, or the threat of violence, is integral to PW, but the role it plays and 
the intent of PW is what separates it from other concepts of warfare. 
                                                 
22 David S. Maxwell, “Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight: The West Dealing with Russian Unconventional 
and Political Warfare in Former Soviet States,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2014. 
hhhttp://warontherocks.com/2014/04/taking-a-spoon-to-a-gunfight/. 
23 Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks, 
July 28, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-
threats/. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
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Political warfare is separate from other forms of warfare because it is a deliberate 
effort to achieve strategic goals using less-bloody means. Peace and war exist on a 
continuum. On one end is complete utopian peace, on the other is total nuclear 
conflagration. On this continuum, PW occupies the space in between contentious 
diplomacy and conventional war. It differs from other modes of warfare by integrating all 
levers of national power, in whichever admixture is most advantageous for the situation, 
in order to achieve strategic goals without resorting to conventional war. The actual use 
of military force is likely to be limited and in support of other elements of national 
power. Conversely, conventional war places the diplomatic, informational, and economic 
tools of national power in support of the military apparatus in order to compel or coerce 
the enemy into the desired end state. PW does not rule out—and in most cases is 
dependent upon—unconventional warfare or covert and clandestine violence. An 
effective PW strategy, however, will achieve strategic effects without either party to the 
conflict turning to conventional, overt force. The deliberate intent to ensure that all 
parties to a conflict avoid conventional war is what separates PW from other modes  
of warfare. 
Political warfare, despite the fact that one of its operating principles is to avoid 
conventional war, is still a form of war. Less violent modes of warfare abound, but are 
recognizable as warfare because of their dynamic, adversarial, and zero-sum nature. 
Scholars and practitioners of war are comfortable with the economic, electronic, 
psychological, and cyber forms of warfare—among many others—but no one expects 
carnage from their employment. Warfare is not defined by body counts, but by violence. 
Violence—as an instrument, not an organizing principle—is inherent to PW. Kennan 
explicitly referred to irregular and unconventional warfare as tools of PW, tools that are 
explicitly violent. Whether harnessing the massed power of a social movement, raising a 
surrogate military force, or targeting specific personalities, PW clearly includes violent 
means. Short of conventional war does not mean short of force. It must also be noted that 
pursuit of a PW strategy directed at one state may not preclude engagement in 
conventional war with another. In this way, the United States fought so-called “limited 
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wars” in Korea and Vietnam to contain the spread of communism, while still pursuing 
PW against the USSR. 
More broadly, the use or credible threat of violence is a necessary precondition 
for successful PW. “Political warfare may serve as a surrogate for actual war, but it does 
not work without actual force backing it up.”28 This is because “military power 
undergirds the other instruments of statecraft.”29Without the plausible threat of violence 
there is limited room for maneuver in the political space. Conversely, strategies that 
undermine the probability of the successful use of force diminish the capabilities and 
opportunities to exercise the other levers of state power. 
Activities conducted in support of PW can also be used in support of other ends 
and during wartime. However, one of the defining principles of political warfare is to 
remain short of conventional war. In case of war, the types of activities conducted in 
support of a PW campaign should continue—in support of conventional war—in order to 
shape the conflict and the peace following it. In such a case, however, the orginal 
conceptual framework of PW no longer applies. While the techniques and tactics may be 
the same, the intentions are not. Political warfare seeks to avoid war, while similar 
activities conducted during wartime seek advantage in war and should be defined by their 
intention and methodology. Political warfare is more conceptual than concrete. It is a 
means of bridging the Western intellectual gap between peace and war. Political warfare 
is a guiding vision for action, not an action in and of itself. It is not limited nor defined by 
its tools, but by its objective, which is to harness all available means to attain strategic 
objectives without war. Political warfare theorist Angelo Codevilla writes, “No lines 
demarcate the practice of political warfare from that of vigorous politics on one side, and 
from subversion, counter-subversion, and war on the other. Such names describe 
concepts by which we distinguish phenomena that, in reality, exist intermingled with one 
                                                 
28 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War: Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books  1989), 184. 
29 Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics,  ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers  2009), 4. 
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another.”30 Codevilla highlights the fact that in practice, the transition from PW to 
diplomacy or outright war is rarely clear. 
This intermingling is what often confuses our thinking when trying to grasp the 
gray area between peace and war. Political warfare is an attempt to conceptualize and 
operationalize this space, or counter those that are doing so. Rather than create 
neologisms or attempt to modify a concept that is firmly rooted in American academic 
discourse and foreign policy practice, we will use George Kennan’s definition of  
political warfare.  
Framing Russia’s current strategy as PW accomplishes three important tasks: it 
underscores Russia’s adversarial understanding of the Western world, it anchors recent 
and future events in the historical narrative, and points to historical examples of 
successful opposition to similar strategies. Russia’s leader has never really stopped 
believing that the United States is the “principal enemy.” Therefore, the increasing 
presence of the United States, NATO, or the European Union (EU), in former Soviet 
countries is perceived as a dagger aimed at the heart of Russia. Moreover, there is a 
historic fear that the Western world intends to minimize Russia and keep it from its 
rightful place in international affairs. Russia believes that the West wants to ensure that it 
never again regains its role on the world stage, which makes any dealings with the West 
not just competitive, but adversarial. 
The term “political warfare” demystifies current Russian actions by suggesting 
historical parallels and anchors strategic thinking in the stream of past academic and 
military study. There is a direct and linear progression in Russian PW doctrine from 
Lenin’s Bolshevik party to Putin’s Russian Federation. Therefore, it is impossible to view 
Russian “New Generation Warfare” as a truly new form of warfare. Instead, it is a 
modern permutation of previous PW strategies. It is the logical progression of practical 
and capable people seeking a strategy to address the growth of Western power within 
their financial, manpower, and geographic constraints. Russia cannot oppose the Western 
                                                 
30 Angelo Codevilla, “Political Warfare: Means for Achieving Political Ends,” in Strategic Influence: 
Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare, ed. Michael Waller J. (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute of World Politics Press, 2009), 212. 
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world while conforming to international norms; it must operate outside of those norms in 
order to achieve national objectives. The term “political warfare” is also a reminder that 
this is not the first time that the West has faced a Russia that was bent on reshaping the 
international order. During the Cold War, the brightest minds that could be brought to 
bear were focused on analyzing, assessing, understanding, and countering the Soviet 
Union’s PW apparatus. Maintaining the traditional term “political warfare,” while 
developing new insights informed by modern technology and society, ensures that we are 
not relearning old lessons. It provides a mature view of current events and is a reminder 
that revanchist powers have been bested in the past. 
B. POLITICAL WARFARE TODAY 
The practice and effects of PW are a key feature of today’s environment. Once the 
concept is understood and accepted, its features become ubiquitous. The construct also 
clarifies events that would appear chaotic, nonsensical, or unrelated without it. Today, the 
most prolific practitioners of PW are Russia, China, Iran, and some specific  
terrorist groups. 
1. Russia 
Political warfare describes the strategic intent that animates the full range of 
means employed by Russia in Eastern Europe, though seen most clearly in Ukraine. The 
Russians themselves are referring to their strategy as “New Generation Warfare,” in 
accordance with its conceptualization by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery 
Gerasimov.31 Gerasimov’s doctrine emphasizes the role of nonmilitary means in 
achieving strategic goals, with unconventional warfare implemented late in the conflict to 
                                                 
31 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows: 
Analysis and Assessment of Russian Crime and Security, July 6, 2014. 
http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/. 
*The original article by Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov that is translated and 
analyzed here was published in the Military-Industrial Courier, issue 8 (476) on February 27, 2013. 
It must also be noted that Gerasimov never used the term New Generation Warfare, it was applied to his 
thinking after the fact: Col. S.G. CHEKINOV (Res.), Doctor of Technical Sciences Lt. Gen. S.A. 
BOGDANOV (Ret.), Doctor of Military Sciences, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” 
Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy, no. 4 (2013): 17–23. 
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cement previously established gains. Conventional forces are used only as a strategic 
reserve to avoid reverses or to complete the consolidation of power. 
The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the 
broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other 
nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential 
of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a 
concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational 
conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of 
forces—often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is 
resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final 
success in the conflict.32 
Instead of focusing on the new portion of “New Generation Warfare,” attention is 
better directed to the generation portion of the term. The new doctrine flows directly 
from the old. It is the current expression of Russian destabilization doctrine that has roots 
in the early phases of the Bolshevik Revolution, evolved through the Soviet Union’s 
consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, modernized during the rough tutelage of both 
Afghanistan and Chechnya, and is currently continuing development in Ukraine. The old 
Soviet playbook has been updated for the digital age. “New Generation Warfare” is 
Soviet-style disruption using “active measures” and “masked warfare” with the addition 
of computers, social networks, and 24-hour news coverage. As with most forms of 
warfare, technology has increased the speed of communications and intelligence 
gathering. Cyber and electronic warfare have the potential to cripple governments and 
militaries alike. Actions and reactions are quicker and more agile, and not just for 
military formations. The Russian information and media apparatus can adapt its themes 
and content to tailor messaging to multiple targets simultaneously, based upon real-time 
awareness of events on the ground. Gerasimov’s model is also being applied to the whole 
Russian military, as opposed to just the special operations or intelligence services. 
Conventional military training does not change direction quickly. Conventional forces’ 
indoctrination and training with Gerasimov’s ideas signals that Russia intends to use this 
model to address international conflicts for the foreseeable future. Despite these updates, 
                                                 
32 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” 17–23. 
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PW still accurately describes the Russian application of its ways and means to reach its 
strategic goals. 
2. China 
Today, China is a dedicated practitioner of PW. The People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) has established a PW command within its General Political Department in order to 
shape international relations to its advantage. They accomplish this by using military and 
civilian practitioners to blend all instruments of national power to conduct PW, while 
simultaneously working to counter foreign PW.33 In conjunction with the military, 
multiple civilian agencies take part in PW with—to external observers—no clear 
centralization.34 “Chinese political warfare, or liaison work in contemporary PLA 
lexicon, has a rich tradition built upon centuries of military history.”35 Chinese 
philosophers of conflict have embraced the continuum of war and peace from antiquity 
through today. Sun Tzu wrote, “those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s armies without 
battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without 
protracted operations.”36 More recently, Mao Zedong wrote, “Politics is war without 
bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed.”37 
The most recent permutation of Chinese PW began in 1999, when two PLA 
colonels wrote a treatise called Unrestricted War. They claim that the principles of war 
have changed from “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” to 
“using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, 
and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”38 Their 
                                                 
33 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political 
Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013), 3–4, 16. 
34 Ibid., 42. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
79. 
37 Mao Zedong, On Protracted War, 3d rev. ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), section 64. 
38 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House, 1999), 7. 
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goal, in the context of the First Gulf War, was to formulate a strategy to sidestep 
American technological superiority and conventional capability. This line of development 
continued in 2003, with the concept known as the three warfares: the integration of 
psychological, media, and legal warfare to negate military advantage and achieve 
strategic objectives short of war. The concept is Kennan with a Chinese flavor. 
“Contemporary PLA liaison work is influenced by Marxist-Leninist theory, tempered by 
traditional Chinese strategic culture, and informed by careful study of foreign political 
warfare experiences since World War II.”39 Interestingly, a U.S. government sponsored 
report on the three warfares, written in 2013, predicted the American inability to 
counteract PW. “By adopting the three warfares as an offensive weapon, the Chinese 
have side-stepped the coda of American military science. Our institutional apparatus and 
intellectual traditions are focused on a different phenomenon when we speak of, or think 
of, war.”40 
3. Iran 
Since 1979, Iran has used the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods 
Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Lebanese Hezbollah to export the 
Iranian Revolution and shape the geopolitical environment through methods short of war. 
The “Iran Action Network,” is the human infrastructure “involved in crafting and 
implementing the covert elements of Iran’s foreign policy agenda, from terrorism, 
political, economic and social subversion; to illicit finance, weapons and narcotics 
trafficking; and nuclear procurement and proliferation.”41 The effects of this network on 
American policy can be felt throughout the Middle East, Africa, and within the United 
States itself.42 Unfortunately, we do not have access to any Iranian documents detailing 
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the theory, doctrine, or planning behind their political warfare methodology; however, 
their actions speak for themselves. Through the exercise of an extensive PW effort, they 
are able to have foreign policy effects far beyond what would be expected of another 
country of similar size and Gross Demostic Product (GDP). Iran is able to punch above 
its weight class because of firm integration of all elements of national power to meet 
foreign policy objectives while avoiding war. 
4. Terrorist/ Non-State Actors (NSAs) 
Terrorist organizations and non-state actors cannot conduct PW because, by 
definition, they do not possess the instruments of statecraft. Non-state actors, even global 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, do not typically have more than a robust 
informational/propaganda wing and some irregular or terroristic military capability. 
Despite the powerful propaganda that terrorism relies on, “Each beheading, each 
bombing, and each beating sends a powerful message or, rather, is a powerful 
message,”43 most terrorist organizations do not have the vital economic and diplomatic 
capabilities of a state. There are, however, a few intriguing exceptions. “Violent non-state 
groups offering social welfare services undermine the state by attacking the social 
contract.”44 This gives these organizations the opportunity to form pseudo or shadow 
governments within the borders of a recognized state. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are 
examples of organizations that complicate the social contract by providing social services 
and subsuming the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence.45 Clearly, both Hamas and 
Hezbollah engage in limited diplomatic and economic functions that go far beyond the 
capabilities of standard terrorist groups and border on PW. An area for further research is 
the relationship between the assumption of state functions and the development of the 
traditional elements of statecraft in non-state actors. This however, does not mean that 
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states cannot conduct PW against non-state actors. Such strategies would likely be 
directed at those states most likely to provide such entities with support. 
This section has made the case for Kennan’s definition of political warfare as an 
authoritative and useful construct and has explored the dimensions of the concept. It has 
applied the definition of political warfare to the foreign policy of Russia, China, and Iran, 
and argued that they are currently pursuing political warfare strategies. The following 
case study introduces the initial application of Russian political warfare, in the context of 
the early Cold War. 
C. CASE STUDY: THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF EASTERN EUROPE 
Thanks to ideology, the twentieth century was fated to experience 
evildoing on a scale calculated in the millions. This cannot be denied, nor 
passed over, nor suppressed. 
-Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn46 
The overarching theme of this entire body of work is the development of Russian 
PW doctrine into what it is today. It is uncontroversial to suggest that contemporary 
infantry or armor doctrines evolved from earlier forms; PW progressed in the same way. 
The earliest model can be broken down into four phases: infrastructure development, 
destabilization, conflict, and consolidation. The key differences between early Russian 
PW doctrine and later models was a protracted infrastructure development phase, because 
none had previously existed, and the use of the societal upheaval following World War II 
in place of a “demoralization” phase. This case study will provide a brief, historical 
background discussing the rationales supporting the primacy of PW within Soviet 
strategy and the development and implementation of the PW doctrine that Moscow used 
to establish the Eastern Bloc. 
The earliest form of a doctrinal template for Soviet PW became evident in Eastern 
Europe immediately following World War II. It is important to note that this was not a 
written doctrine; there was no manual. The methods employed to install Soviet satellite 
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regimes throughout Eastern Europe, however, share a remarkable similarity from one 
country to another. This, in conjunction with the extreme level of governmental control 
exercised by Stalin and a high degree of coordination between Moscow and the 
respective communist parties of Eastern Europe, indicates that a de facto doctrine was 
implemented. The Soviets actively spread and supported communist organizations 
throughout the world. Then “Sovietization or Bolshevization,” of communist parties—by 
expelling or discrediting individuals that disagreed with Moscow on any policy—created 
cadre parties that were capable of implementing effective PW.47 World War II disrupted 
European society and cast the Red Army in the role of liberator from fascism and a 
societal stabilizing factor. Communist ideology and Soviet national interests demanded 
that states under the administrative control of the USSR become communist. The Soviets 
“had the advantages of geographical proximity, experience in running a police state, and 
the disorientation that the war had left behind.”48 
1. Historical Background 
In 1848, Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels penned the Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, a work that is a paragon of propaganda, hinting at a seething mass of communism 
inherent in the working classes and inciting that mass to rise up in violent revolution.49 
Paul A. Smith, who literally wrote the book on political warfare, points out that the 
Manifesto claimed to represent a group that did not yet exist, thus creating the 
Communist Party instead of the other way around.50 As the political philosophy of Marx 
and Engels languished, the turmoil of World War I disrupted the old orders of Europe and 
provided strategic space for new ones to rise up. 
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The violent revolution demanded by communism’s founding document was 
executed in Russia following the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, and its success was 
partially rooted in PW. World War I was ongoing and, in the face of German invasion, 
the Bolsheviks struggled for power internally against less radical socialists, while also 
conducting a civil war against fellow Russian “White” and “Green” factions. In the midst 
of this conflict, “The Bolsheviks did not acknowledge national boundaries and in the 
usage of the time ‘civil war; referred first, and foremost; to the political and social 
struggle between the Bolshevik regime and its own citizenry.”51 After the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk ended Russia’s involvement in World War I on March 3, 1918, British and 
American forces moved troops into Russia to prevent war materiel going to the Germans 
and to support Russian factions willing to carry on the war. At that point, all of the 
territory controlled by the Bolsheviks was under siege by external forces.52 However, the 
Russian civil war was not solely about the control of terrain, but was “primarily a 
political conflict, a struggle for power and not a conventional war.”53 These dual features, 
Russia besieged and an unending struggle for political power, would shape the worldview 
and international relations of the Soviet Union. According to internationally recognized 
expert on the USSR, Stephen Blank: 
The legendary tactical flexibility of the Soviet regime derives from their 
conceptualization of conflict as being waged on all fronts or across the 
board—whence the internal structure of the protagonists becomes the 
center of gravity. The Bolshevik vision of politics as another form of 
warfare endowed its practitioners with the maximum feasible number of 
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instruments with which to wage their struggle even in the face of superior 
enemy military power.54 
The Bolshevik movement was forced to use every means at their disposal in their rise to 
and consolidation of control. Because of military necessity—due to conventional 
weakness—and their grasp of the peace/war continuum, the Bolsheviks were soon 
practitioners of whole-of-state PW. 
2. Infrastructure Development 
Infrastructure development was by far the longest phase of the early Soviet PW 
model, beginning after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and transitioning after 
World War II. The spread of a revolutionary ideology and the development of a reliable 
and effective human network takes time and effort. Once this initial network had been 
developed, however, infrastructure development and maintenance ceased to be a separate 
phase of PW doctrine and became an ongoing and ever-present process in the background 
of all state functions. Initial Soviet infrastructure development depended heavily upon the 
diplomatic and informational levers of power to legitimize the nascent Soviet state, to 
propagate its ideology, and to protect its interests. 
Early communists were convinced that the destruction of capitalism was a 
scientific inevitability and the inexorable direction of mankind. Therefore, the Bolsheviks 
began attempts to export their revolution before they had finished consolidating power 
within Russia. In 1919, the Soviets created the Communist International, or Comintern, to 
advocate, support, and direct world communism. This organization was born in blood and 
revolution, based upon internal propaganda and external political warfare, and 
determined to use every weapon at its disposal to destroy capitalism. “The Communist 
International was established to spread the revolution globally through subversion and the 
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foreign internalization of adversarial communist politics, in other words, to conduct 
worldwide political warfare.”55 
In response to this threat, communist parties were outlawed in most Eastern 
European countries following the Russian Revolution. This strengthened the movement, 
“Illegality encouraged the communists to develop the conspiratorial principle of rigid 
organization, centralized hierarchy, and military discipline and cell structures.”56 
Moscow encouraged the exportation of communism and the Russian importation of 
foreign communists for training in Moscow under the auspices of the Comintern, which 
gave Soviet leaders the opportunity to develop, train, and assess those who had the talent 
and proclivities for advancement within the party. The eventual communist political 
leaders of Eastern Europe were hard-core party members who trained in Moscow prior to 
and during the Second World War. This form of PW developed a cadre of revolutionary 
leaders and organizations for future recruitment and expansion among the populations of 
target countries. It became a form of externally directed political insurgency. During 
World War II, partisan organizations and governments in exile coalesced in anti-Nazi 
resistance. The Communists cadres were a small, but vocal and active minority within 
them. This prepared the parties to take advantage of the societal and governmental 
upheaval during and after the war.57 
In addition to foreign communist party advancement, the Soviets emphasized the 
development of fellow-travelers and agents of influence in order to control or manipulate 
foreign narratives about communism. As Stalin gained power, he was ruthless in his 
desire to maintain dominance within Russia. Forced collectivization of agriculture led to 
approximately 5.6 million Soviet deaths in 1932-1933, about half of which were ethnic 
Ukrainians.58 Following the mass famine, the Great Terror of 1937-1938 “killed twice as 
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many Soviet citizens as there were Jews living in Germany.”59 The crucial role of Soviet 
PW in this era was to convince the Western world to ignore genocide in the mistaken 
belief that the Soviet Union was becoming more modern and westernized. Media control 
and perception management, using witting or unwitting European and American agents 
of influence acting as apologists for the Soviet regime, were vital to this strategy.60 
Masterful management of the informational lever of national power enabled the Soviet 
Union to gain and maintain normalized diplomatic relations with potentially adversarial 
countries throughout the world. 
3. Destabilization 
Destabilization was implemented by communist elements that infiltrated the 
governments, security forces, and societies of target countries in order to confound non-
communists’ goals and install their own regimes. The horrors and demoralization of the 
Second World War provided the communists with the opportunity they needed to gain 
control of key levers of power across the DIME spectrum. This phase placed heavy 
emphasis on mass recruitment and population mobilization to subvert and control 
elements of the state across all four levers of power. 
Advancement of the communist cause within national governments was achieved 
through anti-Nazi and exile-government service during World War II. The disciplined 
cadre parties developed during phase one were vital to the success of this effort, in 
particular by gaining control of key governmental ministries and assets. In the aftermath 
of the war, the positive public perception of the Red Army, combined with aggressive 
recruiting and economic and social incentives, led many people to join the communist 
party. The East European communist parties borrowed a page from Nazi recruitment by 
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sponsoring organizations of every conceivable type and target audience to increase party 
membership or affiliation. In many places, they also used the promise of land reforms or 
distribution of confiscated lands to win converts from the peasant classes. These methods 
resulted in an explosion of popular affiliation. 
In four years, from 1944 to 1948, the Romanian Communist Party grew from 
1,000 to one million members. In Czechoslovakia, the increase was from 40,000 to 2.67 
million, in Hungary from 2,000 to 884,000.61 These astonishing rates of growth supplied 
a mass base that could be mobilized to support the communist party, protest 
governmental actions that ran counter to communist designs, or provide a threat of 
imminent violence and unrest. Immediately following the war, as governments were 
being established, communist leadership ensured that they received governmental 
positions that controlled security forces and internal communications, typically ministries 
of the Interior and Information.62 Development of “national committees”—groups 
purportedly representative of local government, but controlled by the communists—
added credibility to communist claims of popular support. “At the national, regional, and 
local levels, communist dominated national committees were acting as organs of 
government.”63 Communist elements also “colonized” organizations and institutions 
through legitimate membership or coercion.64 They then sought ways to discredit their 
political rivals through what the Hungarian communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi, termed 
“salami slicing,” i.e., removing the outer edge of the opposition by accusing them of 
some unprovable crime. In a parallel to current Russian tactics, accusations of “fascism” 
were a common technique. They also sought to destroy their opponents on the left 
through internal division. The result was that, “Having split them time and time again, the 
Communists would swallow what was left of these parties whole.”65 
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4. Crisis 
Initiation of the crisis phase began when irreversible momentum towards 
communism had developed, or when it seemed that communist parties were in danger of 
losing ground in legitimate elections. Communists would then foment, or, in some cases, 
exacerbate a crisis by using social movements to incite protests, work stoppages, and 
vigilantism. This would give the communist-controlled security forces and the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Soviet secret police, the opportunity to 
“restore order” by removing opponents through intimidation, violence, or arrest. Many 
potential resistors fled their countries; the intractable often met with “accidents,” or were 
outright killed.66 The communist party would then hold a single-list or rigged election to 
provide a veneer of “democracy” to their takeover. 
5. Consolidation 
In the consolidation phase, tensions would be reduced, while power was secured. 
Then the communists would accelerate their political agenda, while at the same time 
removing any remaining threats to the state. Once the full extent of the communist 
program was revealed–radical land reform, introduction of heavy industry, and the 
institution of a police state–it was too late for the revitalization of opposition political 
parties. The final step in the consolidation of power was the cleansing of the party itself. 
“In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s the whole of Europe descended into a terrifying 
purge, where everyone and anyone could find themselves under suspicion.”67 This final 
cleansing of the communist parties minimized deviation from Moscow, centralizing 
power under Stalin. 
6. Conclusion 
The communist takeover of Eastern Europe is a case of the successful 
implementation of a long-term PW strategy. The USSR patiently developed human 
infrastructure to spread their ideology. When the opportunity presented itself, the Soviets 
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integrated all elements of national power, using overt and covert means, to achieve their 
objectives. While it would be impossible to ignore the fact that the proximity of the Red 
Army was a factor in the speed of the takeover, it merely aided the process through the 
implicit threat of ready force. In some cases, the withdrawal of the Red Army actually 
aided the communist cause by “proving” that the USSR was noninterventionist.68 The 
eight countries that were the target of successful Soviet political warfare—Romania, 
Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany—
were diverse in language, culture, political tradition and thought, religion, and ethnicity.69 
Yet, effective PW turned them all into totalitarian Soviet satellites. The following case 
study will explore the implementation of early Russian PW doctrine in Czechoslovakia. 
D. CASE STUDY: THE COMMUNIST TAKE OVER OF 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1921-1948 
We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to twist your 
neck. You know that the Russian Bolsheviks are masters of this. 
-Klement Gottwald, speech in Czechoslovakian Parliament, December 1929 
This section will present the case of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia as 
a study of Soviet PW doctrine in practice. Czechoslovakia was chosen because it is 
demonstrative of the effectiveness of PW at subverting a representative democracy; it is 
also the scene of later doctrinal developments of Soviet PW. Events will be analyzed in 
accordance with the early Soviet PW model of infrastructure development, 
destabilization, crisis, and consolidation. 
1. Infrastructure Development: 1921–1946 
The infrastructure development phase was by far the longest phase of early Soviet 
PW—in Czechoslovakia and throughout Europe—spanning the period between the world 
wars, the duration of World War II, and the immediate post-World War II re-creation of 
Europe. This is logical, as communism was exporting its ideology and creating believers 
                                                 
68 1945 Czechoslovakia is a prime example. See: Staar, The Communist Regimes, 64. 
69 Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 
2012), xxiv. 
 30
whole-cloth. During infrastructure development, the communists relied almost entirely on 
the diplomatic and informational levers of power to spread communist ideology, while 
simultaneously discrediting individuals that were non-adherents to the Bolshevik party 
line. The Comintern became a kind of militant foreign service, spreading Soviet ideas and 
ideology throughout the world. The seeds of success were sown by years of patient labor, 
building the necessary human infrastructure and networks to support Moscow’s decisions 
when crisis or opportunity presented itself. 
a. Interwar 
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa 
or KSČ) was inaugurated in May 1921, after two years of effort from the Communist 
International to ensure the establishment of a fledgling party in the democratic state.70 
The democratic traditions of Czechoslovakia, however, did not produce communists of 
sufficient ardor and tractability to suit Moscow. The Comintern thus set out to 
“Bolshevize” the nascent KSČ. “Throughout this process of Bolshevization the 
intervention of the Comintern was repeated and decisive, every major turn of policy and 
shift of leadership being accomplished with the aid of that body, and in one case through 
the personal guidance of Stalin.”71 In February 1929, Klement Gottwald, selected and 
aided by the Comintern, rose to power. This change of leadership divided the party, with 
more than half of the members following the old leadership to form a new organization 
outside the auspices of the Comintern and Moscow.72 However, this division resulted in a 
party that was younger, less influenced by social democracy, and attracted to the 
revolutionary extremes of the Russian Bolsheviks; in short, members that were prepared 
to toe the Soviet party line.73 “During the decade following 1929 a nucleus of Bolshevik 
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cadres was fashioned, capable of assuming the heavy responsibilities of wartime struggle 
and postwar government.”74 
In 1934, the KSČ opposed the reelection of the sitting president, Tomas Masaryk, 
using the slogan “Not Masaryk but Lenin.”75 This slogan led to an arrest warrant for 
Gottwald on charges of high treason. He escaped to the USSR—giving him the 
opportunity to further bolster his reputation as a true communist believer—in August 
1934 and remained there until February 1936, when he was allowed to return to 
Czechoslovakia. At the seventh Comintern Congress in the summer of 1935, the 
Comintern finally endorsed a “popular front” strategy to oppose fascism. This was 
completed working under the threat of Stalin’s purges and despite earlier Moscow 
directions to tolerate the Nazis. The popular front strategy led to the KSČ’s support for 
Edward Benes’ election as president, support that was to serve communist goals during 
the postwar reconstruction of the country. It also provided yet another opportunity to 
identify those individuals who did not adhere to the party line. Benes was to be supported 
as an antifascist, but also to be regarded as an enemy of the revolution. By 1939, 
Gottwald had established control of the KSČ and developed it into a disciplined and 
Moscow-orthodox communist machine; an organization that was both reflective of the 
policies and desires of the Soviet Union and the Communist International, while at the 
same time prepared to take political control of postwar Czechoslovakia.76 The KSČ was a 
force in being, waiting for an opportunity. 
b. World War II 
Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, 
President Benes fled to London to establish a government in exile and Gottwald went 
back to the bosom of communism in Moscow. Other key communist leaders, who seem 
to have been following a prearranged evacuation plan designed to ensure continued 
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influence in any exile governments, fled to Moscow, Paris, and London. The KSČ 
immediately began working to ensure their place in the postwar government. The Czech 
communists were quick to pledge their loyalty to Benes and provide assurances of 
collaboration, while at the same time planning to remove him from power after the war. 
President Benes was not entirely taken in by communist practicality, but he believed that 
the allies, including Russia, would be victorious and would support Czechoslovakian 
independence, his only goal.77 
In early November 1943, Benes travelled to Moscow to meet with Stalin and the 
Czech communists in residence concerning the future government of his country. He left 
believing, with some reservations, that democracy would return to Czechoslovakia after 
the war.78 President Benes and the majority of democratic politicians believed—along 
with many in the West—that the crucible of war would have a “purifying effect on the 
Communist regime, which would grow tamer, more liberal, and more tolerant—at least 
of democratic socialist practices. It would in no way endanger the humanist values 
cherished in Czechoslovakia.”79 This mistaken belief in the predominance of democracy 
would influence all Czech governmental interactions up to the brink of the communist 
overthrow. On October 18, 1944, the Red Army crossed the border into Czechoslovakia 
and with them they brought the Soviet secret police, the NKVD. Local communists 
quickly began to organize “National Committees” at the village or town level. These 
committees were supported with funding and supplies by the Red Army’s political 
commissars and the NKVD; noncommunist groups were left to their own devices. Where 
sufficient local communists could not be found, the commissars provided them.80 The 
elections for the National Committees were hasty affairs, generally consisting of local 
residents and show-of-hands style voting. The Communists did much better in these 
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elections than later support for the party would have indicated.81 82 Thus, the victorious 
liberation of the Red Army enabled the advancement of the communist cause at the local 
level of government throughout Czechoslovakia. 
It was vital to the popular perception of communist power for the London 
government to make the pilgrimage to Moscow and integrate with the KSČ prior to 
returning to Prague. The communists worked very hard to ensure that this happened for 
popular prestige and to aid favorable negotiation.83 On March 17, 1945, Benes and the 
political delegations from the London government in exile arrived in Moscow to reunite 
with their representative. They began negotiations concerning the composition of the 
future Czechoslovakian government that appeared to be equitable; however, KSČ 
planning and preparation ensured that communist party members, or their fellow 
travelers, dominated the government, especially the all-important Ministries of the 
Interior and National Defense. Thus, the KSČ was able to favorably influence the 
reintroduction of democracy to Czechoslovakia with the intention of using it to gain 
control of the country or subvert it. 
2. Destabilization: 1946–December 1947 
In the destabilization phase, the KSČ made use of economic and informational 
factors to increase party membership and its importance in a democratic environment. Its 
ability to attract membership is truly astounding and is another testament to the 
effectiveness of communist infrastructure development prior to the war. The disciplined 
and committed cadre party multiplied itself many times over. The real goal was not to 
increase the size of the party for its own sake, but to gain the ability to mobilize masses 
of people at a moment’s notice. Whether it was getting out the vote, protesting or 
                                                 
81 Zinner, Communist Strategy, 146–147. 
82 “The Secretary General of the Party, R. Slansky, giving an account before the first session of the 
Cominform in September 1947 about party activities, reported that all three chairmen of the Provinces 
National Committees were communists, that out of 163 district National Committees 128 (80 percent) and 
out of 11,512 local Committees 6,350 (57 percent) were chaired by communists. Almost 140,000 party 
members worked in various National Committees and their commissions.” Korbel, The Communist 
Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 147. 
 
 34
demonstrating, staging general strikes, or incitement to violence, the KSČ could 
manufacture crowds at will. The communists infiltrated trade unions, multiple 
governmental ministries, the military, and the police in order to leverage elements of 
national power. The KSČ used economic factors in the form of land and jobs to 
incentivize party leadership. They employed informational factors, control of newspaper, 
broadcasting, and word of mouth to influence the actions of both party members and the 
general populace. This gave the KSČ the opportunity to destabilize democratic 
institutions by controlling a minority of the population. 
Postwar Czechoslovakia was a country with ravaged institutional systems and 
internal ethnic conflicts. It looked to the Soviet Union and the Red Army as agents of 
liberation and stability. This had an immediate and positive effect on the popularity of 
both the Soviet Union and the KSČ. The Soviet Union also had a prepared plan to assist 
and develop Czechoslovakia; the West did not.84 In addition to control of the influential 
ministries, the communists set about establishing their presence in every organization and 
institution within Czech society. Mass recruitment resulted in unprecedented 
organizational growth. Between 1944 and 1948 the Czech Communist Party grew from 
40,000 to 2.67 million members.85 This unprecedented growth was accomplished through 
organizational infiltrations carried out by the Gottwald-developed cadre party. 
During the war, the KSČ conducted a major campaign in the trade unions. After 
the war, white collar workers, government workers, and students were invited to enter the 
communist-dominated organizations. The Central Council of the Trade Unions (URO) 
became “the most powerful instrument of communist policy, in the name of an 
organization which was supposed to be non-partisan and in which many members were 
non-communists, indeed even anti-communists.”86 An additional key feature of trade 
union domination was the establishment of armed factory militias, ostensibly to guard 
key infrastructure in the turbulent months immediately following the war. By communist 
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design, however, these paramilitary formations were never disarmed and remained under 
staunch communist control until they were put into action at the behest of the KSČ. 
“In Czechoslovakia, as in all other countries in Eastern Europe, land reform and 
nationalization served as economic levers that the Communists exploited to further their 
own political ends.”87 Through control of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Czech 
Communist Party accelerated the redistributions of land that had been agreed upon during 
the Moscow conference. Throughout this redistribution they ensured that loyal 
communists were at the front of the line for receiving redistributed land. Land 
redistribution was also controlled by the communist-controlled Interior Ministry, which 
was entrusted with the postwar tasks of national purification from fascist influence and 
the resettlement of citizens in lands that had been owned by Germans.88 The ability to 
distribute land or denounce collaborators and “fascists” presented the Czech Communist 
Party with a unique opportunity to gain friends and undermine potential enemies. In the 
short-term, land distribution was a tangible economic benefit that the KSČ used to further 
its membership goals and gain control of the population. 
Control of the national security forces was the key feature of the Ministry of the 
Interior. The KSČ neutralized the reconstituted Czechoslovakian military by ensuring 
that men who had served in the Red Army or sat out the war achieved positions of 
importance within the hierarchy. Soldiers who had fought with the British or French 
militaries, or were known proponents of democracy, were relegated to dead-end 
positions; however, the Czechoslovakian armed forces, especially the officer corps, were 
extremely conservative. This made them an uncertain prospect from a communist 
perspective. The police force would be their preferred tool of violence. 
Vaclev Nosek, the Minister of the Interior, recognized that rapid communization 
of the police force would be overly transparent and would result in a backlash against the 
party. Instead, he created several internal organizations that received special emphasis, 
duties, and training. Namely, he organized a mostly communist group of mobile and 
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heavily armed police to patrol volatile border regions with the excuse of combatting any 
fascist remnants that might still exist. In addition to these police, he established a secret 
police force—the StB (Státní bezpečnost), which was modelled on the NKVD—and the 
land security division, the Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa (ZOB). The ZOB was 
eventually abolished by the democratic parties within the government, but its personnel 
and equipment were absorbed into the Ministry of the Interior, thus it remained a force in 
being, if not a sanctioned organization. These new organizations provided the KSČ with a 
paramilitary force that had the added authority of wearing the uniforms of those 
dedicated to the preservation of law and order. At the same time, average police officers 
were mostly left to continue with business as usual in order to preserve appearances. 
The KSČ used complete control of mass media to manage and advance its agenda. 
At the same time, the communists were very careful to project the image of a 
democratically oriented, Czech-nationalist, coalition government. They carefully and 
artfully worked to increase their power and popularity within Czechoslovakia through 
control of both the press and the radio, under the communist Minister of Information, 
Vaclav Kopecky. No publications could appear without Ministry approval and none 
could be owned by private individuals, only political parties or public institutions. 
Conservative newspapers were suppressed with the explanation that they had supported 
fascism. The communists also limited disfavored periodicals or newspapers through 
economic controls of paper and ink. Communist-controlled trade unions could also 
refuse—on order—to deliver these precious commodities to opposition voices.89 
The KSČ also endeavored to pack government ministries with adherents or fellow 
travelers. Once the number of governmental workers had ballooned to an unsustainable 
level, they suggested the economic reduction of workers—of course ensuring that the 
majority of the jobs reduced belonged to non-communists. Thus, “The governmental 
offices became hot-beds of infiltration, subversion, and denunciation.”90 In the 1946 
                                                 
89 Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 142–145. 
90 Ibid., 148. 
 37
election, the KSČ mobilized the widespread social movements it had developed and won 
38% of the vote; Gottwald became Prime Minister. 
None of this is to imply that the communists had control of every political or mass 
organization in Czechoslovakia. In contrast, the KSČ remained a minority party, which is 
what made full-scale PW necessary. The communists would have been just as happy with 
a peaceful democratic take over. However, outside of the trade unions and ministries, the 
KSČ had difficulty gaining adherents in local farmer’s associations, influential athletic 
clubs, youth groups, and especially, university students. As the KSČ infiltrated society, 
geopolitical events nudged the situation towards a breaking point. Two events accelerated 
the impending conflict—the Stalin ordered rejection of the Marshall Plan and Soviet 
condemnation of the KSČ. 
On 9 July 1947, Gottwald was summoned to Moscow and informed by Stalin that 
Czechoslovakian participation in the Marshall Plan would be viewed as an act of 
aggression against the USSR. Once Gottwald relayed this news to the capital, while 
President Benes was incapacitated with a brain hemorrhage, the Czech government 
agreed to withdraw from their original acceptance of the Marshall Plan. This incident 
revealed to the population the true depth to which the KSČ was responsive to Stalin’s 
will. This revelation sparked a backlash within the population. A poor economy and the 
KSČ’s increasingly evident radicalization also began to take their toll on communist 
popularity. The communists realized that they did not have the same level of support as 
1946; there was a crisis coming. 
In September 1947, the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform, was 
founded in the face of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. At the inaugural 
meeting, the Czechoslovakian delegates were severely criticized by the Soviets. The 
world was becoming bipolar and the KSČ was failing to move Czechoslovakia into the 
Soviet sphere. In the face of this dangerous reprimand, the KSČ redoubled their efforts.91 
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3. Crisis: January-February 1948 
Conflict initiation was not begun until the party leadership was ready to stage-
manage the outcome. The KSČ had the ability to temporarily control or neutralize all of 
the democratic bulwarks of Czechoslovakian society. Once people were in the streets and 
violence was visible, true democracy was too slow to react. The Red Army was on 
standby should intervention have become necessary; however, as with any successful PW 
campaign, the use of overt violence is only useful if PW fails. The military was a 
supporting effort to the control of the economic, informational, and diplomatic levers  
of power. 
At the end of January 1948, the KSČ used a program of economic factors as a 
provocation for action. The Ministries of Internal Commerce, Finance, and Agriculture 
all proposed nationalization measures that were far more extreme than what the coalition 
government was prepared to accept. These measures were targeted to separate leftist 
political parties from the rest of the government. “Their tactic was successful; the Social 
Democrat Party—reliably left-wing and populated with communists fellow travelers—
voted on these questions with communists and the opposing democratic parties were 
attacked in the communist press as champions of the capitalists and reactionaries.”92 This 
political move helped to mobilize the communist-dominated trade unions in an effort to 
continue the separation of the Social Democrats from the rest of the government. The 
other political parties had one card left to play in an effort to keep the Social Democrats 
voting with them—protesting the increasing communization of the police force. 
On 13 February 1948—Friday the thirteenth—the democratic Minister of Justice 
presented a report to the Ministerial Council that detailed the continuing communization 
of the police force, culminating with the fact that Minister Nosek had recently replaced 
eight democratic police commanders with communists.93 The non-communist members 
of the council demanded that the communists cease this subversion and voted that the 
senior police officers should be reinstated. Despite the vote, Gottwald and Nosek refused 
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and triggered the mobilization of their social movement networks as a demonstration of 
power. On 21 February, 12 of the non-communist cabinet members submitted their 
resignations, believing that President Benes would not accept them and that the 
communists would be publically embarrassed. With the common knowledge that the 
KSČ was polling poorly, they hoped to force an early election and ensure a communist 
electoral defeat. This would have been a shrewd political move against opponents 
operating under democratic principles; however, the communists used it as a pretext to 
spark the conflict they had been seeking. 
While the separate parties of the National Front government were paralyzed by 
debate, the KSČ unleashed their social networks into massive procommunist 
demonstrations, with the implied threat that if there was violent unrest then the Red Army 
would intervene to “restore order.” The Soviet ambassador, Valerian Zorin, travelled to 
Prague, presumably to serve as a go-between and observer for Stalin. His presence 
reinforced Soviet support for the KSČ and the potential of Red Army intervention. On  
22 February, Gottwald declared a state of emergency and recalled the communist-
dominated frontier police that had been created by Nosek. Communist “action 
committees,” armed by the worker’s militia members in conjunction with the police, took 
over Prague. This access to weapons and people willing to use them further emphasized 
the importance of communist control of the Interior Ministry. Army personnel were 
ordered to stay within their barracks and did not interfere. Communist demonstrations 
were mounted throughout the city and an anticommunist student demonstration was 
broken up with gunfire from police and militia members.94 Communist “People’s 
Militias” took over noncompliant government ministries and prevented the entrance of 
non-communist government workers and the ministers themselves. To shut down 
uncontrolled information, printers refused to run any non-communist press, mills refused 
to produce their paper, and workers refused to load it or unload it. 95 Non-communist 
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members of the Ministry of Information were not allowed in the building and radio 
airtime was refused to non-communist officials.96 
Gottwald then gave a speech promising a general strike unless President Benes 
agreed to form a new, communist-dominated government. In a nicely staged piece of 
political theater, Valerian Zorin offered the use of the Red Army—then poised on the 
country’s borders—to “restore order.” “The process of infiltration which had started in 
June 1941, after the Soviet Union had entered the war—process which the democrats’ 
own good will and loyal cooperation had facilitated—now, in February 1948, paid rich 
dividends. It could not be stopped by any weapons which democrats knew how to use.”97 
4. Consolidation: February 1948–March 1953 
Consolidation of power in the final stage can be viewed in hindsight as an 
inevitable process; however, Gottwald and the KSČ realized how fragile the situation 
was. They attempted, at every turn, to retain the trappings of democracy: political parties, 
elections, and democratic titles; all carefully controlled by decisions in Moscow. 
Economic incentives and informational influence, backed by the threat of violence, 
provided the communists time and space to remove, coopt, or subdue those who 
presented threats to their rule. This process continued throughout the era of communist 
control in Czechoslovakia. 
The communist consolidation of power began with the seating of a KSČ 
government in February 1948 and did not end until March 1953, with the deaths of both 
Stalin and Gottwald. In the face of internal and external threats, on 25 February 1948, 
President Benes allowed the formation of a majority KSČ government, with Gottwald as 
the Prime Minister. The only important ministry held by a noncommunist was the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs held by Jan Masaryk; two weeks later he was dead. To this 
day, there is still debate about whether he jumped out of his apartment’s bathroom 
window or was thrown out by communist agents. On 9 May, a new constitution was 
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adopted and on 30 May, “elections” were held. These were a single-list affair—with only 
one party, the communist-dominated National Front represented—and they predictably 
received 89.3% of the vote. After the completion of the takeover, opposition to the KSČ 
began to melt away. This was partly due to the leadership of other political parties fleeing 
the country. President Benes, psychologically and physically ruined by years of political 
abuse, resigned on 7 June and was succeeded by Klement Gottwald. He died in 
September 1948 and his archives were seized by the communists a few hours later.98 
While the KSČ continued to dispose of potential enemies and consolidate power, the 
death of Benes signaled the end of the last remaining democracy in Eastern Europe. The 
KSČ continued to institute Moscow’s policies and there were several rounds of purges 
until the death of Stalin on 6 March 1953 and the death of Gottwald immediately 
thereafter, on 14 March. Strikes soon began across Czechoslovakia, many directly related 
to protests against the death of Jan Masaryk, sowing the seeds of future resistance against 
the communists and setting the stage for new rounds of PW.99 
5. Conclusion 
While the majority of historical analyses focus on the personalities and events in 
Czechoslovakia during 1947 and 1948, it is vital to remember that the action was the 
denouement of a decades-long effort to spread Soviet influence and the players were 
surrogate forces of Moscow, developed as tools of Soviet foreign policy. The communist 
takeover of Czechoslovakia is often referred to as a coup d’état or putsch, terms that 
connote a violent change of the heads of government with no real change to the 
governmental system or operation. The terms do not apply here. The proxy forces of the 
Soviet Union, the Bolshevized KSČ, subverted a democratically elected government and 
rapidly established a communist satellite. It was a nearly bloodless—at first—and 
externally supported communist revolution. It demonstrates the power of PW 
concentrated against a democracy. Moscow, through the KSČ, employed all the levers of 
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national power across the DIME spectrum in order to meet its foreign policy objectives, 
which included, among many others, the communization of Czechoslovakia. 
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III. THE COLD WAR – PART I: SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE 
1947-1991 
Political warfare was a fundamental mechanism for achieving long-term Soviet 
objectives during the Cold War. Unlike U.S. grand strategy that remained rooted in 
containment policy, but vacillated in intensity with each administration, the Soviet 
strategy was anchored in a relatively consistent ideological frame and resource 
commitment for the duration of the Cold War period. Security dominated all other aims. 
Internally and along her immediate periphery, the Soviet Union used ideological, 
structural, and cultural subjugation to maintain the security gains achieved in Eastern 
Europe following the Second World War. In Western Europe, the USSR pursued an 
aggressive policy of gaining security dominance over the continent through the expulsion 
of American influence and the establishment of a new geopolitical defense and economic 
structure. Soviet political warfare outside of Europe was based on the formation of an 
international consensus block that would support Soviet policy and facilitate the 
ascendance of a Soviet-dominated security structure on the European continent. In all 
three cases—the immediate, intermediate, and global spheres—the Soviet model for 
conducting PW to achieve its aims was similar. The Soviet Union, relying on a 
combination of its security and military intelligence services and “soft power” diplomatic 
and economic levers, refined a complex political warfare model over the course of the 
Cold War. This model, made public by the Soviet defector Yuri Bezmenov in the mid 
1980s, factored in short-, intermediate-, and long-term (generational) effects and used 
relatively unrestrained subversion to alter the global geopolitical balance. 
This chapter will describe the principal objectives and strategies of the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, provide a general analysis of Soviet active measures as 
essential methods to achieve these objectives, and discuss the phased application of these 
methods through the Bezmenov model. The last section of the chapter analyzes, and 
provides examples of, the various elements of PW used by the Soviet Union across 
DIME. This method allows us to see the effectiveness of political warfare in each 
individual element and understand the complexity involved in synchronizing overt and 
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covert measures, as well as identify strengths and vulnerabilities of various PW 
programs. The chapter concludes with a case study that demonstrates the effectiveness of 
PW in achieving national objectives when sufficient synchronization takes place. Though 
the USSR disintegrated in 1991, the Soviet model and its methods have survived, and are 
an integral component of the current political warfare doctrine for the Russian Federation 
in the twenty-first century. 
A. OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND METHODS: ZERSTZUNG AND 
ACTIVE MEASURES 
The overarching objectives of the Soviet Union were the consolidation of security 
gains in Eastern Europe following World War II and the expansion of that security 
blanket as far away from the Russian border as possible. All other strategic goals were 
directed towards this end. These interim objectives included gaining influence in Western 
European affairs, the establishment of a Soviet-dominated security structure on the 
European continent, gaining support for Soviet policies within international 
organizations, and the global spread of communist and socialist ideology. Soviet policy 
was often misrepresented during the Cold War as deriving directly from one of these 
ancillary objectives. Each one of these was independently an important pillar in the 
overall strategy, but given the staggering toll that the “Great Patriotic War” took on the 
Soviet Union, the penchant was to ensure security above all other aims. 
The United States was the main strategic threat. The USSR overtly pursued a 
gradual strategy of minimizing U.S. military, political, and cultural presence in Western 
Europe by influencing the defense policies and internal politics of these nations and 
hindering progress towards Western European unity. The ultimate goal was the vital 
interests of stability and security within the Soviet sphere. The promotion of Western 
Europe’s transition to socialism was a declared objective throughout the Cold War, but 
was subordinate to the stability and security paradigm.100 The USSR’s historic ties to 
Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, superpower status, and ideological 
frame also helped cement the idea that the “Soviet Union has the right to greater 
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influence in all European affairs than she [presently had].”101 This notion helped justify 
their strategic initiatives in Western Europe. Soviet strategists believed that breaking U.S. 
influence in the West would lead to a global shift in economic parity towards the Soviet 
Union by undermining the “unequal” monetary, trade, and commercial order championed 
by the United States since the end of the Second World War.102 This would allow the 
USSR to aggressively promote its system of “pan-Europeanism” and “collective 
security,”103 and set the stage for the inevitable “revolutionary transition from capitalism 
. . . to socialism and communism.”104 Only these conditions would guarantee peace  
in Europe. 
The relative impasse on the European Continent in the post-early Cold War period 
that followed Stalin’s death in 1953 shifted the contest for global influence between the 
United States and Soviet Union to the Third World. Despite Premiere Khrushchev’s 
pronouncement in 1961 that “the ‘sacred’ anti-imperialist struggle of colonies and newly 
independent states,” would advance the Soviet Union’s “own progress to Communism 
and ‘bring imperialism to its knees’,”105 the principles behind the conflict were far more 
pragmatic. The concept of an existential battle between communism and capitalism, with 
the eventual global triumph of a Marxist-Leninist revolution, certainly existed among 
some within Soviet decision-making circles. This was especially true within the Soviet 
security services, where the conceptual shift to aggressive action in the Third World 
originated; but, the more realist policy approaches from the politburo and Soviet foreign 
ministry tended to balance out the ideologues. There was agreement on near- and mid-
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term policy prescription in the Third World, which aimed to create an environment of 
international consensus at the United Nations (U.N.) and other international bodies that 
would counterbalance the United States and favor the Soviet Union through either 
neutrality or socialist unanimity.106 In theory, this international consensus would directly 
support Soviet policy in Europe and elsewhere along the Soviet periphery. Once again, 
security dominance over the European continent and along Russia’s immediate borders 
was the overriding aim for actions in the Third World. 
The primary mechanisms for achieving these objectives, in Europe and elsewhere, 
were bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to gain influence, economic 
interdependence measures, support for communist and socialist parties, active military 
intimidation, and advantageous arms control agreements that asserted Soviet 
conventional dominance.107 Given the extremely narrow geopolitical gap between the 
superpowers throughout the Cold War, however, these overt policies were inadequate on 
their own to achieve Soviet aims and required the critical support mechanism of “active 
measures.”108 When understood in the perspective of a global struggle for influence 
against the “principal enemy,” all this activity falls under the PW umbrella. 
Where the USSR could not gain decisive bilateral or bloc influence through 
diplomatic, economic, and military leverage alone, they adopted the idea of “Zerstzung” 
as an important pillar of long-term strategy. Zerstzung was the splitting of the social and 
political structure of a state by targeting the tension control mechanisms in a society, be 
they democratic consensus or authoritarian governance.109 This approach was initially 
adopted by the Soviets in the early postwar years and proved successful in Poland in 
1946 and again during the bloodless takeover of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1948, 
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using existing tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks to tear the governing social and 
political systems apart and facilitate Soviet intervention. Similar tactics during France’s 
coal and railroad strikes in 1947 and 1948, orchestrated through the French Communist 
Party, were less successful.110 
The lack of Soviet-influenced state control mechanisms in the West; namely 
Soviet-dominated security services, a monopoly on print and radio, and the pervasive 
threat of the Red Army, necessitated a slightly different approach. The strategy in 
Western Europe, following a similar pattern to early Cold War Eastern Europe, aimed at 
creating international and subnational disequilibrium leading to a fracturing of the idea of 
collective security and a popular expulsion of American influence. Due to the lack of 
Soviet systems of influence, however, the time frame to fully execute this strategy had to 
be extended. Accordingly, the Soviet Union adopted a generational approach to gently 
steer the population and politics of Europe in a desired direction. 
The Soviet Politburo’s covert postwar campaign to weaken Western Europe and 
drive out U.S. influence was primarily tasked to the newly formed MGB (Ministerstvo 
Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti), which, in 1954, was renamed the KGB (Komitet 
Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti). Operations ranged from basic intelligence collection and 
analysis to subversion, media manipulation, propaganda, forgeries, political repression, 
political assassinations, agents of influence, the establishment of opposition parties and 
criminal organizations, antiwar movements111 and front organizations, and proxy 
paramilitary operations.112 The term “activnyye meropriatia,” or “active measures” was 
adopted in the 1960s to describe these activities and remained in use through the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. These programs gradually grew in complexity, incorporating Soviet 
military intelligence, the Foreign Ministry, and Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
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(CPSU) agencies like the International Department (ID) and the International Information 
Department (IID).113 
Active measures were a key component of PW in each principal element of 
national power and were aimed at influencing the policies of Western governments, 
undermining their social and leadership structure, straining bilateral and multilateral 
relationships between nations, preventing the successful posturing and modernization of 
U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), and price manipulation in Western 
markets.114 Specific goals and methods varied by country and region; however, the 
principal objectives remained consistent. These included frustrating opposition 
strategies—mainly those of the United States, her Western Allies, and China—
engineering a diplomatic split between target countries by contriving negative public and 
diplomatic perception of the opponent, and “enhancing the Soviet positions in diplomatic 
and economic relations.”115 The central objective of Soviet active measures, however, 
was targeted at the “principal enemy” and aimed to “discredit, isolate, and separate the 
U.S. from its allies.”116 
Soviet PW was not simply limited to engaging adversarial and neutral states, but 
included keeping the Eastern Bloc firmly in the Soviet sphere. In Eastern Europe, Stalin’s 
death provided an opportunity for nationalists, halfheartedly supported by Western 
clandestine services, to reject Soviet sociopolitical doctrine and break away from 
Moscow’s grip. These attempts were met with brutal internal suppression and large-scale 
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Soviet military interventions. Aggressive Soviet repression of the East German Revolt in 
1953117 and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,118 the subjugation of Polish opposition in 
the 1950s and 60s, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968119 served as the stepping 
stones for the adaptation of the Brezhnev Doctrine; utilizing all means necessary to 
stabilize the Soviet sphere from both internal disintegration and external influence.120 PW 
served as the vanguard of Soviet policy in all these instances. 
When viewed from a macro perspective, the centralized and ideologically 
grounded substructure of Soviet decision making throughout the Cold War period created 
an ideal environment for the conduct of PW. Soviet mid- and long-term objectives 
remained relatively consistent for the duration of the Cold War. Strategy and methods 
were kept highly compartmentalized and were not subjected to the same external 
influences as in Western democratic countries. The result was an effective 
synchronization of ends, ways, and means that negated the inherent structural and 
ideological flaws in the Soviet economic and social systems relative to the West. This not 
only occurred between the organs of the Soviet state and the elements of national power, 
but temporally; leading to a long-term, phased approach to conflict management that still 
permeates the contemporary Russian system. 
B. THE SOVIET SUBVERSION MODEL OF CONFLICT 
Ideological, structural, and cultural subversion, all pillars of Leninist ideology, 
were the foundation of Soviet PW doctrine during the Cold War. Former deputy Chief of 
the Soviet Research and Counter-Propaganda Group, Yuri Bezmenov, following his 
defection from the USSR in the 1970s, identified the four phases of Soviet subversion: 
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demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization.121 This model was based on a 
key principal in the conduct of PW, that of using all elements of national power below a 
calculated “provocation threshold” to achieve long-term national aims. 
“Demoralization” was the systematic breakdown of ideological, structural, and 
cultural consensus within a society, and active measures were the primary method to 
achieve this breakdown. This phase encompassed a substantial time period of 15 to 20 
years and served as a foundation to conduct subsequent phases. Bezmenov describes the 
lengthy time period as a necessity to develop a new generation that would be unwittingly 
more susceptible to Soviet influence. Tactics encompassed the full range of measures 
along the peace-war continuum, below actual “hot” war, and targeted the domestic and 
international policies of adversarial states, destabilizing social consensus for the purposes 
of either disunity or external control, manufacturing strain in bilateral or multilateral 
relations between nation states, and attempting to tilt the global economy in favor of the 
Soviet Union.122 
Ideological manipulation was conducted by politicizing and utilizing religion, 
manipulating education and media to create a “uniformed myopia,” and creating cultural 
phenomena, such as role models, to generate mass movements of public sentiment 
towards a desired direction. Structural subversion was based upon manipulating 
legislative and security systems, social relations, aggravating the security apparatus to 
create a sense of “defenselessness” in a population, manipulating internal politics to sow 
disunity and antagonism, and, finally, the gradual isolation of the target nation 
internationally. The last area of subversion within this phase was cultural, and involved 
the steady dissolution of societal loyalty to the state, the inflaming of racial and ethnic 
divisions, alienating segments of the population from one another, such as rural versus 
urban centers, and creating a sense of victimization through the use of existing 
organizations, such as labor unions.123 
                                                 




Demoralization occurred, to a varying degree, in virtually every corner of the 
globe and spanned the entire Soviet time period. This phase took a persistent generational 
approach, attempting to slowly change the global social and political landscape, and was 
not specifically targeted at a particular crisis or potential crisis point. Bezmenov details 
the structures of choice for the demoralization phase, including black and white 
propaganda outlets, “agents of influence” within government and society, and 
“international forums” orchestrated to cover and legitimize Soviet operations. These 
actors executed a diverse set of measures, including the organization and provocation of 
social unrest and mass demonstrations, misinformation and rumor campaigns, widespread 
use of forgeries of official documents and press releases, and the planting of spurious 
news stories in Western media. Further active measures included the establishment of 
countless front organizations and media outlets, subsidized by the USSR, not only for the 
purposes of information warfare, but in order to develop semilegitimate financing 
channels to “subversives and radicals.” This soft campaign would be coupled with more 
aggressive tactics such as sabotage, character assassination, terrorism, and the occasional 
targeted killing; all designed to achieve long-term psychological effects on the targeted 
society. The idea was that if you stretch out subversive action over an extended period of 
time, your opponent would be “unable to perceive the process of subversion as a 
[consistent] and willful effort.”124 
Destabilization aimed to exacerbate the perceived power struggles within society. 
This was done by engineering an overreaction of social control mechanisms by the 
government and security forces, creating substantial negative economic effects on the 
population, fracturing the societal and governmental fiber and producing grass roots 
opposition social movements, and further isolating the target nation in the international 
system.125 This was the necessary buildup to generate a crisis. 
The crisis phase was the generation of the perception of national emergency. This 
involved the full complement of PW measures, to include limited military actions. The 
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generated crisis necessitated a prefabricated “solution” to the emergency and created 
conditions for the eventual reduction of tensions and an increased level of influence or 
control by the Soviet Union on the target state.126 Due to the nuclear and conventional 
force balance between the superpowers during the Cold War, controlling the pace and 
level of escalation by threatening overwhelming retaliation, a concept know as escalation 
dominance,127 allowed for a generous amount of flexibility in initiating peripheral 
conflicts, especially within traditional spheres of influence where an overt military 
intervention was unlikely to generate a military response. 
Normalization, a term coined following the Russian invasion and subjugation of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, referred to the establishment of a post-conflict settlement, 
reduction of tensions, “peacekeeping operations,” and international stability. Bezmenov 
describes this period as a time of stability and “a pause in expansion,” causing a 
reevaluation of strategic aims by the opponent, namely the United States.128 This phase 
further presented an opportunity to selectively and permanently remove undesirable 
individuals from the political landscape. The Soviet crushing of the Czechoslovakian 
Prague Spring in 1968 is one of the many examples of the full model being 
systematically implemented and serves as a case study at the conclusion of this chapter. 
There are a number of key lessons from the Bezmenov model for our broader 
analysis of PW. Bezmenov provides us with a framework to view seemingly disjointed 
and isolated events as a systematic and well-organized PW campaign, coordinated across 
a variety of disciplines and carefully sequenced to achieve a desired effect. The long-term 
aspect of the model, in addition to being a strategic multigenerational approach to 
national policy, has a built-in deception feature designed to disguise various aspects of 
the ends, ways, and means in Soviet strategy. Finally, this model was designed to factor 
in a variety of Western response measures to Soviet action, thus being able to operate 
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below any effective countermove in the initial phases due to the covert nature of  
its actions. 
The following section examines Soviet PW within the individual elements of 
national power. The Bezmenov model can be used to maintain the perspective that while 
an individual element may have been dominant in a particular case, it was the 
synchronized framework over time and across all of DIME that characterized Soviet 
strategy. It is precisely this model that we will see reemerge in the post-Soviet Russian 
Federation under Vladimir Putin, and be driven to the crisis point during the 2008 
Georgian war and the 2014 Ukrainian conflict. 
C. SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL WARFARE 
All political warfare is diplomatic in nature in that it aims to affect the foreign or 
domestic policies of its target. The distinction of Soviet diplomatic PW in the is that it 
attacks the existing political structure through direct manipulation. This is done by 
infiltration of the target’s political system, and covert and overt support for elements of 
that system such as political parties, with money, resources, and intelligence. Other 
activities include bribes or coercion of officials, and international diplomatic pressure 
constructed through the careful arrangement of allies, multinational blocs, or  
extra-governmental organizations. 
The use of the “Comintern,” the Communist International, in the prewar years and 
the “Cominform,” the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, in the 
early Cold War period, are classic examples of Soviet diplomatic PW. The Cominform 
was founded in 1947 and was a successor organization to the prewar Soviet Comintern. 
The bureau was designed to coordinate the activities of national communist parties under 
Soviet leadership. Since most of the senior leaders in these national communist parties 
were former Comintern members and spent the prewar years in the Soviet Union, they 
became a natural mechanism to establish Soviet control over Eastern Europe. The 
Cominform, not particularly influential as a coordination mechanism, nevertheless 
effectively dissolved any veneer of East European pluralism by ending, through 
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absorption, the vestiges of social democracy.129 This was Stalin’s tool to press his policy 
across the fledgling communist parties in the Eastern Bloc, as well as conduct PW 
initiatives in Italy, France, and the rest of Western Europe. 
Almost immediately following the Soviet liberation of Eastern Europe, the Soviet 
Union began to establish control through the development of Soviet-supervised secret 
police elements, controlling print and radio, dominating youth groups and civic 
organizations, and often conducting intimidation, massive deportation of whole societal 
segments to the gulags, and ethnic cleansing. Initial democratic elections were permitted 
as the perceived control of media and internal security services would, in theory, bring 
communist elements into power through the natural acquisition of class consciousness 
among the working class majority. It did not. The communists lost across Eastern Europe, 
causing party leaders to suspend democratic elections in Poland in 1946, install a 
communist government in Romania in 1947, oust the Bulgarian Prime minister, and stage 
a communist coup in Czechoslovakia in early 1948.130 Across Eastern Europe, the 
formula was the same. The first steps involved the engineering of procommunist social 
movements through organized demonstrations, the disbanding or disruption of any 
opposition movements, and the establishment of control over the government. This was 
all supported by the communist-dominated security apparatus and under the threat of Red 
Army intervention. Once power was taken, systematic purges of any remnants of 
opposition soon followed and, finally, a democratic façade was established a by holding a 
single-list election. Communist control over Eastern Europe was firmly established by 
1949, and precipitated a second round of Stalinist purges, this time aimed at communist 
elements deemed to be a threat to Soviet domination. The result was the total supremacy 
of Moscow’s power across the Eastern Bloc.131 
Outside the Eastern Bloc, the KGB relied heavily on agenty vliyania, or “agents 
of influence” such as journalists, government officials, academics, labor leaders, and 
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prominent citizens to support Kremlin policies. These were used in an interactive systems 
framework, kombinatsia, combined with overt propaganda campaigns and clandestine 
direct operations, to achieve strategic objectives. The term “agents of influence” was, in 
essence, an assortment of relationships fostered or generated by the Soviet intelligence 
apparatus. There were three primary categories. Actual MGB/KGB or Soviet Main 
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) operatives and their recruited agents formed the 
foundation of the program. “Fellow travelers” were individuals who were ideologically 
sympathetic to perceived Soviet objectives and conducted both directed and desultory 
activates in support of these aims. The third category were unwitting agents, ranging 
from social contacts passing information or executing an operational act without 
awareness of the hidden hand behind the activity, to “useful idiots” that en masse helped 
unsuspectingly drive the Soviet agenda.132 
Agents of influence spanned the full spectrum of society: from government, 
media, academics, the security services, military and law enforcement, the banking 
sector, and criminal enterprises. The “illegals” program, a massive network of deep cover 
Soviet agents living abroad under Western identities, was a key control mechanism. The 
illegals, operating under both the KGB’s Directorate S and the GRU, were perhaps the 
most active element in identifying and priming these individuals for further recruitment 
or operational control, coordinating efforts through the “center” with Directorate K and 
the KGB residencies.133 What places this activity predominantly in the diplomatic 
element of national power is that these agents, despite their clear ability to collect 
intelligence and facilitate propaganda, primarily focused on influencing the domestic or 
international political landscape through direct access to government officials, or indirect 
access through the body politic, using business, labor, and various other forums. 
Soviet support for nonruling communist and socialist opposition parties was 
another key pillar of Soviet long-term strategy. Many of the communist parties, despite 
their populist appeal, survived entirely on Soviet subsidies during the Cold War. This was 
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especially true in the Third World, where resistance movements and communist parties in 
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East endured almost entirely on 
funds, arms, propaganda support and military training provided by the USSR; but, due to 
the overt nature of the relationship with the CPSU, these communist parties proved less 
effective in promoting Soviet interests. Soviet ties and support to nationalist-socialist 
movements proved far more fruitful.134 The ID of the CPSU supplanted the Cominform 
in the 1950s and was the principal coordinating element to both nonruling communist and 
socialist parties. Over the next three decades, the ID became the prominent arm of the 
Politburo in dealing with radical movements across Europe and in the Third World, 
including controlling all monetary and material flow from the USSR and running the 
various global front organizations.135 Hundreds of these fronts, including four United 
Nations certified organizations—the World Peace Council (WPC), World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the 
International Union of Students (IUS)—added depth in the system, with the ID using 
their professed neutrality and independence to push coordinated Soviet agendas and 
reactions on various national and international stages.136 
Unfortunately for Soviet strategists, early successes in the diplomatic PW gave 
way to relative stagnation later in the Cold War, as the global communist model began to 
lose its appeal due to its inability to generate promised social and economic reforms. This 
precipitated a nuanced shift in Soviet PW away from the diplomatic and towards the 
other national power elements. The ID likely served a secondary function to both 
complement and restrain actions by the KGB and GRU. This multiorganizational 
approach illustrates the depth within the Soviet system, but also exposes the competitive 
and sometimes disjointed operational decision-making scheme between the political 
leadership, the military, and the security services. The underlying factor that maintained 
efficiency in the system was a common sociopolitical vision that permeated the various 
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structures of power through generational indoctrination and careful recruitment and 
selection criteria. This calls attention to a critical weakness in the Soviet, and now the 
Russian, PW model. The “deep state” may have been effective at coordinating complex 
strategic efforts, but compartmentalization and a lack of ideological diversity made the 
various organizations especially prone to certain cognitive biases, especially mirror 
imaging Western intentions and groupthink within the decision-making bodies. Major 
strategic errors, such as the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979, can be partially 
attributed to this structural flaw. 
D. SOVIET INFORMATION POLITICAL WARFARE 
Following the conclusion of hostilities in 1945 Europe, the Soviet Union rapidly 
established robust mechanisms to control the information environment. This structure 
included a “full array of ‘non-political’ fronts, organized from above and below, 
‘spontaneous’ mass appeal and resolutions, subsidized media, and manipulated 
politicians serving hidden agendas.”137 The newly formed Cominform promulgated 
policy set by the Secretariat of the CPSU across the European continent. In Eastern 
Europe, this was accomplished through “official media, educational, and cultural 
establishments,”138 and backed by the clandestine efforts of the Soviet security services 
and the occupation forces of the Red Army. In Western Europe, the Communist and 
Socialist parties, as well as Front organizations, backed by covert actions, served as the 
principal medium. The basic policy that would dominate the Soviet narrative for the 
duration of the Cold War was set in the first meeting of the Cominform in 1947, 
declaring that: 
The imperialist and anti-democratic camp having as its basic aim the 
establishment of the world domination of American imperialism and the 
smashing of democracy, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp 
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having as its basic aim the undermining of imperialism, the consolidation 
of democracy, and the eradication of the remnants of fascism.139 
Propaganda was the heart and circulatory system of Soviet active measures and 
was perhaps the best coordinated structure within the Soviet PW machine. The politburo 
and the central committee of the CPSU approved all major themes of the propaganda 
campaign. The IID of the CPSU, established by Brezhnev in the late 70s as a successor to 
the Soviet Information Bureau, was responsible for all overt media campaigns, and 
coordinated propaganda efforts with the generally “gray” activities of the International 
Department and the covert and “black” activities by the KGB’s Service A. The IID, as 
the overt arm of the tightly woven Soviet information infrastructure, included two major 
newspapers (Pravda and Izvestiya), Radio Moscow, and numerous official information 
departments based out of Soviet embassies. The Telegraph Agency of the  
Soviet Union (TASS) news service, with branches in nearly 100 countries, and the 
“competing” Novosti News service that connected with hundreds of national and 
international news agencies, in addition to countless radio and television stations, 
publishing houses, and over 7,000 newspapers and magazines, in essence comprised a 
global mass media empire.140 The system was designed to provide operational 
synchronization between covert and overt active measures and get ahead in the 
information reaction cycle with both engineered and chance events. The ID’s front 
organizations and KGB agents of influence and forgery operations further amplified the 
propaganda effect by propagating and supporting the overall narrative.141 
The efficiency of this global disinformation network was evident early in the Cold 
War. In 1952, at the height of the Korean War, the World Peace Council released a report 
accusing the United States of using germ warfare in Korea. This report, originating with 
Kuo Mo-Jo, the head of the Chinese branch of the WPC, claimed that U.S. military 
aircraft were actively disseminating microbes of plague, cholera, typhus, and other 
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contagions across North Korean territory. The story, accompanied with pictures of 
supposed germ warfare and supported by an investigative delegation of doctors that was 
organized by the various Soviet front organizations, was quickly propagated through 
various WPC branches across the globe. Further “investigations” from the International 
Association of Democratic Lawyers, another Soviet front, supported the germ warfare 
conclusions and the story rapidly spread through recruited “agents of influence” into 
Western media, including the Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Christian Science 
Monitor, as well as the Daily Express in London. Declassified Soviet documents in the 
1990s reveal that the Soviet MGB fabricated the germ warfare scenario, going as far as to 
prepare “false areas of exposure” by bringing in corpses from China and germinating 
those corpses with cholera.142 
“Black” radio operations, generally located within the Soviet Bloc, but presenting 
themselves as transmitting from within the target country, aided in the broad 
disinformation campaign, and were active from the borders of Western Europe to as far 
away as Turkey, Iran, and China.143 Though attempts at misinformation inside the United 
States proved to have very limited overall effects, the combined efforts of the Soviet 
propaganda architecture had substantive impact in entrenching opinions in Europe and 
the Third World. The anti-Vietnam movements in the 60s and 70s,144 and campaigns in 
the 70s and 80s against enhanced-radiation warheads and U.S. nuclear modernization 
were relatively successful in affecting global perception and causing social and political 
friction within the Western-aligned bloc.145 Among the more successful propaganda 
mechanisms were the Cuban-led and KGB-sponsored publications of Philip Agee, a 
former Center Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer in Latin America, who wrote 
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Inside the Company; CIA Diary in 1975, exposing hundreds of CIA operatives and 
claiming that “millions of people all over the world had been killed or had their lives 
destroyed by the CIA and the institutions it supports.”146 The widespread global 
propagation of the memoir by the Soviet information instrument caused substantial 
effects, including a majority sponsored bill in the British House of Commons calling for 
the expulsion of the CIA station, and a flood of media efforts across Europe to expose 
CIA stations and operations worldwide. In 1978, Agee began publishing the Covert 
Action Information Bulletin as well as another book titled Dirty Work: The CIA in 
Western Europe, both supported and supplied with a steady stream of information by a 
specialized task force (codename RUPOR) within Service A of the KGB’s Directorate K. 
The combined efforts of Agee and RUPOR ended up exposing nearly 2,000 CIA 
operatives across Europe and Latin America.147 Further propaganda efforts in the 1980s, 
aimed primarily at the European and Third World audiences, were the supposed artificial 
synthesis and dispersal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) created in 
U.S. military laboratories at Fort Detrick, and allegations of Americans butchering Third 
World children in order to harvest their organs for transplants in the U.S.148 
Forgeries were another critical component of the active measures campaign. One 
of the more sophisticated and influential falsified documents was Supplement B to U.S. 
Army Field Manual 30-21, titled Stability Operations Intelligence – Special Fields. This 
document, first appearing in 1975 and carrying a “SECRET NOFORN” label, contained 
operational parameters to create a “strategy of tension” within foreign societies and their 
governance systems. The document advocated false flag operations blamed on leftist 
extremists to discredit communist and socialist movements, and press the target nation’s 
security services into harsh civilian control measures. This theme continued to echo in 
further falsified U.S. documents, to include a remarkably prophetic “leaked” 1978 
National Security Council (NSC) memorandum from Zbigniew Brezinski to Carter. This 
document proposed a destabilization policy in Poland along socio-economic, diplomatic, 
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and covert lines of effort, including the use of Polish labor unions and mass media, 
designed to weaken Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Forgery activities in the 
Third World were just as pervasive, and included everything from leaked plans to supply 
South Africa with combat aircraft, to documentation implicating U.S. Ambassador 
Thomas W.M. Smith in Ghana of ordering the assassination of Nigerian politicians and 
attempting to stage a CIA led coup, prompting Ghanaian officials to publically charge the 
United States with interfering in its internal affairs.149 The use of forgeries continued 
well into the 1980s, and included a 1987 forged document from William Casey, then the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to stage a coup d’état of India’s Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi, instructions by President Reagan to destabilize Panama in 1988, and 
efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa in 1989.150 
Disinformatzia and active measures in Soviet information PW were highly 
successful in supporting existing anti-Western and specifically anti-U.S. sentiment across 
the globe and helping drive the generational disequilibrium of Bezmenov’s 
demoralization phase. The relative success of this approach was clearly rooted in the 
massive investment of time and resources that the Soviet Union placed in information 
PW. The United States, however, did not fully commit to this dimension of PW until the 
late Carter and early Reagan administrations, essentially allowing the USSR to hold a 
monopoly in the information domain for three decades. The fatal flaw in the Soviet 
system was its reliance on fabrication. Once the United States engaged in a concerted 
effort to expose Soviet deception measures and substantially increased its own 
involvement in the information arena without relying on misinformation, the Soviet 
propaganda system was unable to keep up. 
E. SOVIET MILITARY POLITICAL WARFARE 
There are three components of Soviet military PW that need to be explored. These 
are the role of the GRU as a mirror organization to the KGB, the use of strategic 
signaling through military means, and the actual application of military force in conflict 
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management, which falls underneath the PW umbrella. Together, they give a clear picture 
of the utility of the military arm in the conduct of political warfare. 
Soviet military intelligence also played a critical role in the PW mechanism. From 
the onset, and in line with Leninist philosophy, Soviet military intelligence was organized 
by a duplication principle, in order to both create redundancy and develop an internal 
rivalry designed to prevent one organization from consolidating power and one day 
challenging the political leadership. In the early days of the USSR, the Cheka was 
counterbalanced by the Registered Directorate of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, 
an organization that would later develop into the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the 
General Staff of the Soviet Army, also known as “Unit 44388,” or the GRU.151 For the 
better part of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union functioned under a “triumvirate,” 
with the Party, the Internal Security Service, and the Army functioning as the three pillars 
of the Soviet system.152 In the years following the Second World War, Stalin attempted 
to weaken the Army and the Ministry of State Security by removing the “intelligence 
organs” from these organizations and consolidating the intelligence apparatus under a 
centrally controlled Committee of Organization (KI) that was subordinate to the party. 
The turmoil following Stalin’s death in 1953 resulted in another restructuring of Soviet 
intelligence and the reestablishment of the triumvirate, with the GRU under the General 
Staff and the creation of the KGB.153 
The GRU developed a nearly identical structure to the KGB, with its officers 
operating out of Russian embassies as diplomats, military attachés, and trade 
representatives; tasked primarily with recruitment and intelligence gathering, and also 
subversion, sabotage, and targeted killing operations.154 The GRU, in parallel with the 
KGB, developed a robust “illegals” program. Just like the KGB illegals, these GRU 
officers were tasked with infiltrating all facets of Western society, from business, 
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industrial, and financial sectors to political parties, the military, and government 
institutions. They would serve as critical agents of influence in pushing the overall Soviet 
agenda.155 Two key GRU capabilities absent from the KGB were a broad “space 
intelligence” program and the control of Spetsnaz units—the GRU’s shock troops 
designed to conduct “espionage, terrorism, and large-scale partisan operations.”156 
Though the practical methods between the GRU and KGB were nearly identical, the 
essential function of the two organizations differed markedly. The KGB was guided by a 
principle of preventing a collapse of the Soviet Union from within, while the GRU 
focused on an externally generated collapse in the form of general warfare (the military 
front), or the political, technological, and economic fronts.157 
The majority of Soviet military-centric PW occurred in the Third World, but the 
GRU became progressively more involved in the conduct of military “active measures” 
on the European continent as the political and social climate began to turn away from 
Communism. The evidence for both KGB and Soviet military involvement in the rise of 
European left-wing terrorism in the 1970s, points to an unmistakable tie with the decline 
of communist political appeal.158 As one PW element began to lose its functionality, the 
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Soviet Union adjusted to another. By 1975, the KGB center in Vienna was deeply 
involved in strengthening “terrorist formations in Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and 
France.”159 The GRU set up training centers in Czechoslovakia and across the Eastern 
Bloc, facilitated the transfer and dispersal of large arms and explosives caches across 
Western Europe, and heavily utilized Cuban armed forces and intelligence services in 
training camps on the North African Coast to Syria and Lebanon, as well as the 
Palestinian Rejection Front in southern Yemen.160 Direct Soviet involvement was largely 
minimized not only due to the advantage of political distance in the event of compromise, 
but also for the “revolutionary credentials” of Cuba and Palestine and their romanticized 
revolutionary appeal, which far exceeded that of a Soviet authoritarian hegemony.161 
The conduct of Soviet PW using the military arm was not limited to covert GRU 
operations, but extended to everything from military assistance programs to the use of 
naval and air assets in attempts to effect political change in target nations. The 
exponential rise of Soviet submarine incursions in Swedish waters during the 1980s, to 
include penetrations of Swedish harbors and naval bases, is an excellent example.162 
On the surface, the geopolitical effects of the increased naval activity may have 
been negative for the Soviet Union; undermining Soviet-Swedish relations, causing an 
increased emphasis on Swedish defense spending, contributing to a shifting pro-Western 
outlook among the population, and most critically undermining Soviet efforts to assert its 
image as a peaceful superpower intent on ensuring stability and security on the European 
continent.163 These intrusions were generally dismissed as motivated by military versus 
political calculus, designed around generating intelligence on the susceptibility of 
Swedish naval and air defenses, with the overall objective of crippling Sweden’s ability 
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to effectively oppose Soviet use of their airspace in a military campaign against 
Norway.164 
Sweden’s official neutrality was, in reality, a façade for its domestic audience. 
Sweden was very much aligned with NATO through both official and unofficial 
agreements, authorized transit lanes for U.S. nuclear submarines, participation of 
Swedish officers in NATO exercises, covert membership in NATO stay-behind networks 
in the event of a Soviet invasion, and even the development of contingency plans to 
establish a government-in-exile in the United States.165 The Kremlin, being well aware of 
Sweden’s unofficial status, used the submarine incursions as a strategic communication 
tool, signaling its intent to treat Sweden as a hostile NATO power in the event of the 
Cold War turning “hot.” This was a prime example of James Cable’s purposeful, 
catalytic, and expressive “gunboat diplomacy,” designed to assert Soviet military 
dominance and willful imposition of force against a NATO “ally” without breaching the 
NATO provocation threshold.166 Because the long-term Soviet aim was to shift the 
security structure of Europe in favor of the USSR, visible intimidation without 
reciprocation was a viable tool to gradually degrade trust in the NATO security blanket. 
Sweden’s initial aggressive response to Soviet submarine incursions in the early 80s was 
met with only increased Soviet provocations and eventually led Sweden to reevaluate the 
political risks of confrontation and adopt a more passive policy after 1985. Sweden 
limited public disclosure of Soviet incursions and continuously downplayed the Soviet 
threat, likely out of fear that repeated pronouncements of an anti-Soviet policy would 
threaten the domestic picture of Swedish neutrality and place it officially in the NATO 
camp.167 
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The final element of the Soviet military as a political tool blurs the line between 
political and conventional war. Despite varying in intensity, duration, and commitment of 
conventional forces, all Soviet military interventions during the Cold War were proxy 
actions, in the sense that they aimed to alter the geopolitical balance relative to the United 
States, Western Europe, and China, without a direct military confrontation. In these 
instances, the military aspect of the four elements of national power briefly took the 
dominant role in the PW program. Military intervention was incorporated as a 
contingency in the crisis resolution phase of Bezmenov’s state subversion model and 
served the Soviet Union well on several occasions. The idea of conditions being set for 
military involvement through the varied forms of PW is foundational for any military 
conflict. What made Soviet actions stand out was the successful application of 
conventional and proxy military force, while remaining below a calculated response 
threshold of the West. Soviet military operations to crush the East German revolt in 1953, 
the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 generated 
little more than condemnation from the West. Likewise, advisory missions in Korea and 
Vietnam, limited military actions during the Israeli “War of Attrition,” the Ethiopian-
Somali War from 1977 to 1978, Mozambique, Angola, and other countries were 
calculated against an assumed Western reaction.168 The one great miscalculation was 
Afghanistan. The Western reaction was far more intense then the Soviet Union could 
absorb, and over the course of a decade the USSR would pay dearly in blood, treasure, 
political will, and domestic consensus. Afghanistan factored into Soviet inaction to the 
Polish Solidarity movement in the early 1980s, and contributed to the gradual 
socioeconomic unraveling of the USSR. 
Two critical aspects of Soviet military PW stand out. First, the versatility of 
having a parallel GRU structure to that of the KGB greatly increased the ability of the 
Soviet Union to conduct military-based PW; including paramilitary action, training of 
proxy elements, influence operations, and direct subversion. While U.S. covert action 
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became progressively more restricted by congressional oversight by the 1970s, the KGB 
and GRU enjoyed relative freedom and autonomy in pursuing similar activities. The 
Soviet parallel structure created an internal mechanism to prevent policy overreach by 
diffusing authority and creating competition between the two organizations. This 
structure had the additional effect of establishing an internal monitoring program among 
the three pillars of Soviet power. 
A second notable feature of Soviet military PW was the calculus involved in 
military activity deliberately designed to achieve effects and, at the same time, remain 
below an assessed provocation threshold. This was accomplished through two methods: 
strategic communication used to demonstrate will through military force and the actual 
application of force to gain strategic objectives. The Soviet leadership, true to their 
Leninist origin, believed “will” was the deciding factor in the global contest. Victory 
rested in the eventual deterioration of your opponent’s resolve, achieved through the 
gradual and often times seemingly insignificant imposition of one’s will. The use of the 
Soviet military for strategic signaling, as was the case with the sub example, was used to 
project strength and resolve for a particular political effect, while factoring in the 
potential reactions of various players. The application of actual military force for 
strategic ends followed the same threshold principal. Soviet military engagements in the 
Third World attempted to tilt the global balance of power, while keeping the principal 
enemy on the sidelines as an idle observer or, at best, a spirited cheerleader. 
Covert GRU operations, overt strategic signaling as a measure of will, and 
military campaigns below the international provocation threshold are important concepts 
in understanding the role of the Soviet, and now Russian, militaries in the conduct of PW. 
These ideas continue to resonate in the ever-shrinking inner circle of the contemporary 
Russian leadership, who view covert action as a principal policy tool, see the West as 
weak and lacking that essential element of will,169 and evaluate military activity on the 
question of “whether we can versus whether we should.” The Russian Federation has 
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resurrected these PW techniques, believing them to be integral components of its long-
term strategy. 
F. SOVIET ECONOMIC POLITICAL WARFARE 
“We declare war on you . . . in the peaceful field of trade. We declare war. We will win 
over the United States.” Khrushchev, November 1957170 
The Soviet Union’s posture in the economic realm is critical to understanding the 
full scope of PW during the Cold War. The Soviet Union singularly used its economic 
policies to promote the “interests of the Soviet State and the philosophy on which it was 
founded.”171 Foreign economic endeavors were not based on the realities of the global 
market, but designed as a politico-economic activity to improve the cultural, political, 
economic, or military position of the USSR relative to the West, and facilitate the spread 
of socialism and communism across the globe.172 
Until the death of Stalin, the USSR practiced relative economic isolation, 
importing primarily capital goods needed for industrialization and exporting raw 
materials needed to balance the import costs. By 1953, the Soviet Union began to emerge 
from its economic isolation and engage in a comprehensive strategy to establish global, 
bilateral trade relationships designed to degrade the “flexibility and freedom” of its trade 
partners’ economic affairs, leading to a gradual loss of sovereignty. In the 1950s, the 
economic policy of the Soviet Union centered on the building of a Soviet-controlled 
“economic bloc” and the “economic, political, and ideological penetration of 
underdeveloped countries” through bilateral trade and economic and military assistance 
and “designed to aid in disrupting Western alliances, encouraging neutralism, and in 
spreading Soviet and communist influence.”173 
Overt methods of economic manipulation were the establishment of aid and lines 
of credit to underdeveloped nations, bilateral trade agreements that balanced cost by 
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adjusting the volume of trade per commodity, and creating further lines of credit and 
dependence through export surplus. Additional measures included the use of Soviet-
controlled financial institutions such as the Banque Commerciale pour L’Europe du Nord 
in Paris that supported local communist interests, and direct interference in select global 
commodities such as tin and aluminum, selling these products at below market cost.174 
Furthermore, by the 1970s, the Soviet Union began a series of steps to entrench its 
economy in Western European markets, primarily in the export of oil and natural gas in 
exchange for capital goods, in order to make economic pressure on the Soviet Bloc a 
perilous endeavor requiring both international consensus and the willingness to hurt one’s 
own economy. 175 
A clear example of the use of the economic aspect of PW was demonstrated in 
Finland in the late 1950s. The USSR established a bilateral relationship that purchased 
nearly three-quarters of all Finnish metal products and a large portion of other 
commodities, and further instituted “triangular arrangements” with other Eastern 
European counties to tilt the export balance in favor of the Soviet Bloc. Additional 
actions established a trade environment where nearly all the grain, oil, coal, and fertilizer 
requirements for the country’s economy were supplied out of the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states. When the Communist Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) was 
left out of the coalition government in 1958, the Soviet Union applied pressure by 
threatening the trade relationship, causing the resignation of the new Finnish government 
and the reestablishment of the SKDL, and correspondingly of Soviet influence in 
Finland.176 It is precisely this concept of “state trading,” where a state’s economic, 
political, and military interests are harmonized in implementing commercial policy that 
drove much of Soviet economic decision making during the Cold War. The Soviet Union, 
linking its economic position to geostrategic security, attempted to increase its influence 
in international affairs and block any consensus opposition to the Soviet position by 
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establishing political, military, and economic dependence across the globe. Just as it had 
been in Finland, the overall goal was to assure a positive response to coercive pressures 
such as economic retaliation, cessation of trade or strategic commodities, or the 
withdrawal of aid.177 
The concept of state trading to achieve political gains at the expense of economic 
ones was the foundation of Soviet economic PW. The USSR established dependence 
relationships and monopolized essential materials needed by other nations to sustain their 
economies. This made virtually any nation with a substantive trade relationship with the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc proxies susceptible to economic coercion. The only 
true counter to this policy is the diversification of trade partnerships and generating 
redundancy in the supply of strategic commodities. As we have witnessed with the other 
elements of national power, Soviet economic PW did not die out with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, but continued in the post-Cold War period. The centralization of the 
Russian economy under Putin has seen a reemergence of this state trading PW 
mechanism, particularly in the oil and gas sector, and will likely remain a key component 
of Russia’s foreign policy in the foreseeable future. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The quest for security, from both internal and external antagonists, was the 
overriding goal of the USSR. The control of Europe was a key objective to this end, and 
Soviet peripheral actions in the Third World were supporting measures. PW was a 
fundamental component of Soviet grand strategy. It was executed across all four major 
elements of national power, coordinated through various organizations under the 
leadership of the politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU, and executed over 
multiple generations using a doctrinal phased approach that included the Bezmenov 
subversion model. The complexity and sophistication of the Soviet PW apparatus was 
unparalleled in human history. How did it fail? Significant vulnerabilities existed within 
the substructure of specific elements of national power. 
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The increasingly unrealistic views of the Soviet leadership, brought about by 
endemic compartmentalization, paranoia, and a lack of ideological diversity, combined 
with the economic and social stagnation of the global communist system, was a recipe for 
disaster. This made diplomatic PW progressively less effective as the Cold War entered 
its later stages, and much more vulnerable to aggressive exploitation by the West. 
Increased reliance on the other elements of power to compensate for this factor did not 
produce results. The Soviet use of the information was tainted with misinformation, and 
when the United States reciprocally engaged the USSR, truth proved a far more powerful 
tool. The military element served primarily as a supporting function to other elements of 
national power. Soviet military intelligence paralleled KGB operations, while the Red 
Army was relegated as a strategic signaling tool, only taking a leading role in select 
instances of paramilitary or conventional conflict. The military, while relatively effective 
in its own right and less vulnerable to external pressures, could not compensate for the 
erosion present in the other levers of power. Finally, economic PW by the USSR and its 
surrogates was only effective when a narrow set of conditions supported a favorable 
Soviet economy. Through both internal and external pressures, these conditions shifted 
and revealed the structurally hollow command economies within the Bloc that were 
vulnerable to fluctuations in global energy and commodities prices as well as direct 
economic measures by the West. The entire Soviet system, to include its PW apparatus, 
was fundamentally fragile. U.S. policy in the 1980s directly targeted many of the 
weaknesses along the DIME spectrum with its own PW campaign, greatly contributing to 
the collapse of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the 
USSR in 1991. Given the right leverage, the structure came down like a house of cards. 
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H. CASE STUDY: THE CRUSHING OF THE PRAGUE SPRING 
Don’t talk to me about socialism. What we have, we hold. 
-Leonid Brezhnev Comment to Alexander Dubček, 1968178 
The best case study of the Bezmenov model is the crushing of reform movements 
in Czechoslovakia between 1968 and 1970. Following the Second World War, the 
prevailing view within the Kremlin was that the “democratic façade had to be preserved 
throughout Eastern Europe, [and] the open use of force to exclude non-Communist 
Parties from power had, so far as possible, to be avoided.”179 Within this context, the 
Soviet security services began a systematic campaign of violent repression, coercion and 
disinformation, layer by layer, destroying any opposing force in Eastern Europe and 
reinforcing the one-party system through a fraudulent democratic veneer.180 This was the 
generational first phase approach to demoralization directed at any potential opposition 
within an allied state, and pervaded the first two decades of Soviet dominance in Eastern 
Europe. The idea was never to move past the “first phase” within an aligned state unless 
compelled by external events. Those events confronted the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1968 in Prague. In response to political and social 
reform movements threatening to break the Soviet system, the KGB launched a 
comprehensive PW campaign involving various active measures inside Czechoslovakia. 
This was a designed approach following the Soviet subversion model; the destabilization 
of the social and political structure while building a bloc coalition, the generation of a 
crisis to justify a military intervention, and finally normalization to consolidate gains. 
Yuri Andropov, the KGB chairman and driving force behind the PW campaign, believed 
the reforms in Prague threatened to break the very fabric of Soviet control over its 
satellites and, more importantly, understood that force, not ideology, was the purveyor of 
that control. 
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1. Background and Demoralization (1947–1968) 
The Soviet Union and its East European satellites were anything but a unified 
bloc. Immediately following Stalin’s death in 1953, an uprising in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and workers’ protests across Czechoslovakia signaled what 
was to come. Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 
put significant strain on party legitimacy across the satellite states. Inner-party power 
struggles and massive economic problems caused waves of political discontent and social 
unrest, as 1956 brought multiple workers’ uprisings and demonstrations in Poland, and 
student protests in Czechoslovakia and Romania.181 The Hungarian Revolution in 
October was violently suppressed under the weight of Soviet armor. In the late 1950s, 
there was growing disunity in Poland, Ukraine, and within intellectual circles inside the 
Soviet Union.182 By the mid-1960s, criticism of the Soviet system seeped into the 
communist party itself, and was directed at the “ideological dogmatization and perversion 
in practice of the socialist idea.”183 
In the 1960s, worry of growing Western influence within the Soviet Bloc 
permeated the politburo. The KGB cited “subversive activity in the political and 
ideological sphere against the socialist countries . . . seeking to persuade the population 
of the superiority of the Western way of life.” Soviet concerns about pervasive pro-
Western print and broadcast media, anti-Soviet subversive literature, Western tourism, 
postal exchange, and cultural programs were amplified by the perceived lack of social 
monitoring and control mechanisms of the national security services, in particular within 
Poland and Czechoslovakia.184 
The January ’68 election of Alexander Dubček as the First Secretary of the KSČ 
was initially viewed by the KGB as a positive, as Dubček spent his formative years in the 
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Soviet Union and graduated from the Moscow Higher Party School in 1958. However, 
the growing Czechoslovakian reform movement and Dubček’s progressive reform 
policies, branded “socialism with a human face,” caused alarm bells to go off across the 
Soviet Bloc, with various party leaders declaring the entire system in danger.185 In early 
1968, the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with calls for political reform in Ukraine, a 
growing split with Romania, and large-scale anti-Soviet riots in Poland. By mid-March, 
however, the situation in Prague began to take center stage.186 Initial Soviet efforts to 
curb Czechoslovakian reform programs centered on diplomatic and economic measures, 
including negotiations on a loan to restructure the Czech economy.187 On April 5, 1968, 
Dubček and the reformist bloc of the KSČ published the Action Program, a plan to 
introduce individual liberties and social, political, and economic reforms into a uniquely 
Czechoslovakian socialist structure; in essence, rejecting the Soviet-led socialist 
platform.188 The most striking aspects of the Action Program called for the “right of non-
Communists to form social organizations that would work with the party in a rejuvenated 
National Front,” and proposals for a “new constitution, further guarantees for the 
freedoms of assembly and association, a law lifting censorship,” as well as programs for 
electoral and security service reforms.189 The CPSU Plenum, held in Moscow on 9 and 
10 April, reaffirmed “to do everything necessary for the steady political, economic and 
defensive consolidation of the socialist commonwealth,” citing “foreign ideological 
subversion” as the root cause of bloc instability.190 Without directly mentioning 
Czechoslovakia, the CPSU advanced the argument that events in Prague threatened the 
security of the entire Soviet system. 
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2. Destabilization (April–July 1968) 
As Soviet influence continued to deteriorate, the free press in Czechoslovakia 
began challenging Soviet “ideological control over the bloc” and exposing Moscow’s 
interference in internal politics. At the May Day parade in Prague, Dubček was greeted 
with “Czechoslovak-style hippies carrying homemade placards and even an American 
flag.”191 
While the Soviet Politburo was busy devising economic incentives and political 
maneuvers to bring Prague back under control, the hardliners in the KGB acted. The 
KGB chairman, Andropov, redirected the full scope of Department S resources, 
previously concentrated on Western Europe, to identify and expose the “counter-
revolutionary” movements. Department S consisted of deep cover Soviet operatives 
living under assumed Western identities who’s primary task was to infiltrate and 
influence various segments of Western society. By mid-April, Andropov had expanded 
the legal KGB residency in Prague, and set up a second undeclared residency tasked with 
“identifying reliable, pro-Soviet members of the KSČ to form a quisling government after 
a Soviet invasion.” Operation PROGRESS, designed to set conditions for a military 
intervention in Czechoslovakia, was up and running by early May. The illegals began 
attempted infiltration of identified centers of the “counterrevolutionary” movement, 
including the Union of Writers, radical journals, television and radio, the K-231 club for 
former political prisoners, the Club for Committed Non-Party Members (KAN), and the 
Socialist and People’s Parties.192 
Soviet propaganda directed at the KSČ focused on the idea that “agents and 
saboteurs disguised as Western tourists had been able to penetrate Czechoslovakia 
because of poor border security” and were actively engaged in subversive activity. Active 
measures, codenamed KHODOKI, used fabricated evidence of a right-wing conspiracy 
engineered by Western intelligence services to justify a Soviet invasion. The Department 
S deep cover operatives, operating as counterrevolutionary Western sympathizers, pushed 
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reformist journalists to publish provocative anti-Soviet articles, attempted to convince 
reformist organizations to accept aid from fictitious groups armed with Western supplied 
arms, and planted caches of American made weapons across the country. The Soviet 
leadership made public a “secret [American] plan” to overthrow the regime in Prague. 
The extensive propaganda network across the Eastern Bloc was quick to propagate the 
apparent fear that “Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or to  
a coup.”193 
In late June and early July, Soviet political and military pressure intensified. The 
Šumava military exercises conducted on Czechoslovakian soil and scheduled to end by 
30 June extended into July without Dubček’s or KSČ concurrence. Dubček’s request for 
the removal of Soviet troops was ignored, and Soviet forces did not fully withdraw until 
early-August. Several Hungarian military participants acknowledged in a top secret 
report that the exercises “were organized essentially for political reasons” to “paralyze 
and frighten . . . anti-socialist forces [and] intimidate wavering elements.” More 
importantly, they served to “gain greater experience in planning, organizing, supervising, 
and cooperating in a large-scale military operation.” During the exercises, Soviet 
commanders openly drew “comparisons between the events in Czechoslovakia and the 
Hungarian Counterrevolution [in 1956].”194 By late July, a second massive Soviet 
military exercise, dubbed Nemen, began in Western Ukraine, moving large troop 
formations through Poland near the Czechoslovakian border. Concurrently, a large-scale 
air defense exercise, “Heavenly Shield,” was conducted from the Baltic to the Black Sea 
coast.195 Outside of conventional military force, the CPSU “encouraged” an increase in 
activities of The People’s Militia, a hardline communist paramilitary contingent in 
Czechoslovakia. The organization announced plans to conduct street marches “in full 
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gear,” similar to ones conducted during the February crisis of 1948. Dubček negotiated 
with the militia leaders in mid-June and managed to prevent a full confrontation.196 
On the political side, the CPSU Politburo sent a letter of concern to the KSČ 
Presidium on 4 July, echoed by similar letters from other Warsaw Pact members, 
affirming the dangerous developments inside Czechoslovakia and pronouncing that the 
USSR was “ready to provide all the necessary help” to counter the subversion of 
Socialism in Czechoslovakia.197 The rhetoric intensified through July and culminated in a 
29 July meeting in Čierna nad Tisou, between the KSČ and virtually the entire CPSU 
Politburo, including Brezhnev. While Dubček continued to defending the reform 
program, Brezhnev issues a stern warning condemning the reforms as 
“counterrevolutionary” and proposing a new Warsaw Pact provision to deploy Soviet 
troops under the decision of a joint command, essentially threatening invasion.198 
3. Crisis (August 1968) 
By early August, negotiations curbing Dubček’s reform programs between the 
Soviet Union and the KSČ were stalled. Brezhnev made several more attempts at 
diplomacy on 13 August, but was unconvinced of Dubček’s commitment to stopping the 
reforms.199 Andropov continued to push inflated threat assessments of Western 
involvement and potential dire consequences to the Soviet politburo and key Warsaw 
Pact members, and by mid-August, Moscow, along with the leadership of Bulgaria, East 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland had formally agreed to military intervention. Using a 
letter signed by senior leftist members of the KSČ that requested immediate support and 
assistance to combat the “imminent danger of counterrevolution” propagated by right-
                                                 
196 Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, 90. 
197 Ibid., 194. 
198 Ibid., 189. 
199 Ibid., 312. 
 78
wing groups “fomenting a wave of nationalism and chauvinism, and provoking and anti-
communist and anti-Soviet psychosis,” the Warsaw Pact initiated the conflict.200 
Another large-scale military exercise, “Horizon,” began on 11 August in the 
GDR, southern Poland and Western Ukraine, and was used as cover for the invasion.201 
On 17 August, after two days of deliberation, the Kremlin finally gave a green light.202 
On the night of 20 August, over 100 plain-clothed Spetsnaz agents secured Ruzyne 
International Airport in Prague, followed shortly by a Soviet Airborne Division.203 
Simultaneously, nearly 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops and 2,000 tanks crossed the border 
with virtually no resistance by outmatched and outnumbered Czechoslovakian forces.204 
Reminiscent of the crushing of the Hungarian opposition movement in 1956, on the 
morning of 21 August, the KGB stormed in and arrested Dubček and his “collaborators,” 
extraditing them to Moscow to be “browbeaten into a degree of submission.” 205206 The 
international reaction was relatively weak. A symbolic vote, condemning the invasion 
and calling for the removal of Warsaw Pact troops, was conducted at the United Nations 
Security Council and was naturally vetoed by the USSR. The United States, with its own 
problems in Vietnam and ongoing attempts to negotiate the SALT (Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks) treaty with the USSR, had no intentions of escalating the situation. 
Furthermore, U.S. condemnation of Soviet actions was tempered by the still fresh U.S. 
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (Operation POWER PACK), where the 
United States insisted that the action was a regional issue outside the UN’s scope and 
fully justified as a self-defense measure against the spread of Marxism-Leninism within 
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the U.S. sphere of influence.207 The Soviet calculation of acting below the Western 
response threshold proved accurate. 
4. Normalization (September 1968–1970) 
Following the military intervention, the KGB expanded its activities to penetrate 
and disrupt reform movements, incorporating Warsaw Pact security services and their 
“illegals” into their operations. The illegals effectively accessed key leadership within K-
231 and the Christian Democratic Party, as well as the Socialist and People’s Parties. 
Dubček was allowed to remain in office, but his position was compromised by Soviet-
controlled KSČ hardliners placed around him. The KGB continued its active measures 
campaign, staging anti-Soviet riots and using instigators within peaceful protests to turn 
the demonstrations violent, causing further repressive measures against the reformists and 
reinforcing the Soviet party line of Western interference.208 By April 1969, Dubček was 
forced to resign and was replaced by the anti-reformist and more controllable Slovak 
First Secretary, Gustáv Husák, who would remain in power until the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. With KGB and Soviet politburo coordination, Husák expanded the power 
of Czechoslovakian security services to crack down on reformists; purged virtually all 
reformers from leadership positions within the government, mass media, and the 
judiciary; revoked and modified laws instated under Dubček; reinstated centralized 
control over the economy; and established closer ties to Moscow and his Soviet Bloc 
neighbors.209 Cultural subjugation continued and, by 1970, nearly one-third of all 
university professors had been dismissed, all social and literary journals had been closed, 
and Czechoslovakia became a “veritable cultural cemetery.”210 
The crushing of the Prague Spring ushered in a new era of KGB involvement in 
the Soviet Bloc. The KGB, reenergized by the adoption of the “Brezhnev doctrine,” 
                                                 
207 Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. 
Can Do About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
208 Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 262. 
209 Peirce, “1968 and Beyond.” 
210 Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1989), 100, from 
Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 266. 
 80
vastly expanded its use of active measures and “illegals” to penetrate every facet of 
reformist or potentially subversive groups in Eastern Europe, to include the 1972 KGB 
Directive No. 150/3-10807, expanding the use of “illegals” into the Baltic States.211 On 
the international front, the Soviet Union embraced détente (razryadka) as part of the 
broader normalization phase outside the limited scope of the Czechoslovakian conflict, 
but Brezhnev continued to make pronouncements to the Politburo that the relaxing of 
tensions allowed for a regrouping of Soviet capacity and the reprioritizing of the main 
adversary’s (U.S.) strategic priorities in favor of the Soviet long game.212 
5. Analysis 
There existed two competing tracks in the Soviet handling of events in 1968. 
Divisions between the hardliners and moderates within the CPSU Politburo necessitated a 
diplomatic approach to resolving the Czechoslovakian crisis in the months leading up to 
the invasion. While this track proceeded with political, economic, and military pressure 
to compel a rollback of reforms by the KSČ, a second track to destabilize Czechoslovakia 
and force a military solution was being conducted by the KGB. This second track 
undertook a systemic, doctrinal approach developed by the KGB to foment instability, 
bait reformists into overt provocations, and produce inflammatory evidence of Western 
interference. Bezmenov’s model is clearly evident in the process. The demoralization 
phase pervaded all Soviet satellite states in the decades following their absorption into the 
Soviet sphere, and included harsh repression of dissent by state security services under 
the direction of the KGB, widespread communist and anti-Western propaganda, direct 
manipulation of the political structure by the CPSU, and the ever-looming threat of the 
Red Army. The publishing of Dubček’s Action Program in April ’68 cemented hardliner 
opinion and the KGB initiated the destabilization phase outside of the Politburo’s direct 
control. The phase reached its desired state by August and transitioned into a crisis; 
resolved by the Warsaw Pact invasion. The protracted period of normalization that 
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followed allowed for a gradual reestablishment of draconian control over the country and 
the cementing of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe for the next decade. 
The elements of national power were not synchronized; however, they served to 
complement each other in execution. Diplomatic, economic, and military levers were 
used to pressure Dubček and the KSČ into reversing the reform programs without 
resorting to a costly military solution. Since the military option was never “off the table,” 
actions in these three elements helped reinforce divisions within the KSČ and created 
conditions for information to play a decisive role in dictating final Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact policy. The KGB controlled the information arena. KGB active measures to foment 
instability inside Czechoslovakia, an intense propaganda campaign across the Soviet 
Bloc, and corresponding inflated threat assessments reaching the Soviet Politburo and 
other Bloc countries created irreversible momentum for a military intervention. 
Ideally, an effective PW program requires careful management and 
synchronization of diplomatic and economic efforts, the threat or use of military forces, 
and control of the information environment. As can be surmised from the Czech case, 
however, as long as actions within the elements of national power are complementary, 
they can achieve a desired end-state without the clear synchronization of “ends.” 
Andropov and the KGB controlled the information domain, and were able to dictate the 
desired end-state for the PW program in Czechoslovakia. 
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IV. THE COLD WAR – PART II: U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE 
1947–1991 
Soviet political warfare during the Cold War did not occur in a vacuum. The 
United States engaged in its own robust PW program, providing a critical counterweight 
to Soviet policy. From World War II to the mid-1960s, the USSR possessed 
overwhelming conventional military superiority in Europe.213 Although the late 1960s 
and early 1970s saw an increase in NATO conventional capability, significant doubt 
persisted in U.S. and NATO circles of their ability to successfully defend against a Soviet 
conventional attack without relying on tactical nuclear assets.214 The defensive posturing 
of NATO conventional forces, combined with the accepted viability of a mutual nuclear 
threat, provided an element of stability for the duration of the Cold War. As a result, 
“both sides pursued an alternative and complementary policy of keeping the opponent off 
balance by means of political warfare.”215 This section describes the broader U.S. policy 
towards the Soviet Union through its renderings across different administrations, offers a 
review of U.S. covert action programs that largely mirrored Soviet active measures, and 
provides examples of the use of PW by the United States across the various elements of 
national power. The chapter concludes with a case study demonstrating the effectiveness 
of a well-coordinated political warfare strategy. What this review demonstrates is that a 
balanced approach to PW—synchronized across DIME guided by clearly stated, overt 
national policy objectives—is essential to effective foreign policy in adversarial, state-on-
state interactions below the level of war. This was the case in the late Cold War period of 
the 1980s, when the United States engaged in an aggressive and well-coordinated PW 
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campaign against the Soviet Union that underwrote the collapse of Soviet domination 
over Eastern Europe and the eventual dissolution of the USSR. 
A. U.S. COLD WAR POLICY 
U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be divided into 
four distinct phases. The first phase was the early Cold War period from 1947 through 
1953, was characterized by idealistic and aggressive actions by the Truman and early 
Eisenhower administrations to contain the spread of Communist influence, and careless 
attempts to pry Eastern Europe from Moscow’s control. The developing nuclear 
stalemate between the superpowers and the death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in the next 
phase. This second period, from 1953 to 1969, was true “containment” designed to halt 
the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World, while accepting the status quo at the 
end of the Second World. This was followed by a decade of détente in the Nixon, Ford, 
and early Carter White House years and was complemented by the loss of domestic U.S. 
consensus and substantive disengagement by the United States from previous Cold War 
policies, including PW. The United States began to reverse this trend in the late 1970s 
under the second half of Carter’s term in office and into the Reagan years. The last phase 
of the Cold War, from 1979 through 1991, was a relentless ideological campaign against 
the USSR, pushing back Soviet gains in the Third World and directly targeting the Soviet 
Union through overt and covert measures. U.S. PW vacillated with each phase shift; from 
early growing pains and relative freedom of action in the first two periods, to near-total 
incoherence as a policy tool in the third period, to a final resurrection and ascendancy in 
the 1980s, as indispensable to a successful foreign policy. Across the various 
administrative shifts, the United States did not have a stable grand strategy, an enduring 
national narrative, a collective vision of an existential threat posed by communism, or 
even a resemblance of domestic unanimity on foreign policy. Though “containment” and 
the “Soviet threat” remained very influential factors in the framing of U.S. foreign policy 
during each phase of the Cold War, the extent of PW programs targeting the USSR 
greatly varied in intensity and commitment. These facts are not meant to be a 
condemnation of U.S. policy, but a recognition that the lack of durable strategic clarity is 
an inherent feature of representative democracies. What made the U.S. ultimately 
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successful in the Cold War was seizure of strategic initiative during a limited window of 
opportunity, starting in the summer of 1979, to “roll back” and destabilize the Soviet 
Union prior to the next invariable shift. 
By 1947, the United States viewed the potential economic collapse of Western 
Europe and the consequent ascension of communist power across the continent as the 
“principal threat to American national security.”216 The year 1947 was pivotal in the 
consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Communist regimes were installed in 
Romania and Hungary, democratic elections in Poland were cancelled, and the elected 
Bulgarian prime minister was removed, leading to the establishment of a communist 
People’s Republic. Czechoslovakia would follow in early 1948, with a near-bloodless 
coup supported by the Soviet military that eliminated the last independent government in 
Eastern Europe.217 The rise of communist party membership in Italy and France 
following the Second World War, and Stalin’s systematic subjugation of Eastern Europe, 
set the stage for the adoption of the “containment strategy” that would dominate U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for decades. Outside of Eastern Europe, in 1946-
1947, the Soviet Union began conducting PW in Greece and Turkey in an effort to bring 
the two countries closer to the Soviet sphere. In response, on March 12, 1947, President 
Harry Truman announced what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, pledging aid 
to any country facing Communist pressure.218 One of the first strategic applications of 
the containment policy in the Truman administration was the announcement of the 
European Recovery Program (ERP) in June 1947. Its implementation as the Economic 
Cooperation Act of 1948, later known as the Marshall Plan, provided economic support 
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for Europe’s devastated agricultural and industrial capacity in order to prevent the social 
and political slip towards communism.219 
In December 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) drafted memorandum 
NSC-4, calling for the U.S. State Department to develop interdepartmental plans and 
programs in order to influence foreign opinion in directions favorable to the United 
States.220 The U.S. government then planned and conducted its first postwar PW 
campaign in Europe, potentially swaying the 1948 election in Italy. 
The Italian election marked a crucial moment in the development and 
organization of American political warfare. The U.S. campaign had been 
conducted below the level of total military conflict and the fact that the 
Italians had rejected communism appeared to be tangible proof that the 
approach could meet the broader Soviet challenge.221 
Following the perceived success of the Italian campaign, America began to codify PW 
and Kennan penned The Inauguration of Political Warfare.222 
Then, in August 1949, the USSR tested its first nuclear bomb. This changed the 
playing field and the advent of substantive thermonuclear capability on both sides 
tempered the “militant, ideological crusading spirit of the classic Cold War period [and 
gave] way to a cold calculation of vital national interests.”223 With the Eastern and 
Western blocs relatively solidified in Europe, the struggle between the United States and 
the USSR shifted to proxy warfare and subversion in the Third World. “Indeed, Soviet 
analysts made no bones about the fact that while nuclear weapons ruled out the 
inevitability of a military clash with imperialism, they only made the ideological-political 
                                                 
219 Dobson, U.S. Foreign Policy, 25. 
220 Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-
1956 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), 18. 
221 Kaeten Mistry, The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 
1945-1950 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3. 
222 State Department Policy Planning Staff, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” April 
30, 1948. Box 11A, Lot File 64 D 563, Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Administration, 
College Park, Maryland, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269. 
223 Blackstone, The Strategy of Subversion, 301. 
 87
one more likely and more intense.”224 The developing Cold War became the context for 
the dynamic interaction of U.S. and Soviet policy, evolving strategic goals, and the 
interaction of PW measures within the contested space in Europe. 
In the decade that followed, the key guiding document for the U.S. containment 
strategy was National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), issued by the National 
Security Council in April 1950. NSC-68 took on a more rigid and aggressive tone than 
George F. Kennan’s original concept of selective and multidimensional containment, 
emphasizing the existential threat faced by the spread of global communism, militarizing 
the concept of containment, and adopted the idea of negotiating with the USSR only from 
a position of overwhelming strength.225 In the words of John Lewis Gaddis, NSC-68 
made “all interests vital, all means affordable, [and] all methods justifiable.”226 The 
Eisenhower administration would take the principles of NSC-68 and developed its “New 
Look” policy that attempted to accomplish “containment on the cheap” by focusing 
efforts on nuclear versus conventional containment.”227 It also emphasized increased 
burden-sharing by allies in their mutual defense framework, with the aim to “encircle the 
Soviet Union and China with states aligned with the U.S.,” and most critically renewing 
focus on “covert, economic, and psychological warfare.”228 
With a nuclear-conventional stalemate developing in Europe in the 1950s, PW 
emerged as the principal weapon to influence the Cold War balance. For the United 
States, winning the sociopolitical narrative across the globe necessitated discrediting the 
principles of Soviet communism, especially among Third World nationalist movements 
fighting Western colonialism. Where socialist and communist ideologies were firmly 
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entrenched or beginning to threaten national interests, the United States adopted more 
aggressive policies. These often conflicted with “American principles of Democracy, 
anti-colonialism and national self-determination,” by directly interfering in the social and 
political fabric of states, often supporting colonial powers or dictatorial regimes and 
subverting democratic movements.229 The Cold War calculus of overcoming the 
perceived threat of Soviet global domination through incremental strategic gains, simply 
outweighed American idealism. 
To further tip the balance, the United States needed to disrupt the economic 
stability of the Soviet bloc. This was accomplished through a combination of overt trade 
initiatives and covert measures, denial of USSR access to technology and resources, 
signaling U.S. commitment to supporting allies to prevent a slip away from the West, and 
signaling the potential negative consequences of Soviet alignment or neutrality. The 
overall shift from the superpower military balance to that of global sociopolitical 
competition placed primary emphasis on the tools of PW: coercive state diplomacy, 
public diplomacy and psychological warfare, conventional and nuclear military posturing 
and paramilitary activity, covert action, and influence through economic statecraft.230 
The 1960s saw a shift in U.S. containment policy to the Kennedy “flexible 
response” doctrine, which proposed a gradual escalation to nuclear war in case of a 
military confrontation with the Soviets. This concept, however, rapidly evolved into the 
concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) following the Cuban Missile Crisis. On 
the PW front, the idea of ideological containment remained consistent with previous 
administrations, but was vastly expanded in scope and shifted in focus to the Third 
World. This expanded focus fixated on countering communist insurgencies and 
subversion efforts through unconventional military measures such as the use of covert 
action, Special Forces, economic and educational endeavors, as well as “nation-building 
around progressive movements.”231 The Peace Corps, Food for Peace project, and the 
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Alliance for Progress in Latin America were all initiatives in the early years of the 
Kennedy administration to curb the structural and ideological appeal of communism.232 
With the visceral divide of the Vietnam War and the reemergence of neo-
isolationist sentiment in the United States, the containment policy saw its second major 
adjustment. Under Nixon, U.S. foreign policy shifted away from the ideological realm 
and centered on the realpolitik calculations of reprioritized national interests.233 Détente, 
defined by then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger as “mutual restraint, 
coexistence, and, ultimately co-operation,”234 aimed to contain the Soviet Union by 
attempting to incorporate the Eastern Bloc into the economic and internationalist 
framework, strategic arms limitations, and exploiting existing rifts between communist 
regimes, such as the Sino-Soviet split, to gain leverage in negotiations with Moscow.235 
The Soviet Union had its own view of détente, with Brezhnev delivering a secret speech 
to the politburo in 1971, declaring: 
We communists have to string along with the capitalists for a while. We 
need their credits, their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going 
to continue massive military programs and by the middle 1980s we will be 
in a position to return to a much more aggressive foreign policy designed 
to gain the upper hand in our relationship with the West.236 
The Carter administration attempted to change the nature of détente, trying to 
move away from Kissinger’s realpolitik to intemperate idealism, favoring “international 
law, open diplomacy, promoting self-determination and universal human rights, [and] 
avoiding the use of force.” In doing so, the administration unintentionally took a much 
more confrontational posture with the Soviet Union, which was perceived as a move 
away from Nixon’s “tacit coexistence to being satisfied only with a fundamental change 
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in the Soviet System.”237 The second half of the decade, with the fall of Saigon in 1975, 
communist gains in Africa and Latin America, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979, signaled a substantive escalation in the Cold War. 
In the next decade, U.S. containment would take on a much more aggressive 
nature. Reagan, accusing the Soviet Union of using détente as a cover to spread 
communism across the globe, adopted the idea of “rollback” by taking initiatives in the 
Third World to push back communism, including the overthrow of the Marxist 
government in Grenada, providing support for the Afghan rebels against the communist 
government in Afghanistan and for the Contras against the Sandinista government in 
Nicaragua, as well as supporting anticommunist forces in Angola, Kampuchea, and 
Ethiopia.238 The policy of rollback was extended to Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe 
with aggressive political and economic actions in Poland supporting the Solidarity trade-
union movement. Further actions included the drastic escalation in defense spending on 
programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), wide-ranging economic 
measures against the USSR, and a renewed emphasis on public diplomacy and strategic 
communication to counter Soviet propaganda. These efforts helped aggravate the 
growing scientific-technological gap and massive political, ideological, and economic 
flaws in the Soviet system, which were exposed by Gorbachev’s disastrous glasnost 
policy in the second half of the decade, and led to the rejuvenation of regional 
nationalism in the USSR.239 
Reagan embraced PW and used it effectively to support overt national strategic 
aims. By the time George H. W. Bush was inaugurated as the 41st President of the United 
States in January 1989, the Baltic republics were openly running nationalistic popular 
fronts, Soviet Central Asia was witnessing similar nationalist movements, and the first 
domino in the Soviet system, Poland, was already falling.240 Aggressive U.S. actions, 
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both overt and covert, played a critical role in the eventual disintegration of Soviet 
control over Eastern Europe and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Policy fluctuation due to U.S. administration changes limited what PW measures 
were deemed acceptable or practical. Soviet successes in the PW realm directly 
correlated with U.S. vacillation. Passive acceptance of Soviet hegemony over Eastern 
Europe in the late Eisenhower, Kennedy, and early Johnson administrations allowed the 
USSR to aggressively repress any deviation from Soviet control and expand its 
subversive activities to the West and the Third World. Assertive U.S. policies in the First 
and Third World, however, counteracted Soviet efforts. Through the late 1960s, the U.S. 
and the West managed to maintain the narrow geopolitical balance with the USSR; 
however, fracturing U.S. domestic and Western international consensus over Vietnam 
under Johnson and Nixon, the restructuring of covert action and continuance of détente 
under Ford, and the blind idealism in the first half of Carter’s term led to the drastic 
decline of U.S. PW in the 1970s. This brought about major Soviet gains in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa. PW essentially became a one player game. As Karen Brutents, the 
deputy head of the Soviet ID pointed out, “the world was going our way.”241 The late 
1970s and early 80s, under the Carter and Reagan administrations, saw a dramatic shift in 
U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union, hallmarked by a drastic revitalization of U.S. PW, 
negating Soviet momentum and helping bring the Cold War to its end. Two critical 
concepts emerge from this historic perspective. First, given a relative geopolitical parity, 
states that engage in comprehensive PW programs possess a significant advantage over 
states that do not. Second, a PW program, especially one that involves covert action, 
which is out of synch with overt national policy goals, will not be effective. 
B. U.S. COVERT ACTION 
Covert action in support of PW was the U.S. parallel to Soviet active measures. 
Covert action, regulated by 50 U.S.C. § 413(b), is defined as “activities of the United 
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States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where 
it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly.”242 This concept can be divided into four mutually supporting 
functional areas: propaganda, political action, paramilitary activity, and intelligence 
assistance. The first, propaganda, is any form of adversary communication, especially of 
a biased or mislaeading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or 
behavior of any group in order to benefire the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.243 
Political action is the use of covert political means, agents of influence, or material 
support to target both governmental and third party institutions—labor unions, religious 
movements, ethnic groups, or criminal enterprises—to achieve desired outcomes, which 
can range from policy shifts to coup d’états. Paramilitary activity lies on the more 
destructive and objectionable edge of the covert action spectrum and encompasses 
everything from counterterrorism operations, to assassinations, to fully sponsored 
unconventional warfare. Finally, intelligence assistance is the nonattributable support to 
governments or groups with intelligence training, material and technical support, and 
information sharing in order to influence the decision cycle of the supported entity or a 
third party actor through secondary or tertiary effects.244 
Starting with the Truman administration in the post-World War II years, the 
overarching intent of U.S. covert action was to halt the spread of communism outside of 
the newly formed Eastern Bloc and to weaken internal communist consensus within the 
Soviet sphere without the actual overthrow of Soviet-controlled regimes.245 In 1948, 
Truman authorized NSC-20 and NSC-20/4, allowing the use of paramilitary operations, 
assistance to resistance groups, and supporting sabotage activities within the Baltic States 
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and Soviet Bloc countries in order to “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure 
of power and control, particularly in the relationship between Moscow and the satellite 
countries.”246 From 1949 through the mid-1950s, the CIA unsuccessfully supported 
nationalist resistance elements in Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, and Albania. The 
failure of these efforts lay with the high-level Soviet penetration of Western intelligence 
services and the underestimation of the scope and sophistication of Soviet 
counterintelligence and counterinsurgency operations that managed to effectively 
infiltrate and annihilate U.S.-sponsored émigré movements.247 
Eisenhower built upon the previous administration’s initiatives with NSC-162/2, 
that spelled out a “third option” between diplomacy and military force in achieving U.S. 
national security objectives and countering Soviet subversion efforts of “political and 
economic warfare, propaganda and ‘front activities,’ Communist-controlled trade unions, 
sabotage, exploitation of revolutionary and insurgent movements, and psychological 
warfare.”248 In the early 1950s, CIA-sponsored coups in Iran (Operation TP-AJAX) and 
Guatemala (Operation PB-SUCCESS) were determined to be resounding successes in 
U.S. covert action, though both had significant, lasting, negative effects on U.S. regional 
foreign policy that are still felt today. The overarching motivations for the two operations 
were markedly similar, shaped by existing economic interests and the global balance for 
power that necessitated the actions in order to prevent a potential shift in regional 
geopolitical orientation to the USSR.249 Europe was deemed far too sensitive for 
aggressive covert action programs. Despite some emotional appeals for assistance during 
the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the United States stayed out and Budapest quickly fell 
back under the Soviet boot heel. 
The Kennedy administration oversaw an expansion in covert action programs well 
beyond the “containment” scope of the previous two administrations and into the realm 
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of justified “unlimited intervention” into the internal politics of allied and adversarial 
nations. These included a prolonged paramilitary intervention in the Belgian Congo, 
financial and propaganda support for the Chilean Radical Party (PR) in preparation for 
the 1963 elections, and similar support for Western-aligned democratic parties in Italy. 
Further activities involved the facilitation of bribery and social disturbances in an attempt 
to prevent the pro-communist Cheddi Jagan from taking power in British Guyana, the 
supplying of weapons and explosives to internal dissident groups in the Dominican 
Republic, and covert operations against the Castro regime in Cuba. The latter included 
disastrous operations like the Bay of Pigs invasion and a series of failed assassination 
attempts against Castro that were “generated from within the White House.”250 The 
programs initiated during the Kennedy years were continued in largely the same tone 
during the Johnson administration. When Nixon took over the oval office, he expanded 
the scope of several programs, most notably operations in Chile, which increased funding 
and propaganda activities, initiated programs to “destabilize the Chilean economy,” and, 
finally, support for an eventual coup against Allende.251 
From the early days of the Cold War until the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to 
the Foreign Assistances Act of 1961, U.S. covert action was largely unhindered by 
legislative oversight. From its inception, the CIA had “the standing authority to initiate 
and execute low-level, low-cost, low-risk ‘routine’ covert action programs without 
presidential approval or even notification, so long as the programs were in consonance 
with presidentially established foreign policy objectives.”252 The amendment created a 
necessity for a “presidential finding” and a “Memoranda of Notification” (MON) to 
congress in the event that a covert action was authorized, and eliminated the “plausible 
deniability” argument if a covert activity became compromised or publically exposed. 
The consequence of this legislation was that Congress now had veto authority for any 
covert action program through the power of the purse, which severely diminished the 
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executive branch’s willingness to engage in such actions.253 Further fallout from the 
detailing of CIA and executive abuses in the conduct of covert action operations during 
the Church and Pike Committee hearings in 1975 exacerbated the impact of Hughes-
Ryan, and effectively stalled U.S. covert operations. Without the counterweight of U.S. 
PW, the Soviet Union made significant strides, including aggressive PW actions in 
Angola, opposed by only lackluster U.S. financial support to anticommunist elements, 
resulting in the USSR gaining a strategic foothold on the African continent for military 
and naval basing, and as a staging base for further operations in Africa.254 
For all its initial general disdain for the CIA, the Carter administration realized 
very quickly that their overt humanist policies were ineffective against a tide of Soviet 
PW measures. With the urging of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security 
Advisor, the U.S. began “an unprecedented White House effort to attack the internal 
legitimacy of the Soviet Government.”255 The blatant structural manipulation of the 
political processes of Third World nations that had occurred in the preceding decade was 
quickly dismissed as a policy option. With Carter’s approval, however, the United States 
began directly targeting the USSR in a covert propaganda campaign that included the 
distribution of illegal dissident literature, known as samizdat, across Soviet society. U.S. 
covert support to European human rights and prodemocracy groups vastly increased, and 
CIA covert action specialists, along with Brzezinski’s influence, managed to push the 
agenda of supporting nationalist programs inside the Soviet Union, thus “keeping alive 
the culture, history, religions, and traditions of the oppressed non-Russian minorities.”256 
Covert successes were intermixed with inaction during the Carter admiration, with 
failures to initiate findings or preempt Soviet political actions in Zaire, Somalia, and 
Ethiopia early in the administration contrasting with approved presidential findings for 
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covert action in Yemen and Central America in 1979.257 By far the most aggressive 
measure undertaken by the administration was a presidential finding authorizing lethal 
aid support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan six months before the actual Soviet 
invasion in December 1979. Brzezinski wrote a memo to Carter first declaring that the 
aid to the mujahedeen would likely induce a Soviet military intervention and then, on the 
day the Red Army actually crossed the border, stating that “we now have the opportunity 
of giving to the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam.”258 
The Reagan presidency, building on Carter initiatives, directed a substantial 
escalation of covert actions against the Soviet Union. Operations in the Third World 
accelerated, with covert actions being conducted in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, 
Central America, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Lebanon, to name only the declassified 
initiatives.259 In May 1982, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-32 came into 
effect as the U.S. National Security Strategy, authorizing a broad spectrum of covert 
programs aimed at destabilizing Soviet control over the Eastern Bloc. This was to be 
accomplished through the use of aggressive propaganda campaigns to bring to light 
Soviet “active measures” initiatives and utilize sponsored social movements, in 
conjunction with economic measures and diplomatic pressure, to drive the deeply flawed 
Soviet system into collapse.260 NSDD-54, signed in September 1982, further targeted 
Eastern Europe by “encouraging more liberal trends in the region . . . . Furthering human 
and civil rights in East European countries . . . . Reinforcing the pro-Western orientation 
of their peoples . . . . Lessening their economic and political dependence on the U.S.S.R. . 
. . [and] Undermining the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.”261 
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Perceptions of covert action in the Reagan administration are dominated by the 
Iran-Contra scandal with its “not so covert” action program. Other Central American and 
Third World programs also put congressional and executive policies at odds; however, it 
was the CIA’s covert action in Afghanistan and U.S. PW in Poland that was the 
culmination, and ultimate vindication, of U.S. Cold War doctrine. Covert action in 
Poland, facilitated through an alliance with the Catholic Church in much the same 
manner as the 1948 Italian election campaign, was well synchronized with U.S. economic 
and diplomatic levers of national power.262 Afghanistan bled the Soviet Union dry, not in 
manpower and resources, but in will and domestic consensus. These actions, combined 
with U.S. PW across the Eastern Bloc, precipitated the beginning of the end for the 
USSR. 
Competent covert action, when appropriately synchronized with overt elements of 
national power in a coherent foreign policy with realistic goals, can be a dominant force 
for global change. Full-spectrum PW, with covert action at its core, maintained the 
geopolitical balance for nearly two decades after World War II, stagnated in the 1970s, 
and decidedly tipped the Cold War balance in favor of the United States in the 1980s. 
The 1970s theme of overregulating and marginalizing PW programs through 
congressional oversight would reemerge again in the early 1990s. However, unlike the 
rapid realization of the Carter and Reagan administrations that covert programs in support 
of PW were essential to counter the Soviet Union, post-Cold War administrations let 
many capabilities atrophy, while the Russian Federation gradually rebuilt its capability 
and fortified its domestic will. 
C. U.S. DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL WARFARE 
As George Kennan noted, U.S. involvement in the 1948 Italian elections was the 
“inauguration of organized political warfare” in the post-Cold War period.263 The first 
part of this section provides an overview of the U.S. PW program in the run up to the 
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1948 Italian elections. The election serves as both an excellent example of U.S. 
diplomatic PW and as a foundational construct for broader U.S. PW efforts examined in 
the second part of the section. The second part looks at the “state-private network” 
concept adopted as a cornerstone of U.S. PW in the early Cold War, its decline in the late 
1960s and 70s, and its reemergence under the Reagan administration with the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED). The underlying argument is that the structures of 
diplomatic PW, such as covert funding channels to foreign parties, state-private networks, 
and sponsored nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the NED, are critically 
important to an effective foreign policy when dealing with a cunning and antagonistic 
adversary. 
U.S. support for anticommunist elements in the 1948 Italian elections is one of the 
defining moments in the early Cold War period. Fearing that a communist victory would 
strengthen communist parties across Western Europe and precipitate the collapse of 
European democracy under Soviet domination, the United States engaged in a 
comprehensive PW program to prevent the slip. The U.S. funneled millions of dollars to 
the Italian Christian Democratic Party as well as right-wing socialist parties that opposed 
the Soviet-backed coalition of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Italian Socialist 
Party (PSI). The economic aid offered by the Marshall Plan and Vatican support was 
used as political leverage to present a clear choice for Italian voters: either democracy, 
Christianity, and prosperity; or totalitarianism, atheism, and impoverishment. In the run 
up to the election, the U.S. pumped “interim economic aid” into Italy as a measure to 
prevent the economic and social structure from collapsing until the Marshall Plan could 
be implemented. This was coupled with increased shipments of military equipment to the 
Italian security services and indirect funding support for pro-U.S. political parties in Italy 
through U.S. businesses and organized labor groups.264 
As the April ’48 elections approached, polls showed that a communist victory was 
likely, and the U.S. intensified its involvement. The flow of covert funding and other 
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measures increased.265 U.S. propaganda, in the form of press releases, newsreels, Voice 
of America radio broadcasts, anticommunist and pro-U.S. documentaries, and even the 
re-release and saturation of Greta Garbo’s 1939 film Ninotchka, a satire on Soviet life, 
flooded Italy in the weeks prior to the election. On the diplomatic side, the United States 
pulled off a masterful diplomatic move in late March. The United States, along with 
Brittan and France, rejected Yugoslavia’s territorial claims on the Free Territory of 
Trieste and, playing on Italian nationalistic sentiment, declared for the return of the 
disputed region to Italy. Stalin backed his Yugoslav ally and denounced the move against 
the interests of the PCI, and Italian public opinion of the widely popular move shifted 
away from the communists. Further actions supported the agenda. The U.S. helped 
engineer a splitting of the socialist vote, using Great Britain to legitimize PSLI trade 
union representatives through an official invite and recognition, while the PSI remained 
sidelined. These measures played a role in the Christian Democrats emerging with an 
absolute parliamentary majority in the elections.266 Whether or not the United States 
actually tilted the balance in the Italian elections, the prevailing view inside Washington 
was that U.S. overt and covert methods kept Italy from slipping into the communist 
sphere, and thus justified the employment and expansion of PW programs in the  
coming decades.267 
The use of direct covert funding to support foreign parties in conjunction with 
overt diplomatic initiatives was a key component of PW in the diplomatic realm. The 
Italian model would prove the inauguration of many similar initiatives across the globe. 
Actions such as the decades-long program, beginning in the Eisenhower administration, 
to support the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with covert funding in order to 
undermine the communist agenda in Japan were prevalent across the globe in the early 
Cold War period. In the Japan example, the covert program allowed the LDP to 
overcome socialist movements in Japan, secure close U.S.-Japanese economic and 
political ties, and overcome popular opposition to the U.S. military presence on the 
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islands.268 Outside of direct funding, there were other indirect influence programs that 
dominated the diplomatic domain. 
In the early Cold War period, front organizations on both sides served as a key 
mechanism of influence. The U.S. developed a “state-private network” concept; private 
organizations, covertly funded by the CIA through either direct channels or dummy 
foundations, served as the vanguard of U.S. PW. The state-private relationship developed 
on the idea of “ideological convergence” between the private sector and government 
based on an anticommunist domestic consensus and complementary short-term goals. 
Many of the early initiatives began as independent, ideologically driven private 
actions.269 The Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) was established by the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1944 to assist foreign trade unions and offset communist 
influence.270 Jay Lovestone and Irvin Brown of the FTUC funded anticommunist efforts 
independent to the United States Government (USG) in Italy and France in 1946, and 
were involved in the covert action during the 1948 Italian elections. Sidney Hook laid the 
groundwork for the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) in 1949 as a private venture 
that only later became a CIA front organization.271 The CCF employed American writers, 
artists, musicians and intellectuals to “negate Communism’s appeal” by contrasting the 
communist repression of ideas and artistic expression with artistic and intellectual 
freedom in Western society. By 1950, the CCF was covertly funded by the Office of 
Policy Coordination (OPC) in the State Department until the OPC was absorbed under 
the CIA in 1951.272 The role of the CIA remained unknown to many members of these 
and other front organizations. 
As the domestic consensus began to fall apart in the 1960s, significant friction 
developed inside many of the state-private network organizations. The entire structure 
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collapsed after a series of revelations of CIA and USG involvement in multiple front 
ventures. The “tipping point” was the Ramparts article in 1967, exposing the CIA’s 
connection with the CCF, which led to a series of media efforts that further exposed the 
“AFL-CIO, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Asia Foundation, the National 
Students’ Association, and many other allies and front groups.”273 With the system 
exposure, these organizations became largely ineffective as a PW tool, their unwitting 
members felt deceived, and the revelations significantly limited the pool of willing 
partners for the CIA, as the risks of exposure now seemed too great.274 These events 
brought on a decade of disengagement by the United States from PW in the 1970s, 
hallmarked by the retreat from covert action by the Ford and early Carter administrations. 
Only in late 1979, with virtually unopposed Soviet advances in the Third World, did the 
United States begin to reconstitute its PW capacity. 
In November 1979, the Carter administration created the American Political 
Foundation (APF), which would pave the way for the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED). In March 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig drafted a 
memorandum to Reagan proposing a strategy to counter Soviet expansion efforts in the 
Third World by supporting democratic forces and further “preoccupying” the Soviet 
Union with internal problems “by giving practical assistance to democratic and 
nationalist forces and thus going on our own political offensive.” Haig called for the 
establishment of an “Institute for Democracy” that would become the NED in December 
1983.275 The NED was designed to reconstitute the PW capacity that existed with the 
early state-private networks without the covert and potentially discrediting programs of 
the CIA.276 The NED was designed to be a semiprivate and semiautonomous “democracy 
promoting” institution openly funded by the USG. Its disassociation from the official 
U.S. policy allowed for the institution to pursue actions that bridged the space between 
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the overt policies of the State Department, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the U.S. Information Agency, and CIA covert action. The 
“gray” purpose of the NED was to “channel money, equipment, political consultants, and 
other expertise” to foreign “democratic forces.”277 The U.S. effectively established its 
own version of the Comintern.278 
The NED consisted of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and National 
Republican Institute (NRI), The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and 
the AFL-CIO. The NDI and NRI were training and funding channels to political parties 
outside the United States, while the CIPE and AFL-CIO assisted foreign businesses and 
trade unions, respectively. The NED supported activities across Latin America, including 
funds to anticommunist elements in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Nicaragua. Programs in Eastern Europe were just as robust, with the NED providing 
some $3.7 million to the Polish Solidarity trade union movement starting in 1984.279 
The program leading up to the 1948 elections in Italy laid the groundwork for the 
expansion of U.S. PW in the early Cold War. Both covert CIA funding to various foreign 
entities and the large array of state-private networks served as an effective counterbalance 
to covert KGB funds and the countless Soviet front organizations that supported 
communist and socialist parties and revolutionary movements across the globe. When 
this balance was upset in the 1970s, the Soviet Union made tremendous strides in 
advancing its overall aims. In the zero-sum frame of the Cold War perspective, these 
aims were achieved at the expense of the United States. The revitalization of U.S. PW in 
the 1980s, spearheaded by the NED and similar programs in the diplomatic realm, and 
synchronized with overt U.S. foreign policy and the other elements of national power, 
created irreversible momentum for the resolution of the Cold War. 
Diplomatic political warfare is essential to an effective national foreign policy. 
This is especially true when faced with a geopolitical rival that engages in a robust PW 
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program across the various elements due to an inherently weaker strategic position, as 
was the case with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Today, the United States finds itself 
again the subject of wide-ranging PW campaigns from multiple adversarial nation states, 
making U.S. diplomatic PW initiatives, like the NED, as relevant today as they were 
during the height of the Cold War. 
D. U.S. INFORMATION POLITICAL WARFARE 
U.S. information PW provides two important insights. First, the battle for the 
narrative in a contested space is a massive undertaking, requiring a substantial 
commitment of national resources. This commitment further requires a multidimensional 
approach across covert and overt systems, and necessitates an organization outside of the 
U.S. State Department to coordinate activities. A direct association with the State 
Department severely restricts the national capacity to conduct influence operations in the 
information environment by tying overt national policy aims to all messaging campaigns. 
Separating an information coordination agency from the State Department would allow a 
degree of disassociation from overt, and often delicate, diplomatic efforts and covert or 
limited attribution media efforts that may cause diplomatic friction. Second, the United 
States is particularly susceptible to blowback from state-sponsored misinformation and 
“black” propaganda efforts. Truth is the best weapon in the U.S. arsenal and can be a 
dominant force on the information field if properly managed and adequately supported. 
In stark contrast to Soviet “disinformation” efforts, U.S. PW in the information 
environment largely rejected the use of classical propaganda measures of distortion and 
manipulation. U.S. efforts mainly focused in the realm of public diplomacy and “white” 
propaganda readily acknowledged by the sponsor. “Gray” propaganda, designed to 
remove the sponsor’s hand from the message by not revealing its source, was also 
effectively used by the United States throughout the Cold War.280 Media manipulation, 
disinformation, and “black” propaganda were still employed effectively by the CIA in the 
                                                 
280 Carnes Lord, “What ‘Strategic’ Public Diplomacy Is,” in Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, 
Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare, eds. Michael J. Waller, Carnes Lord, John Lenczowski, 
Jennifer Marshall, Robert R. Reilly, Herbert Romerstein, Andrew Garfield, Angelo Codevilla, John J. 
Tierney, Hampton Stephens, Stephen C. Baker, and Juliana Geran Pilon. (Washington, D.C.: Institute of 
World Politics Press, 2009), 48.  
 104
first two decades of the Cold War, but the scale of these programs was limited and 
largely dwarfed by similar efforts by the Soviet Union. A series of public exposures and a 
breakdown of domestic consensus in the late 1960s and 1970s ushered in a drastic shift of 
PW in the information environment, rejecting misinformation as a viable tool and 
focusing on the right information to the right audience. In principle, the relentless 
idealistic use of truth would prevail against clear Soviet deception and disinformation 
efforts, but in reality the organizational sophistication and operational flexibility of the 
Soviet propaganda engine minimized any contextual perception drawbacks, leading to a 
tightly contested battle for the geopolitical narrative all the way to the end of the  
Cold War. 
Though the U.S. PW apparatus did not match the Soviets in scope or 
sophistication, “the C.I.A. [had] at various times owned or subsidized more than 50 
newspapers, news services, radio stations, periodicals and other communications entities . 
. . mostly overseas, that were used as vehicles for its extensive propaganda efforts.”281 
Furthermore, numerous foreign news organizations and nearly a dozen publishing houses 
were infiltrated, controlled, or at least heavily influenced by the agency.282 Between 1947 
and 1967, over 1,000 books were “sponsored, subsidized, or produced” by the CIA; one 
quarter of them in English.283 The United States controlled its own covert media empire. 
In the late 1940s, the CIA launched Operation MOCKINGBIRD, designed to influence 
media organizations and recruit individual journalists to both provide cover for CIA 
operations overseas and conduct propaganda. The network under MOCKINGBIRD 
would eventually include high-level assets at the “big three” U.S. television networks 
(American Broadcasting Company, National Broadcasting Company, and Columbia 
Broadcasting System - ABC, NBC, CBS), Time magazine, Newsweek, Associated Press 
(AP), Reuters, and a vast assortment of other major media outlets, and included up to 400 
                                                 
281 John M. Crewdson and Joseph B. Treaster, “The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s 
Views,” New York Times, 25 December 1977, 1, 12. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence 
Activities. April 1976, 191–201. 
 105
journalists working under the CIA payroll.284 Details of the operation were revealed by 
the Church committee in 1975-76, with the final report concluding: 
The CIA currently maintains a network of several hundred foreign 
individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at 
times attempt to influence opinion through the use of covert propaganda. 
These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of 
newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, 
radio and television stations, commercial book publishers, and other 
foreign media outlets.285 
In 1976, George H. W. Bush, as the newly appointed CIA Director, announced a 
change in the agency’s media policy, stating that “the CIA will not enter into any paid or 
contract relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by 
any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.”286 
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) were the U.S. answer to 
mounting Soviet propaganda efforts in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. Originally 
conceived by George Kennan and Frank Wisner, RFE began broadcasting to Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in 1950, recruiting primarily from the 
émigré communities in Europe and the Unites States. RL would shortly follow suit, but 
focused on broadcasting inside the Soviet Union in 16 regional languages, including 
Russian. The two organizations provided “local news not covered in state-controlled 
domestic media as well as religion, science, sports, Western music and locally banned 
literature and music.” For much of Eastern Europe, RFE and RL served as critical links, 
not only to the Western world, but to their-own cultural and national identities that were 
under attack by Soviet propaganda.287 An effective early use of both mediums was the 
release and widespread dissemination of Khrushchev’s 1956 speech at the 20th Congress 
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of the CPSU, where the scope of Stalin’s crimes was revealed. The reaction to the speech 
set in motion reform movements across Eastern Europe and contributed to the 1956 
Hungarian Uprising, which was encouraged through RFE by suggestions of Western 
support and intervention that never materialized.288 The U.S. would learn its lesson and 
take a more tempered approach in future broadcasts, being careful not to instigate brutal 
Soviet oppression measures, while attempting to gradually influence societal perceptions. 
The broadcasts were met with continuous Soviet overt and covert measures, 
including long-distance jamming, sabotage, intimidation and terrorist actions, including 
the assassination of a Bulgarian correspondent in London in 1978 and the bombing of the 
RFE/RL headquarters in Munich in 1981.289 So critical was the perceived role of RFE/
RL in the final victory of the Polish Solidarity struggle that Lech Wałęsa, the cofounder 
of Solidarity and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, commented “Would there be earth without 
the sun?”290 
The United States Information Agency (USIA) was the overt information arm. Set 
up in 1953, it was charged with the conduct of “public diplomacy in support of U.S. 
foreign policy,” complementing U.S. diplomatic engagements by “communicating 
directly with foreign publics through a wide range of international information, 
educational and cultural exchange activities.”291 USIA absorbed Voice of America 
(VOA) as its radio arm, and utilized extensive broadcasts across the globe to push U.S. 
values. USIA was used to a high degree of success in the 1950s, but some claim its 
“unbiased mandate” for objectivity clouded its usefulness as a political tool, and as the 
U.S. domestic consensus regarding the Soviet Union began to falter in the 1960s and 70s, 
USIA began to view itself not as an instrument of national policy, but as an independent 
information medium. This began to change in the Carter administration, with Brzezinski 
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pushing the agency to adopt a more anti-Soviet line, and was finally reinvigorated in the 
Reagan administration with substantial funding increases and a new mandate to 
“reengage in ideological struggle with the Soviets.”292 
The U.S. counterpropaganda effort against Soviet active measures intensified in 
the 1980s with Congressional hearings on Soviet covert action (The Forgery Offensive) 
and the establishment of the Active Measures Working Group by the Reagan 
administration. The interagency effort produced a series of Foreign Affairs Notes that 
were distributed by the State Department, USIA, and VOA to a global audience, and 
were relatively successful at exposing Soviet front organizations and disinformation 
campaigns. The 1987 Foreign Affairs Note, compiled from reporting by CIA, USIA, and 
Department of State stations around the globe, described the extensive USSR campaign 
to frame the global AIDS epidemic as U.S. germ warfare against the Third World and 
their own gay community. The report gave the U.S. ammunition to coerce the Soviet 
Union into abandoning the propaganda campaign by threatening to stop all AIDS-related 
scientific aid and information to the USSR, which was dealing with its own growing 
epidemic. The effect was immediate and virtually all AIDS-related propaganda 
disappeared from the headlines. The newfound emphasis on this overt information 
warfare tilted the ideological balance in Europe and spearheaded the final campaign 
against the Soviet Union.293 
The early Cold War contest for information dominance, much like other 
confrontations between the two superpowers in the period, resulted in a protracted 
stalemate. In the 1970s, weak domestic consensus and strict congressional oversight 
resulting from revelations of CIA and executive impropriety caused a U.S. retreat from 
the information war, shifting the balance towards the Soviet Union. The United States 
was ultimately successful in the information arena by the revitalization of the media 
apparatus through the directed use of USIA, the State Department, and the CIA as 
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mutually supporting, but structurally independent, PW instruments within the framework 
of a cohesive foreign policy towards the USSR. This multiechelon effort would have 
been far less likely to succeed had the U.S. heavily relied on misinformation and black 
propaganda as a cornerstone of its information program. Any revelations of such 
activities would likely derail the weak domestic consensus remaining in the United 
States, taint the overall narrative (thus making it that much more unpalatable to target 
audiences), and create ample room for Soviet propaganda to discredit even the most 
benign U.S. efforts. Two critical lessons should be learned. First, the battle for 
perceptions is indispensable to foreign policy in a competitive environment and requires a 
substantial apportionment of national resources to be successful. An organization for the 
management of PW in the information environment, separate from the U.S. State 
Department to avoid mixing sensitive diplomacy initiatives with aggressive limited 
attribution information programs, is necessary to have an effective information system. 
Second, the United States has to rely heavily on truth to have an effective narrative; a 
limitation not shared by most of her geopolitical foes, both then and now. 
E. U.S. MILITARY POLITICAL WARFARE 
U.S. military PW can take many forms and vary in intensity. Actions can range 
from strategic signaling through exercises, force deployments, or weapons procurement 
projects, all the way to paramilitary activities and the use of conventional forces in proxy 
actions. Two PW categories, implemented effectively by the United States during the 
Cold War, deserve particular attention. The first is the development of NATO stay-
behind networks in Europe in the early Cold War period and the redesign of these 
networks to conduct operations against Soviet interests in the West. The second category 
of interest is the United States’ use of military and paramilitary global engagements as a 
PW tool against the Soviet Union. 
A critical medium for countering Soviet “active measures” in Europe was the 
covert repurposing of NATO stay-behind networks by the U.S. and British intelligence 
services. The organization was a net of semiautonomous resistance cells spread across 
Europe with the task of conducting partisan warfare in the Soviet rear in the event of a 
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Red Army offensive. This structure eventually transformed from a strict stay-behind 
element to a PW apparatus conducting anticommunist operations. This shadow 
organization, generally referred to by its Italian branch’s name Gladio, built upon the 
existing NATO structure, spanned across all of Western Europe and projected its 
influence into non-NATO member states. The frontlines of this conflict were most 
prominent in West Germany, Italy, and France,294 though actions between Soviet and 
Western intelligence agencies in peripheral spheres such as the Iberian Peninsula, Greece, 
Turkey, Belgium, Holland, and the Nordic countries were critical components to the 
eventual resolution of the overall struggle. 
Having lived under German occupation, many people in Western Europe 
understood the challenges associated with developing resistance movements after a 
territory became subjugated. Drawing on these lessons, and in light of a developing threat 
from Soviet invasion, West European nations began to develop internal stay-behind 
mechanisms shortly following the conclusion of the Second World War. These were 
modeled after their own World War II experiences, as well as the training and 
organization of “auxiliary units” in England, set up by the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE) in the event of a German invasion and occupation.295 U.S. and British intelligence 
services coordinated some of these efforts on a bilateral and, occasionally, on a trilateral 
basis, but no formal relationships existed until the creation of the Clandestine Committee 
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of the Western Union (CCWU) in 1948, the adaptation of the NATO charter, and the 
formation of the Coordination & Planning Committee (CPC) and Allied Coordination 
Committee (ACC) in the 1950s under the NATO umbrella.296 
United States Special Forces (USSF) and the British Special Air Service (SAS) 
interacted at the tactical level with NATO stay-behind elements, training operatives in 
sabotage and guerilla operations. USSF and SAS elements served as the principal trainers 
and facilitators for this network, developing coherent communication mechanisms, cross-
border “rat-lines,” 297 coordinating the distribution of large weapons and explosives 
caches across Europe, and conducting large-scale exercises in conjunction with 
conventional NATO forces.298 Flint Kaserne at Bad Tölz in Bavaria, home to the U.S. 
10th Special Forces Group, served as the primary training base on the European 
continent, with additional centers in Capo Marargiu in Sardinia and Las Palmas on the 
Canary Islands serving as principal training venues throughout the Cold War period.299 
Though the overt signature of such a secretive network made many member elements 
uncomfortable, a greater deterrent purpose was achieved by introducing added 
complexity into Soviet invasion and stabilization plans, especially as the scale and 
sophistication of the stay-behind network reached Soviet intelligence through the 
information sieve that was the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).300 
As the awareness of Soviet PW grew among Western powers and displaced the 
immediate prospect of a conventional military invasion, NATO planners and Western 
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intelligence agencies began to see the utility of well trained, difficult to penetrate 
preestablished networks. Such networks could be used to counter Soviet long-term plans 
to fracture and subjugate Europe using socialist and communist political movements. The 
unifying democratic principles shared by NATO members strictly contrasted with the 
notion of internal interference and psychological warfare. As a result, West European 
secret services, under the coordination and training of the CIA’s OPC301 and Section “D” 
of MI-6, began to repurpose the stay-behind networks for internal efforts against Soviet 
“active measures.”302 Initial responsibility for coordination was split, with MI-6 
developing and integrating clandestine networks in France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal 
and Norway, while OPC ran the nonaligned networks in Sweden and Finland, as well as 
the remainder of Western Europe.303 A psychological warfare department outside of 
NATO direct command was created in The Hague in 1962, designated the International 
Informational and Documentation Center (Interdoc), and aided in coordinating active 
information warfare in Europe through the national intelligence agencies and 
corresponding stay-behind networks.304 
At the operational and tactical level of the stay-behind networks, membership was 
restricted to individuals who were members of right-wing national groups or 
demonstrated anticommunist leanings to prevent infiltration and compromise. This 
reliance on right-wing membership would severely damage the networks long-term 
credibility, as some operatives were implicated in major overt actions against 
democratically elected officials, right-wing violence, and the tide of “black” right-wing 
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terrorism that swept across Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. The eventual unveiling of 
these networks and their CIA and NATO connections significantly discredited both 
organizations.305 
The network in West Germany is a good case study for understanding the 
effectiveness of the program across Europe. The CIA helped set up the stay behind 
“Technischer Dienst” of the “Bund Deutscher Jugend” (BDJ-TD), the existence of which 
was revealed in 1952. In addition to organizing resistance and sabotage operations in the 
event of a Soviet invasion, the stay-behind network had the role of domestic subversion 
against the Communist Party of Germany (KDP) and the Socialist Party of Germany 
(SDP).306 During this period, German stay-behind members (not only from the BDJ-TD) 
worked in close cooperation with the Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the 
German internal security service, and the ORG (Organization Gehlen) in a 
counterpropaganda and information war against communist elements.307 After the 1952 
revelations, the ORG absorbed many BDJ-TD elements. West Germany joined NATO in 
May 1955, and the ORG became formally incorporated into the NATO CPC/ACC 
structure, changing its name to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in 1956, and establishing 
Department IV as the West German stay-behind element.308 The anticommunist PW 
campaign in West Germany proved to be an effective counter to Soviet propaganda and 
attempts to reintegrate East and West Germany on Soviet terms. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the West German stay-behind network was 
also its biggest flaw: the lack of operational security and ease of access by Soviet 
intelligence agencies. The German BND was considered a “high-risk” service by most 
Western security services and NATO, as infiltration by the East German Ministerium fur 
Staatssicherheitsdient – Stasi (MfS) was rampant due to the shared culture and 
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camaraderie across the German east-west divide. As a result, the Stasi and Moscow were 
well informed of both West German and NATO stay-behind network structures and 
capabilities, at one time running the deputy chief of the BND, Joachim Krase, as a high-
level intelligence source. According to declassified Stasi documents, the East Germans 
cracked the BND stay-behind “Harpoon” codes in 1979 and were able to identify over 50 
operative locations on the East German and Czechoslovakian borders.309 The deterrent 
and strategic signaling aspect of the stay-behind net should not be undervalued, however, 
as both Soviet plans for military intervention or political reunification would be 
exponentially more difficult given the expansive structure and capabilities of a German 
resistance. 
The United States, just like the USSR, engaged in numerous proxy conflicts, 
mainly in the Third World. War, “an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds,”310 
whether executed covertly by a national intelligence service or conducted overtly by the 
legitimate military arm of a nation-state, can only belong in the military element of 
national power. What places most Cold War military and paramilitary actions in the PW 
realm is the proxy nature of the conflicts, where the intended primary target of the action 
was not a principal belligerent. Virtually all the paramilitary actions and conventional 
engagements by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were PW 
activities executed in tertiary worldwide engagements, aimed to tilt the global balance of 
power between the two superpowers. 
There exists a blurred line separating conventional and political war. U.S. “hot” 
conflicts in the Cold War, such as Korea and Vietnam, existed on both sides of this 
divide. The Korean War is by far the farthest removed from the PW realm, especially 
once China entered the conflict in late 1950 and Soviet MiG-15s began engaging in air-
to-air combat with U.S. aircraft in 1951.311 Vietnam, due to its limited nature and lack of 
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direct confrontation between the United States and the USSR or China, was a far murkier 
affair, and contained elements more closely resembling classic PW activity, such as the 
Phoenix program, which was designed “to attack and destroy the political infrastructure 
of the Lao Dong Party . . . in South Vietnam.”312 Further into the PW realm were OPC 
and CIA paramilitary actions, starting with the civil war in Greece and the failed attempts 
at unconventional warfare in the Baltic States, Albania, Poland, and Ukraine in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. U.S. military engagements during the Cold War ran the full 
spectrum of military and paramilitary activity. These included sponsored unconventional 
warfare in Guatemala, Tibet and Afghanistan; covert counterinsurgency efforts in the 
Congo; direct paramilitary action such as the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba;313 
and conventional military interventions such as Operation POWER PACK in the 
Dominican Republic314 and Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada.315 The one unifying 
feature of these actions was the strategic proxy nature of the conflicts, aimed at 
preventing or rolling back Soviet influence through the spread of communism. The 
strategic signaling effect of these actions is another key aspect of proxy warfare. By 
engaging in these conflicts, the United States was communicating to the Soviet Union its 
intentions to aggressively hold on to their sphere of influence in Latin America and 
Western Europe, and to preserve pockets of influence in Africa, the Middle East,  
and Asia. 
Key lessons emerge from both the Gladio program and proxy warfare during the 
Cold War. The Gladio networks allowed the United States and its allies to counteract 
Soviet initiatives in Western Europe. The infrastructure developed under the banner of 
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the “stay-behind” proved a far more effective PW mechanism in coordinating anti-Soviet 
efforts across the continent. The critical lesson learned from these networks is that an 
effective covert infrastructure to combat subversion efforts by an adversary as robust and 
effective as the Soviet Union is difficult to develop without a pre-established backbone. 
The stay-behind networks set-up after the Second World War provided just such a 
mechanism, allowing for the creation of counter-subversion elements under a NATO 
banner. The idea of a Gladio-type organization as an unconventional deterrent is also 
noteworthy. This concept is often overlooked by policy makers that view clandestine and 
covert activities as incompatible with credible deterrent signaling in geopolitics. On the 
contrary, this type of deterrence is precisely PW conducted through strategic military 
signaling and is a viable military counter to the preferred vanguard of belligerent global 
actors today: engineered social movements. Finally, the use of conventional force and 
paramilitary action by the United States as a PW tool was a key factor in maintaining the 
structural global balance between the superpowers. The negative regional and social 
effects of these conflicts were massive. U.S. actions created protracted animosity towards 
the United States in key regions across the globe, kept repressive regimes in power for 
decades, and tallied up an enormous human cost with protracted civil wars and 
insurgencies, some lasting well into the 90s. When looking at these conflicts from a long-
term strategic perspective, the United States managed to contain global Soviet influence 
by the limited application of military force. These U.S. military PW actions greatly 
contributed to the USSR disengaging from military activities in the Third World in the 
late-1980s and abandoning the Brezhnev doctrine in Europe. The Soviet Union simply 
could not afford to play the game any longer. Had the United States chosen not to engage 
in these proxy wars, communism and Soviet influence would have likely spread globally, 
and the United States could have become progressively isolated in the international 
community. West European economic and security consensus could have fractures and 
been replaced with a Soviet-dominated, pan-European security structure, and the idea of 
Western democracy might have slowly faded into the shadows. 
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F. U.S. ECONOMIC POLITICAL WARFARE 
The use of economic warfare by the United States in the early days of the Cold 
War was hallmarked by embargos against communist states, primarily in the realm of 
strategic technology that could aid the Soviet Union in developing their military capacity. 
They were further intended to exploit the inefficiency of the command economy and 
provoke its eventual collapse. To increase the effectiveness of this economic lever, a 
Coordination Committee (COCOM) made up of NATO members was formed in 1949 to 
develop multilateral embargo lists and lasted through the duration of the Cold War. The 
COCOM lists were far less robust than the U.S. national list, and the United States would 
use the Marshall aid program to pressure COCOM members into compliance with the 
national list, most notably using the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 
(Battle Act) that banned U.S. assistance to nations dealing with the Soviet Union.316 
On the covert side, the OPC conducted extensive economic actions targeting the 
Soviet Union. These involved commodity operations including “preclusive buying, 
market manipulation, and black market projects,” and fiscal operations such as 
counterfeiting and currency speculation.317 The commodity covert measures were critical 
components of the overt embargo policy by denying Moscow strategic resources already 
squeezed by the overt resource denial programs. Fiscal operations targeted broader 
strategic aims. One example included cross-border OPC counterfeiting operations 
designed to destabilize the Czechoslovakian economy and increase dissent in the  
Soviet satellite.318 
As the Soviet economy developed into a competitive global force in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the use of embargos shifted in purpose from a strategic technology and 
commodity denial program to a more pragmatic soft power tool. This tool was designed 
to extract favorable agreements from the USSR and force them to “behave in the 
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international economy so as not to gain political advantage in Third World counties or to 
cause distortions in the free market.”319 
Following the détente period of the 1970s, the U.S. reinvigorated its use of the 
economic lever against the USSR by attempting to “undermine Soviet standing in the 
world financial markets, attacked its export earnings, tightened the technological 
blockade, forced the U.S.S.R. into a military spending contest and bled it through a proxy 
war in Afghanistan.”320 The Reagan White House, through NSDD-66 entitled 
“Protracted Economic Warfare Against the U.S.S.R.,” established a policy of intensifying 
the economic privation within the Soviet Union.321 Though the view persists that the 
objectives of the Reagan White House was to “starve” the Soviet Union into collapse 
through export control, global commodities manipulation, and a forced arms race, the 
overall strategy centered on bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table with a 
weak position and developing constructive agreements that favored the United States.322 
The Soviet Union remained relatively secure from direct economic manipulation 
due to a wealth of natural resources, reasonably secure foreign exchange reserves, limited 
interaction within the international capital market, and heavy investment in the 
exportation of strategic commodities that were too important to embargo. Despite this 
security, vulnerabilities did exist, especially with the USSR’s dependence on capital 
generated by the oil and gas market to maintain the Soviet military and industrial 
capacity, the requirement for hard currency, and the relative economic weakness of 
Soviet Bloc members such as Poland.323 
In the summer of 1981, the United States launched its economic offensive against 
the USSR. Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe had limited export capacity to the 
West, and the “bloc’s only significant source of hard currency . . . was Soviet oil and gas 
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sales.”324 This made most East European economies wholly dependent on the Soviet 
Union. Poland was especially vulnerable, needing to borrow “$10 to $11 Billion, of 
which $7 to $8 Billion would roll over the huge existing debt.”325 The United States 
pressured Western banks to demand immediate repayment of Polish debt, causing a 
Soviet bailout of $4.5 billion in hard currency, essentially wiping out Soviet hard 
currency reserves in Western banks and helping shift the Soviet trade surplus of 1980 to a 
$3 billion deficit.326 The attack on the Soviet system took on a simple formula; grain and 
energy. Soviet collectivization under Stalin and shortsighted agricultural reforms under 
Khrushchev turned the USSR into a net importer of grain by the mid-1960s, with 
domestic production fixed at 65 million tons per year for nearly two decades through the 
1980s. The growing urban population in the Soviet Union demanded the ever-increasing 
imports of grain from the West, and the corresponding hard currency outflow was only 
partially offset by the oil and gas exports.327 Reagan reversed Carter’s embargos on U.S. 
grain sales to the US.SR that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was not a 
humanitarian gesture. The move further extracted hard currency from the Soviet Union 
and left the Soviet oil and gas sector as the single pillar holding up the Eastern Bloc.328 
U.S. efforts at affecting the Soviet natural gas exports to Europe played a key role 
in pressuring the Soviet economy. The United States prevented the full development of a 
trans-Siberian natural gas pipeline that would supply Western Europe by denying the use 
of any American equipment or technology, to include the use of U.S. subsidiaries abroad 
in the construction of the project. This led the USSR to sink billions of additional dollars 
into the venture that, in the end, could only produce half of the original expected 
capacity.329 In 1982, the project suffered a massive setback when a multikiloton 
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explosion destroyed a significant amount of pipeline. The explosion has been attributed 
to a CIA effort to use a Canadian company to develop deliberately flawed software that, 
after a period of normal operation, “reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce 
pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds.” Thanks to 
Western penetration of the KGB’s Directorate T for Science and Technology, the CIA 
supposedly knew of the Soviet plans to steal the software and was able to place the 
“Trojan Horse” and conduct perhaps the first large-scale, industrial cyber-attack  
in history.330 
U.S. options in effecting Soviet revenue from oil production were limited, 
primarily centering on the ban of advanced extraction technology that the Soviet Union 
could not procure elsewhere. In 1980, the price of crude had spiked to over $35 per barrel 
and coincided with a major increase in gold prices. To put this into perspective, the 
Soviet economy annually gained roughly one billion USD for every one dollar increase in 
crude. Over the next six years, however, the price of both oil and gas were gradually 
driven down, causing a final plunge of oil prices in 1986 to under $10 per barrel and a 
near 50% devaluation of gold.331 Throughout the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia and other 
OPEC nations attempted to prop up the price of oil by cutting production, but waning 
global demand and the introduction of new sources of petroleum from the North Sea, 
Mexico, and Alaska, as well as the refusal of emerging petrol players such as Great 
Brittan and Norway to cut production prevented such price manipulation.332 There still 
remains some debate about whether the final collapse of oil in 1986 was a product of a 
U.S.-Saudi economic warfare strategy to influence the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan or 
simply a Saudi move to ramp up production and find a bottom to the market, paving the 
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way for a gradual price recovery.333 The likely scenario is that both factors played into 
the Saudi calculus. The gradual squandering of Soviet gold reserves (from over 2,000 
tons in 1953 to just under 600 in 1984) in supporting pro-Soviet regimes and buttressing 
a structurally weak Soviet economy in the preceding decades,334 and the drop of gold 
prices from the 1980 peak further complicated the Soviet economic position. The 
combined effect on the USSR was staggering, causing a near $20 billion loss in annual 
revenue, the necessity for increased dependence on foreign lending to prevent a complete 
economic meltdown across the Soviet Bloc, and was perhaps the pivotal condition 
leading to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.335 
U.S. economic PW directly targeted the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the 
1980s and was a decisive factor in resolving the Cold War. A wide range of measures 
were employed by the United States including the denial of technology, preclusive 
commodities purchasing, currency and banking sector manipulation, the initiation of an 
arms race that the Soviet economy could not afford, and indirect sabotage of Soviet oil 
and gas infrastructure. The “weight” of U.S. economic leverage in the twentieth century 
was its biggest strategic asset. This was especially true in the PW realm; however, this 
view advances the flawed concept of a “weighted” U.S. strategy towards the economic 
lever of national power that has persisted to this day. The Cold War was won across all of 
DIME; synchronized by a clear expression of national strategic objectives. Overreliance 
on the economic lever of power, while neglecting other PW options, allows an opponent 
to predict, compensate for, and counteract economic measures; a pattern that has clearly 
reemerged in the twenty-first century. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
The United States succeeded in the Cold War thanks, in large part, to the 
effectiveness of its PW programs. Two central concepts made these programs successful. 
First, U.S. PW was effective when it supported clearly stated, overt, national objectives. 
This was true in the 1950s and 60s with the policy of containing the Soviet Union, but not 
aggressively contesting for space within the Soviet sphere. The policy may have 
generated Western inaction during the uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but maintained U.S. strategic influence in Africa, 
Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, Asia. The breakdown of domestic consensus in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, and the added turmoil over the CIAs covert action programs, 
created a rift between national strategy and PW that allowed the USSR to fill the empty 
space and make significant strategic gains. The shift to an aggressive and overt anti-
Soviet national policy in the 1980s, coupled with a heavy investment in PW mechanisms, 
allowed the United States to reengage in the Cold War, but this time with the aim of 
rolling back Soviet global influence and domination of Eastern Europe. 
The second key factor for the success of U.S. PW programs was the synchronized 
approach that included substantial effort and commitment of national resources across the 
DIME spectrum. The 1980s saw a reinvigoration of PW with numerous covert actions; 
the National Endowment for Democracy and similar diplomatic programs a new focus on 
countering Soviet propaganda and aggressively engaging in the information domain with 
USIA, VOA, RFE/RL, and the U.S. State Department; military support for the 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and a growing arms race that the Soviet Union could not 
afford, and, finally aggressive economic warfare targeted at the heart of a structurally 
flawed Soviet command economy. The pressure generated on the Soviet system by a 
synchronized PW campaign across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic 
levers of national power in support of a singular, overt national policy objective of the 
United States was a major contributing factor to the collapse of USSR’s domination of 
Eastern Europe and the eventual failure of the 74-year experiment in Soviet communism. 
As is often the case with empires, victory brought neglect, and aggressive U.S. PW was 
decried as a vestige of the Cold War, unsuitable for the new internationalist structure. 
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H. CASE STUDY: SOLIDARITY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE EASTERN 
BLOC 
The Pope! How many divisions has he got? 
-Joseph Stalin336 
The triumph of the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s is perhaps the finest 
example of successful U.S. PW against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike 
Soviet models that relied on a phased, protracted, and systematic approach, U.S. political 
warfare was far more opportunistic and reactionary in nature. For this reason, structurally 
framing a case study on U.S. PW using a phased model, similar to the Soviet case studies, 
is problematic. The U.S. PW campaign in Poland did not generate the labor crisis, nor the 
economic privation of the Polish command economy, nor orchestrate the formation and 
organization of Polish opposition. The U.S. simply exploited an existing opportunity that 
practically fell in its lap. Following the declaration of martial law by the Polish regime in 
1981, the United States responded with a well-coordinated PW strategy that effectively 
used purported covert action337 and overt policies across the diplomatic, economic, and 
most importantly, the informational elements of national power. U.S. support for the 
Solidarity trade union helped sustain the opposition, enabling the gradual change in the 
geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Bloc. 
U.S. willingness to engage in aggressive PW in Poland, with covert action as a key 
element, was just one of many factors that contributed to the overall resolution of the 
Cold War. However, without such measures being implemented across the full breadth of 
national capacity in lock step with overt national aims, the repressive regimes behind the 
Iron Curtain would likely endure well into the ‘90s and perhaps beyond. This case study 
                                                 
336 As quoted in Winston Churchill, The Second World War (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), vol. 
1, ch. 8, 105. 
337 The USG does not officially confirm that a covert program took place in Poland; however, multiple 
unofficial sources exist to substantiate the contention that a covert action occurred. All further references in 
this document to U.S. covert action are substantiated only through available open sources, and cannot be 
verified through official USG channels. See: Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s 
Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War  
(New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 450–51; Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan 
Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York, NY: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1994); Carl Bernstein, “Cover Story: The Holy Alliance,” Time, June 24, 2001. 
 123
mirrors the structure of the preceding chapter, discussing the background, covert action 
program, and PW across three of the four elements of national power. The military 
played an important background role in U.S. strategy by helping containing the Soviet 
threat, but was not a principal component of the PW action in Poland. 
1. Background 
Helsinki was a major turning point in the Cold War. Criticized by many as the 
selling of Eastern Europe to the Soviets through the reaffirmation of Yalta, the 1975 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gained something enigmatic 
and invaluable for the West—it created a spark of resistance. By 1976, a number of 
organizations began to spring up across Eastern Europe in line with the CSCE human 
rights provision. This was especially evident in Poland, which had a strong resistance 
base following the strikes by the Gdańsk shipyard workers in 1970 that ended in a violent 
military crackdown, but forced significant regime concessions.338 The Helsinki accords 
allowed Polish opposition to form the Workers’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony 
Robotników – KOR) and the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch 
Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela - ROPCiO), organizations that “gave rise to the 
idea of an independent trade union to defend the rights of workers.”339 
The Catholic Church also played a key role in the Polish resistance movement. 
While KOR and ROPCiO provided the structural base for the formation of Solidarity in 
1980, the strength of will to challenge the existing regime, as well as the underground 
networks to sustain the dissident movement in its darkest hours, had their origins in 1978, 
with the election of Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II. In June 1979, 
John Paul returned to Poland and, while speaking to crowds numbering in the millions, 
challenged the fundamental premise of communism and reaffirmed the idea of human 
and spiritual freedom in the Polish narrative and the necessity to maintain trust and faith, 
and “not be defeated.” The Polish regime propaganda and censorship efforts failed, and 
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only highlighted the crude efforts to misrepresent the dramatic events unfolding before 
their very eyes.340 
Solidarity formed in August 1980, arising out of growing strikes at the Gdańsk 
shipyards that expanded to support mines, factories, and businesses across the country. 
The movement, organized under the Interfactory Strike Committee (Międzyzakładowy 
Komitet Strajkowy, MKS), issued a list of 21 demands including the acceptance of free 
trade unions independent of the Communist Party; freedom of speech, the press, and 
publication; access to mass media; the release of all political prisoners; and the selection 
of management independent of communist party affiliation.341 The possibility of 
nationwide work stoppages forced the regime to accept the demands and triggered the 
resignation of Edward Gierek as party chairman, who was replaced by Stanislaw Kania 
on 6 September 1980.342 From the perspective of the USSR, the path Poland was taking 
resembled the Czechoslovakian reform movements in 1968. The entire Soviet system was 
in danger. By mid-September, growing concern of a Soviet military intervention began to 
emerge. A military intervention was supposedly planned for 5 December and several 
accounts indicate that preemptive signaling by the Carter Administration and Kania’s 
pleas for more time convinced the Warsaw Pact leadership to delay the invasion.343 
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Politburo minutes from the time period, however, indicate that the invasion plans and 
corresponding preparations were likely an elaborate deception operation (maskirovka) 
designed to pressure the Polish government into harsher control measures.344 
In early spring, 1981, the situation in Poland began to deteriorate again, with 
Solidarity continuing to extract concessions from the regime, especially on issues of 
security service repression and political prisoners.345 CIA assessments of the situation 
indicated a serious dilemma for the Soviet Union. CIA Director William Casey wrote to 
the President: 
If they go [invade], they will get economic chaos arising from the debt, a 
slowdown of the whole Polish work force and millions of Poles 
conducting a guerrilla war against them. If they don’t, they are open to the 
West and a political force which could unravel their entire system. Before 
sending divisions in, they will move heaven and earth to get the Poles to 
crack down on themselves.346 
The assessment was accurate, and the Soviets determined that the price to pay for 
a military intervention was too high. The decision was the death knell for the Soviet 
Union. Solidarity continued its peaceful strikes and intensified pressure on the regime 
through early December 1981. The Soviets rejected proposed policies of Polish “national 
reconciliation” and forced a resolution. Communist Party Chairman Kania was replaced 
by Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, who assumed both of the top posts in Poland. On 
13 December, amid the threat of a general strike, martial law was declared.347 
The declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981 was the impetus for 
initiating a comprehensive overt and covert program to challenge the Soviet Union in 
Poland. Solidarity was outlawed, nearly 6,000 leaders within the movement were 
detained, with hundreds charged with “treason, subversion and counterrevolution,” and 
                                                 
344 Wilfried Loth, “The Soviet Nonintervention in Poland, 1980/81,” Lelewel-Gespräche, Historisches 
Institut der Universität Duisburg-Essen, June 2012. 
345 Ibid., 231. 
346 Ibid., 232. 
347 Ibid., 232–237. 
 126
Polish resistance was driven underground and on the verge of collapse.348 Prior to the 
declaration of martial law, Solidarity operated openly for nearly 16 months, becoming 
ingrained in the Polish national narrative. The crackdown was an opportunity for the U.S. 
to exploit the massive resentment growing within Polish society and help bring the 
Catholic Church into “direct conflict with the Polish Regime.”349 
On June 7, 1982, Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II met for the first time in 
the Vatican Library. Both men shared a common vision that rejected the communist 
dominance in Eastern Europe imposed by the 1945 Yalta accord. The extent of the 
collaboration between the Catholic Church and the United States Government over 
Poland remains unknown; however, at a minimum, the exchange of intelligence did take 
place. The Catholic Church would go on to play a critical role in the mitigation of violent 
repression by the Polish government and fostering eventual dialogue with Solidarity. On 
the local level, Catholic institutions would serve as vital hubs of the Polish underground 
movement.350 
The hesitation of the Soviet and Polish regimes to use the Red Army to crush 
unrest, as they did in East Germany and Hungary in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in 
1968, exposed a critical vulnerability inside the Iron Curtain. For the United States, the 
concept to exploit this vulnerability was simple. If Solidarity could be kept alive and 
nurtured through both covert and overt actions following the imposition of martial law, 
and the Communist PRL (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) government gradually made to 
look impotent in the face of popular opposition, then Poland could be made to move 
Westward, if not torn away from the Soviet orbit entirely.351 
                                                 






2. U.S. Covert Action 
The covert action was undertaken under the wide-ranging umbrella of NSDD 
Number 32, which laid out Reagan’s National Security Strategy. NSDD-32 reversed the 
long-standing policy of containment that had pervaded U.S. foreign policy for nearly 30 
years, stating that a fundamental U.S. objective was to “reverse the expansion of Soviet 
control and military presence throughout the world” and “encourage long-term 
liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.”352 
The cornerstone of the covert action was the supply of funding for Polish 
resistance. The CIA used various European financial institutions with existing Polish ties 
to funnel money to Solidarity. By the mid-1980s, Solidarity’s operational budget was 
upwards of $2 million,353 principally funneled through CIA fund transfer mechanisms, 
using witting and unwitting European financial institutions and individuals.354 CIA 
contact with Solidarity was established inside Poland by February 1982, instituting the 
funding transfer mechanism through a European businessman in Warsaw.355 Equipment 
and technology also played a vital role. The CIA used various channels to smuggle funds 
and media support infrastructure to Solidarity. The network encompassed Catholic 
priests, recruited agents, U.S. and European labor organizations,356 and newly activated 
smuggling mechanisms that included the direct maritime shipments from Sweden to the 
Gdańsk shipyards using an Israeli Mossad ratline, where the Polish underground 
collected the equipment prior to inspection.357 Large quantities of third party-purchased 
printing presses, copiers, fax machines, cameras, shortwave radios and transmitters, 
teleprinters, and computers, were smuggled into Poland and formed the physical 
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infrastructure to sustain Solidarity through enhanced command and control and 
propaganda potential.358 Most mechanisms remained unaware of CIA involvement in the 
process. The logistics chain included multiple large storage warehouses in Brussels and 
operatives in Stockholm that would remark shipping containers as “tractor parts,” 
“machine tools,” and “fish products,” and ship them to operatives in Gdańsk for 
distribution in Poland.359 To enhance Solidarity’s intelligence capability and preempt 
regime action, the CIA reportedly deployed a four-man, joint CIA-NSA Special 
Collection Element that conducted both passive and active operations in Warsaw, 
attempting to provide intelligence support to the Polish underground.360 The amount of 
direct intelligence actually reaching the underground through this channel is speculative; 
however, by 1983, a Polish underground security and intelligence organization, referred 
to as the Bureau of Hygiene and Safety, was set up by the resistance. Resistance 
operatives in the Bureau maintained communication equipment, served as a hub for 
resistance command and control, conducted site surveys for meeting locations and 
hideouts, and managed counterintelligence (CI) operations against potential infiltration of 
the opposition by Polish or Soviet security services.361 
3. Diplomatic 
On the diplomatic side, relentless U.S. pressure to force the Polish government to 
accept Solidarity played a critical role in the eventual success of the movement. 
Following the implementation of martial law, the U.S. suspended Poland’s “most-
favored-nation trade status and vetoed Poland’s application for membership in the 
International Monetary Fund.”362 Martial law was lifted in 1983, but this was, in reality, 
a façade. Multiple new laws designed to suppress Solidarity, even stricter than those 
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enforced under martial law, were adopted by the regime.363 The United States continued 
the pressure, demanding a change in Poland’s political prisoner policy and movement 
towards “political pluralism.”364 The United States further used indirect ties to parts of 
the European socialist international, including French and Swedish officials, to support 
programs aimed at the gradual establishment of a Christian Democratic majority in 
Poland, leading to the reconstitution of the Polish Socialist Party in 1987.365 
The AFL-CIO had a long-standing relationship with Polish labor movements 
through the 1970s,366 and became the primary mechanism of U.S. support for the 
Solidarity movement in 1980 and 1981.367 Following the imposition of martial law, the 
AFL-CIO was intimately involved in the assistance and preparation of propaganda 
material and the smuggling of equipment to Solidarity. Though U.S. covert programs 
were kept from the ALF-CIO leaders, so as not to degrade the legitimacy of the 
organization, a high degree of coordination with the administration did exist. The biggest 
advantage that the AFL-CIO had over CIA covert action was its ability to assist in the 
organization and management of the movement. This had a decisive impact on the long-
term sustainability and viability of Solidarity in Poland.368 By 1983, the AFL-CIO had 
been absorbed under Reagan’s initiative for the NED. The NED was an aggressive 
venture to support various prodemocracy movements worldwide, and was the principal 
mechanism to supply funds to anticommunist organizations. The NED provided some 
$3.7 million to Solidarity, starting in 1984.369 
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4. Information 
Propaganda played a critical role in Solidarity’s long-term success. CIA-funded 
equipment and support started arriving in 1982, which allowed for the mass publication 
of print media and broadcast signal intrusion. The overall purpose of the propaganda 
campaign was to “supply uncensored information on political, social, and economic 
issues, and to maintain a spirit of opposition among the populace.”370 Poland’s strong 
history of underground press through the nineteenth and twentieth centuriesfrom Polish 
dissident literature during the revolt against Russia in 1863, to resistance publications 
during the Second World War, to the anticommunist press that flourished even under 
Stalin’s subjugation in the 1940s and 1950s—set the eventual conditions for the success 
of Solidarity in the 1980s.371 
In the mid-1970s, Polish opposition was again on the rise, and the regime was 
reluctant to aggressively block the dissident press for fear of destabilizing the delicate 
sociopolitical structure. The Workers’ Defense Committee was very active during this 
period in distributing illegal publications including Communique (Lomunikat), 
Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informatcyjny), and The Worker (Rabotnik). Further illegal 
ventures included NOWA, an independent publishing house targeting “laborers, students, 
farmers, and other social groups.” These organizations were the seeds of the Solidarity’s 
media network that emerged by mid-1980.372 Solidarity made significant early strides 
after its inception, extracting free-media concessions from the Polish government that 
included legal recognition of unofficial publishing activities, respect for freedom of 
speech, and commitments not to suppress independent publications. The movement also 
ran its own press, Solidarity Weekly (Tygodnik Solidarnosci), with individual branches 
across the country contributing with a number of secondary journals and newsletters.373 
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The base for Polish underground propaganda was very strong and, with Solidarity being 
driven underground after the declaration of martial law, became a solid foundation for 
U.S. covert action. 
The martial law period lasted until July 1983. During this time, much of the 
existing Solidarity infrastructure operated on a limited basis from within the urban 
centers, but nonetheless kept up a significant level of publication consisting of short 
newsletters and limited runs on periodicals, largely restricted by the availability of 
equipment and the regime’s strict monitoring and attempted control of printing supplies. 
By the mid-1980s, however, the Polish underground press was reinvigorated with 
funding, equipment, and supplies. New dissident press organizations began to take 
prominence and made up for aggressive regime suppression of Solidarity print and 
broadcast media. These included the Committees for Social Defense (Komitety Oborony 
Spolecznej) that published KOS, a journal directed at the Polish intellectual community; 
Fighting Solidarity (Solidarnosc Walczaca), advocating a more confrontational position 
within Solidarity; and The Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja 
Polski Niepodleglej), which propagated an aggressive antiregime stance through journals 
Independence (Niepodleglosc) and We Don’t Want Commies (Nie chcemy komuny).374 
CIA funds were funneled directly into NOWA and supported weekly newspapers such as 
Tygodnik Mazowsze, which was operated through an impressive clandestine network 
consisting of 37 different printing locations prior to actual assembly and distribution.375 
Émigré journals, namely the Paris-based Kultura and the opposition publication, Aneks, 
based in Sweden, also played an important role in the Polish resistance. Kultura was 
founded in 1946 and served as an intellectual outlet for the opposition in the 1980s, 
coordinating and framing the debate within Solidarity, while circulating appropriate 
tactics and strategy, especially during the martial law period.376 In the 1950s and ‘60s, 
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Kultura was funded heavily by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a CIA-backed front 
organization designed to support anticommunist publications in Western Europe.377 
By 1985, the Polish resistance was producing some 400 underground periodicals, 
with circulation in the tens of thousands. Thousands of books and pamphlets directly 
challenged Soviet authority and the Polish communist government. Anticommunist 
documentaries were widely distributed and viewed by millions of Poles.378 
Videocassettes from the Paris-based Videoknotakt organization and Polish-produced 
interviews with Lech Wałęsa were in wide circulation. Audiocassettes with antiregime 
songs, news, interviews with various dissident leaders, and programs on Poland’s history 
added to the media onslaught.379 Radio Solidarity, set up during the martial law period by 
Zbigniew Romaszewski, recovered from initial suppression and was effectively operating 
across Poland.380 Solidarity broke through Polish television and radio broadcasts with 
slogans of Solidarność Żyje (Solidarity Lives), and “RESIST,” calling for mass 
demonstrations and strikes.381 More symbolic propaganda efforts included the printing of 
stamps depicting dissident Polish leaders, commemorating “150 Years of Underground 
Press in Poland,” and even honoring George Orwell, as well as counterfeit currency 
depicting Lech Wałęsa in place of Polish communist leaders.382 
RFE and VOA were also instrumental in the information campaign in Poland. 
During the Pope’s visit in 1979, both VOA383 and RFE384 provided minute-by-minute 
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coverage of the events, largely negating Polish censorship attempts, while stressing the 
Pope’s calls for religious and social freedom. Just prior to and during the marital law 
period, RFE exercised a restrained approach. Having learned hard lessons from 
encouraging the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and watching it be crushed by Soviet tanks, 
RFE walked the fine line of supporting Solidarity and streaming much needed 
information to the opposition, while at the same time not encouraging open confrontation 
that could spark a Soviet intervention.385 As the movement was driven underground and 
Radio Solidarity suffered significant setbacks, including the seizure of several 
transmitters in August 1982,386 RFE and VOA became the principal source of 
information. RFE broadcast streamed programs critiquing communist policies, focused 
on the dismal state of the Polish economy, and presented a noncommunist vision of 
Poland in a program entitled The Poland that Could Be.387 Due to strong jamming, VoA 
generally came in better than RFE in many areas, and provided a similar narrative, 
broadcasting interviews with Polish opposition leaders, reporting on U.S. and private 
efforts to help the dissident movement, calling for the release of political prisoners, 
stressing the need for national reconciliation, and even running religious services from a 
Polish-American church in the D.C. area.388 
5. Economic 
By 1980, Poland, weighed down by nearly $25 billion in foreign debt, 
plummeting national income, and a stall in foreign investment entered an economic crisis. 
The economic turmoil created a unique opportunity for the United States to engage in 
proxy PW in Poland.389 The Solidarity trade union movement, primarily made up of 
shipyard and coal workers, was the ideal economic instrument for the United States to 
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pressure the Polish system into capitulation and reform. In the already weakened 
economic environment, any labor stoppages in the coal mines spelled financial disaster 
for the Polish communist government, as Poland almost wholly relied on coal export to 
pay for its petroleum imports from the USSR, as well as generating much of its revenue 
from West European trade. From 1980-1981, work stoppages and wide-spread labor 
agitation were having a devastating impact on the already run-down Polish economy.390 
Polish national income had dropped by 25%, standards of living had plummeted, inflation 
was at 15% in the first half of 1981 alone, and food and base necessity items were barely 
enough to sustain the population. One-third of Poland’s industrial capacity was not 
functioning due to endemic “shortages of energy, materials, and intermediate goods.” 
Central planning was on the verge of collapse.391 
Once the Polish government declared martial law and banned the Solidarity 
movement, the United States responded by escalating its economic measures; stopping 
further lines of credit to the Polish government, ceasing the supply of grain crippling 
Poland’s agricultural sector, restricting Polish access to critical industrial equipment and 
technology, and increasing the tariffs on Polish goods. U.S. objectives were clear; to 
either force the Soviet Union into a bailout it could not afford, force the Polish 
government into deeper austerity and social control measures that would fracture the 
sociopolitical structure of the country, or extract drastic reform concessions from the 
Regime to bring Solidarity into the open political structure, eventually triggering a pro-
Western slide.392 Poland’s leadership attempted economic reforms to modernize factories 
and develop “market socialism,” but these were empty gestures that failed to accept the 
reality of a hollow and unrecoverable command economy. A combination of growing 
labor unrest, Western economic measures, dropping demand for poor quality Polish 
export goods, a substantial trade imbalance, mounting foreign debt, and high inflation 
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had effectively crippled the Polish economic system.393 The United States was able to 
effectively utilize economic pressure to destabilize the Polish economy and incentivize 
regime reforms so that Solidarity could survive. Following the lifting of martial law, U.S. 
sanctions remained in play to extract three primary demands from the Polish regime: a 
general amnesty for all political prisoners, the opening an official dialogue with the 
Church, and the recognition and acceptance of Solidarity. The regime conceded all 
three.394 More importantly, the United States used the hanging $2 billion in guaranteed 
credits that Poland could not repay, and the cessation of economic sanctions in 1987, to 
ease some economic pressure on the Polish population and guarantee Polish capitulation 
to move towards “national reconciliation.”395 This greatly bolstered the prospects for 
Solidarity to emerge from the shadows and advanced the possibility of ripping Poland 
from the Soviet Bloc. 
6. The Beginning of the End 
By early-1987, the internal and external pressure on the Polish regime was 
unbearable. Labor strikes and Western sanctions were crippling the Polish economy, and 
the Soviet Union was unable to support the Polish communists due to its own economic 
spiral, brought about by its failing command economy and aggressive U.S. economic 
warfare. By mid-1988, Gorbachev had publically rejected the concept of Soviet 
interference in Eastern Europe and stated that the Polish government could not function 
without Solidarity.396 Naïvely, Gorbachev believed the social and political reforms in 
Eastern Europe (and in the USSR) would usher in a new era of legitimate communist 
governance across the Bloc, disregarding the lessons of his predecessors that the entire 
communist system functioned on brutality, repression, and force.397 A final wave of labor 
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strikes at the Gdańsk shipyards and a number of coal mines in August 1988 finally forced 
the communist government to the negotiating table. Solidarity was legalized in April 
1989 and allowed to participate in open elections in June.398 Despite preelection public 
opinion polls “virtually assuring” a communist victory, Solidarity won all 161 of their 
allowed seats in the Sejm and 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate.399 Two key groups 
within the Communist PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza); the centrist 
Alliance of Democrats (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne) and the United Peoples Party 
(Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe), defected to join Solidarity and formed a new 
coalition government with a noncommunist prime minister.400 
The Communist monopoly on power in Easter Europe that had existed for over 40 
years had been broken. The Polish example opened a wave of counterrevolutionary 
transitions in Eastern Europe, with Hungary abandoning “Leninism” and opening its 
boarders for the passage of East Germans fleeing to the West, the fall of the Berlin Wall 
on 9 November 1989, and revolutions in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania in the 
closing months of 1989.401 The Soviet Union would stumble along for another two years, 
until it, too, dissolved under its own weight. 
7. Analysis 
The success of the U.S. PW program in Poland can be attributed to a number of 
fundamental maxims that still apply today. First, information is a dominant instrument of 
national policy, but any actions within this domain must be conducted with a careful 
understanding of the cultural and political environment, and supported by a significant 
commitment of national resources to be effective. The success of the Polish opposition 
can be largely attributed to the relentless campaign of print, broadcast, and electronic 
media that exploited the existing disequilibrium in the socio-political structure. U.S. 
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covert and overt focus on the information domain during and following the martial law 
period, from 1981-1989, had the greatest external impact on the survival and ultimate 
success of the Polish opposition. 
Second, economic and diplomatic leverage are excellent tools in PW, but require 
a robust information component to effectively negate the countermeasures of totalitarian 
states. Without controlling information, the effects of external economic and diplomatic 
pressure can be turned to support the target regime’s narrative by blaming internal 
problems on external influence and galvanizing nationalism to support regime policies. 
Economic sanctions, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic actions, and support for the 
opposition through U.S. and international labor organizations contributed to Solidarity’s 
victory, but the heavy emphasis on information dominance by the opposition and its 
Western sponsors kept the dissident movement alive and active while under regime 
repression. The key emerging feature of PW is that a totalitarian state’s ability to deny the 
means of communication to the opposition is a decisive element in overall success or 
failure. Likewise, the ability of an external entity engaged in PW to gain, maintain, and 
expand its information footprint, either directly or through proxy, is a fundamental 
component of a sound strategy. 
Third, a limited, well-defined covert action program that supports overt U.S. 
policy is indispensable to achieving national objectives when dealing with repressive 
authoritarian regimes. At a minimum, covert logistics and financial support to dissident 
groups and social movements is necessary to counteract regime suppression. U.S. covert 
action in Poland helped sustain the resistance through covert funding and equipment, 
allowing the movement to maintain pressure on the regime in the information war. Since 
Solidarity’s success, social movements have taken a prominent role in reshaping the post-
Cold War space. Prodemocracy “color” revolutions in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Kirgizstan, and Lebanon in the 2000s, and the Arab Spring from 2010-2012 and Ukraine 
in 2013-2014 have utilized many lessons from Solidarity to drive political change 
through relatively nonviolent resistance. This is a critical shift in the nature of conflict 
resolution, and U.S. covert action programs must embrace this new reality. 
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Finally, U.S. PW is historically opportunistic and reactionary. The 1980s saw a 
reinvigoration of aggressive U.S. actions to destabilize the Soviet Union, but localized 
success still required robust, preexisting dissident networks and physical support 
infrastructure. Unlike Soviet subversion doctrine, the United States does not develop 
comprehensive agitation strategies that function on a generational or multigenerational 
timeframe. Yes, media broadcasts into the Soviet Bloc and dissident literature programs 
did attempt to inform and influence the populations in these countries over a multi-
decade span, but the efforts varied in intensity based on changing U.S. policy and 
systems of control over the broadcasts, and were not part of a cohesive, long-term 
strategy with well-defined intermediate and long-term objectives. In Poland, existing 
conditions like the Solidarity movement, a strong history of resistance, and an established 
underground network of the Catholic Church, had to be present for an external PW 
program to be effective. This remains a key principal today. U.S. PW to destabilize or 
force concessions from a geopolitical adversary must have preexisting conditions for 
success; including an already strong networked opposition, historical precedent to 
develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize 
and distribute information. 
The influence of expanding social and mass media, and the emergence of NGOs 
as players able to effect geopolitical change on an unprecedented scale, has altered the 
nature of conflict in the twenty-first century. Events move too quickly for a nation to be 
successful with a reactionary PW posture predicated on set patterns of crisis response. It 
is imperative for the U.S. to develop the networked infrastructure well in advance of any 
possible implementation of a PW strategy to give the National Command Authority an 
array of options to deal with an emerging situation. To do this requires a shift to a more 
aggressive foreign policy and a commitment to conduct both overt and covert 
infrastructure development in identified hot spots around the world. If the United States 
does not have skin in the game, the national leadership is bound to be overtaken by 




V. THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE 
1991-2014 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has evolved from a nation 
struggling to solidify its identity apart from the specter of the former USSR to a rising 
power that is capable of exerting strategic influence through the proficient use of PW. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Russia has developed full-spectrum 
PW in order to consolidate power domestically, establish dominance regionally, and 
ultimately challenge the unipolarity of the West, which includes the United States, its 
NATO allies, and other global partners. This chapter concludes that Russia’s vast arsenal 
of PW methods constantly evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
Russia’s leaders have leveraged these PW methods as individual DIME elements matured 
in order to propel Russia out of the shadow of the Soviet Union and the West. Russia now 
considers itself an established regional hegemon and a rising global power capable of 
securing its interests through PW. 
B. RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL WARFARE 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States embodied 
antithetical views on how to structure political, economic, and social life.402 This 
polarizing effect made the Soviet identity easy to characterize, as one simply needed to 
contrast it with the West. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians found 
themselves in a position to reclaim their Russian identity; however, Russia’s national 
identity could have been defined in a number of ways including as Russian speakers, as 
ethnic Russians, as people of Slavic origin, as a union identity to define Russians as an 
imperial people, or as a civic state whose members were all Russian, regardless of ethnic 
or cultural background.403 The domestic debate over the Russian identity was 
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inextricably tied to the debate over diplomacy, since the way Russians viewed themselves 
would fundamentally determine how they viewed their territory and their relationship 
with the rest of the world.404 As the debate over the Russian identity ensued, Russian 
policy makers were simultaneously struggling to develop a coherent diplomatic strategy. 
Throughout 1991 and 1992, Russia’s identity and political direction remained 
confused; however, by 1993, Russia slowly developed consensus that it should move 
toward liberal democratic and market economic reforms, while protecting Russians in the 
near abroad. This emphasis on protecting the Russian diaspora provided Russia with the 
necessary diplomatic trajectory to successfully employ regional diplomacy. Russia 
excelled at creating treaties following its participation in regional conflicts that further 
established its role as a regional peacekeeper.405 Similarly, Russia exerted early 
diplomatic influence on behalf of its diaspora at the UN and at the CSCE when Estonia 
and Latvia passed controversial citizenship laws that effectively removed voting rights 
from ethnic Russians in the summer of 1992.406 The success of these diplomatic efforts 
on behalf of its diaspora led to an increase in assertiveness in the near abroad that 
conflicted with Western ideals and emboldened nationalist perspectives in Moscow.407 
Initially, the Yeltsin administration was unable to establish accord on national 
identity or national interests, and wavered between adopting a cooperative or 
confrontational relationship with the West.408 Russia found itself initially following 
Western initiatives, but increasingly asserting its own interests as nationalism took 
root.409 The quickly diverging perspectives in Moscow resulted in a clash between 
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Western and nationalist perspectives on October 3, 1993. Yeltsin made some provocative 
shifts in foreign policy in an attempt to solidify his power base and secure the support of 
the military. “Both Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Marshal Yevgeniy 
Shaposhnikov had openly expressed their opposition to NATO’s expansion eastward. 
Yeltsin seems to have shifted his public position on NATO at the height of the 
constitutional standoff with [this] simple fact squarely on his mind.”410 Using this shift in 
foreign policy as a weapon, Yeltsin was able to secure the allegiance of the military and 
preserve his position of power.411 Yeltsin then ordered the military to conduct an assault 
on rebellious deputies, which included shelling the parliament building and resulted in 
the death of 147 people, but preserved his position of power.412 The conflict in Moscow 
in October 1993 marked the first major change in foreign policy anchored by Russian 
nationalism versus Western cooperation and partnership. This event was a critical 
milestone in the development of Russian diplomacy because it synergized the disparate 
views on Russian identity, which enabled an increasingly anti-Western narrative. 
In January 1996, President Yeltsin relieved the pro-Western Kozyrev from his 
position as foreign minister and replaced him with Evgeny Primakov, whose nationalistic 
perspective was more in line with the rapidly solidifying Russian identity.413 Primakov 
had recently served as the head of the Federal Intelligence Service, the KGB successor 
unit, and represented a renewed focus for securing Russia’s Eurasian great power status. 
414 This was a PW action designed to emphasize Russia’s foreign policy shift both 
domestically and abroad. It also positioned Russia to openly and reasonably review all 
diplomatic obligations from its new, less Western, vantage point. The appointment of 
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Primakov is considered to be the final shift from Yeltsin’s initial pro-Western perspective 
to a nationalist perspective that emphasized statehood.415 
Although Russia’s steady migration away from the West helped it to develop its 
regional diplomacy, it was not sufficient to oppose the West directly throughout the 
1990s. This was clearly evidenced by the events of the Kosovo War. In the 1990s, 
Russian officials and senior military leaders often supported Serbia, citing Russia’s 
historic alliance and shared Orthodox religious and cultural ties.416 Although Yeltsin was 
likely frustrated by Milosevic and understood NATO’s goals, he stood by Milosevic 
because this position also represented taking a stand against NATO, which resonated well 
with the Russian populace.417 The United States was taking significant steps to expand 
NATO during this period, despite the fact that the Cold War was clearly over.418 
Ultimately, Yeltsin believed the American military was spreading U.S. power inside the 
Russian sphere of influence.419 Russia leveraged the full extent of diplomacy in protest, 
including Primakov turning his plane around in midair while en route to Washington 
when he heard that NATO has initiated a bombing campaign in Serbia.420 In spite of 
Russia’s diplomatic effort on the international stage, it was unable to preclude the NATO 
bombing campaign and viewed the situation from a realist perspective, which framed the 
likely outcome as a win for the United States and the West and a clear loss for Russia.421 
Kosovo highlighted Russia’s lack of diplomatic power when measured against what was 
needed to achieve strategic goals in the international arena. 
A few years after the Kosovo War, while Vladimir Putin was still relatively new 
to the presidential office, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States presented an 
                                                 
415 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 95. 
416 Stent, The Limits of Partnership, 42. 
417 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 265. 
418 Ibid., 183. 
419 Ibid., 12–13. 
420 Stent, The Limits of Partnership, 44. 
421 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose,, 265. 
 143
opportunity to reset Russian-U.S. relations. While surprising, it was not entirely 
unexpected that Putin would embrace a considerably different kind of diplomacy in 
support of Russia’s strategic interests. Abjuring earlier frictions, Putin was the first 
foreign leader to call President Bush after the 9/11 attacks to offer assistance and 
condolences. Russia subsequently enabled U.S. operations during Operation Enduring 
Freedom against the Taliban and al-Qaeda by sharing intelligence, cancelling distracting 
Russian military exercises, and not objecting to the U.S. expansion of bases and transit 
hubs in the region.422 Putin presented Russia as an essential partner in the Global War on 
Terror, and quickly drew parallels between the 9/11 attacks and the intensification of 
terrorist activities in the Caucasus.423 This move was meant to not only elevate Russia’s 
status within Washington, but also to acquire an ally in its struggle against Islamist 
opponents in the North Caucasus.424 This move linked Russia’s own struggles with 
terrorist activities to the United States in order to improve its credibility in the 
international arena. 
While enjoying the benefits of ostensible alignment with the U.S.-centric Global 
War on Terror, Russia covertly employed bribery to affect the regional political 
apparatus. One glaring example is the scandal over the resignation of Latvian Prime 
Minister Aigars Kalvitis in the fall of 2007, when “it was discovered that Russian-funded 
political organizations were buying Latvian politicians.”425 “Prime Minister Aigars 
Kalvitis observed at the time that there [was] a criminal gang consisting of former 
employees of the KGB and employees of the Latvian security services of parliament and 
the presidential office.”426 When the anticorruption minister’s report was presented to 
President Valdis Zatlers, the President did not accept the findings regarding the alleged 
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network of corruption. As a result, Kalvitis and a large portion of the cabinet resigned.427 
Another such example occurred during the 2002 Lithuanian presidential election. This 
scandal revolved around allegations that Moscow funded former Prime Minister 
Rolandas Paksas’s campaign, waged disinformation campaigns, and bought or controlled 
Lithuanian customs and police officers. The ensuing investigation resulted in the 
impeachment of President Paksas in 2004.428 These two examples demonstrate that 
Russia has used PW to subtlety shape the political landscape in the near abroad into a 
construct that enables Russia’s strategic goals. 
Russia’s brief diplomatic alignment with the U.S.-driven Global War on Terror 
came to an abrupt halt over the conflict in Syria in 2013. Syria was one of the top buyers 
of Russian defense equipment, which made Syria a significant economic interest to 
Russia.429 Putin assessed that Assad was stronger than his opponents, the strongest of 
which were jihadis, and prudently decided to back Assad during the conflict.430 
Moreover, Russia also feared the spread of radical Sunni Islamist governments that could 
invigorate Muslims in the North Caucasus. The Assad regime represented a bulwark 
against this threat to Russian interests. First, Moscow vetoed a United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) resolution that called for Assad to step aside. Next, Putin offered the 
United States a chance to jointly lead diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict, but 
the United States predictably pursued its own agenda to get rid of Assad. When President 
Obama’s “redlines” were openly challenged in the August 2013 chemical attack near 
Damascus, Obama was on the verge of implementing military strikes against his own 
desires. Putin seized the opportunity and offered a deal to rid Syria of its chemical 
weapons. Using diplomacy as PW Putin had rejected the U.S. agenda, prevented U.S. 
military intervention, and compelled Syria to give up its sole deterrent in the form of 
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chemical weapons of mass destruction.431 This discredited the West and the U.S., while 
demonstrating that Russia was a great power capable of achieving peace in the Middle 
East where the U.S. and the West could not. This success emboldened Russia and 
solidified its position as a great power in spite of its relatively weak and almost non-
existent military presence in the Middle East. 
Quickly following the Syria crisis, Russia again asserted its position as a great 
power capable of challenging the United States and the West when, in the middle of 
2013, the Edward Snowden whistleblower incident rose to the forefront of the 
international media. After releasing classified documents from the NSA, Snowden 
subsequently fled the United States and sought asylum in a number of countries. Whereas 
China and several leftist Latin American regimes would not confront the United States by 
offering Snowden asylum, Russia accepted him, knowing full well it would materially 
damage relations with the Obama administration.432 Snowden arrived at Sheremetyevo 
airport on June 23rd with several computers containing documents about classified NSA 
programs and the Russians even orchestrated a press conference for him.433 As a result of 
the incident, President Obama cancelled a summit in Moscow, marking the first such 
cancellation of a U.S.-Russian summit since Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev cancelled a 
1960 summit in Paris.434 This move came at great cost to the diplomatic relations 
between the United States and Russia, but it was widely understood in the international 
community to be an embarrassment to the United States. The Snowden incident 
illustrated Russia’s position that it was a great power capable of standing up to the 
unipolarity of the United States and its Western allies. Russia’s diplomatic PW victories 
during the Syria crisis and the Snowden incident established a precedent of autonomous 
decision making unbounded by Western pressure. 
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Summary: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s use of diplomatic PW 
has been reestablished, as Russia solidified its post-Soviet Russian identity and 
established a foreign policy agenda independent of Western ideology. Russia 
demonstrated a pattern of concurrent regional and global diplomatic efforts to support its 
strategic interests. In the early 1990s, diplomacy helped to secure favorable conflict 
resolutions within the former Soviet space in the interests of its diaspora. Yeltsin’s 
eventual resolution on a Russian foreign policy agenda, following the October 1993 
parliament crisis in Moscow, enabled a shift from the West that culminated with the 
Kosovo War, but highlighted Russia’s relatively weak diplomacy when compared to the 
West. Putin deftly aligned Russia’s counterterror efforts with the United States following 
9/11 to overtly increase diplomatic credibility, while consolidating gains covertly in the 
former Soviet space. Finally, Russia was able to selectively employ diplomacy as PW 
during the Syria crisis and Snowden incidents to signal to the international community 
that it was now capable of confronting the United States and the West in the diplomatic 
arena to achieve its strategic goals. 
C. RUSSIAN INFORMATION POLITICAL WARFARE 
Like diplomacy, Russia’s ability to leverage information as PW has grown 
steadily since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike diplomacy, however, which 
improved with the development of the Russian identity and migration from Western 
influence, Russia’s use of information improved with the increasing authoritarian nature 
of the Russian power apparatus and establishment of an anti-Western narrative. Initially, 
widespread foreign policy ideas proliferated through Western free-speech media models, 
which limited the development of a coherent national narrative during the Yeltsin era. 
Russia began to develop its ability to leverage information more effectively, however, 
when Putin came to power in 2000. He began to solidify the Russian narrative and 
established dominance over Russia’s mass media outlets. Media oligarchs Boris 
Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were exiled, and the state initiated a takeover of their 
media empires. This gave greater control over the internal flow of information and 
allowed Putin to propagate the national narrative. In conjunction with appropriating 
internal media outlets, he appointed several super governors that reported directly to 
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him.435 Putin’s initial efforts appeared almost exclusively focused on securing control 
over the domestic aspect of the information element of national power, but soon Russia 
would shift its focus externally. 
The “Color Revolutions” that swept over Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan 
promoted fear in Russia of revolutionary social movements.436 Russia critizied the West 
for inciting and supporting the revolutions, and insisted they were seeking to produce a 
revolution within Russia as well.437 The Russians effectively manipulated the fact that 
Western NGOs promoted civil society and demanded transparency during elections, and 
portrayed these efforts as yet another Western plot to reduce Russia’s influence in its near 
abroad.438 Russia’s primary lesson from the Color Revolutions was the need to ensure 
that nothing similar would happen in Russia. This prompted a renewed focus on 
solidifying the anti-Western narrative. Perceived Western expansion into Russia’s area of 
influence via the Color Revolutions justified Russia’s increased assertiveness in 
controlling and projecting the informational element of national power. 
Tangible economic improvements in the Russian people’s lives, increasing oil 
revenues, and exploding growth rates truly enabled Russia to vocalize firm rejection of a 
Western-dominated and U.S.-led unipolar world.439 During the Munich conference of 
February 2007, Putin proclaimed “today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper 
use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world 
into an abyss of permanent conflicts. One state and, of course, first and foremost the 
United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.”440 This international 
proclamation represented the maturation of Russia’s overt, anti-Western national 
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narrative. Furthermore, this statement allowed Putin to posit the idea of a multipolar 
world in which Russia would be a key player. This idea became the cornerstone of 
Russia’s narrative under Putin’s regime. This narrative was codified in Russia’s 2008 and 
2010 NSCs, which bluntly portrayed Western and NATO expansion as the primary 
external threat to Russia.441 With respect to its near abroad, Russia’s NSCs declared it to 
be Russia’s area of privileged interest and pledged to provide comprehensive assistance, 
including military force, to protect Russian citizens wherever they were.442 Also, it 
proclaimed NATO expansion and construction of military infrastructure and missile 
defenses near its borders to be in violation of the UN Charter.443 
One of the primary vehicles that Russia has used to promote its anti-Western 
narrative is Russian-sponsored international news media, which has a budget of over 
$300 million and is projected to increase by as much as 41% by 2016.444 Russia Today 
was a news agency created in 2005 to create a more positive picture of Russia and present 
the Russian side of international news stories. The original programming emulated CNN 
and BBC, “while mixing in puff stories about the country.”445 In 2008, Russia Today 
rebranded itself as “RT” to focus less on promoting Russia and more on marginalizing the 
West, particularly the United States. RT focuses on already existing anti-Western and 
anti-U.S. themes that originate from Western media outlets, then adds interviews with 
President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov, and finally injects blatant “opinion TV” 
with wild and unfounded accusations. Recent examples of misinformation-infused 
reporting include a report that considered whether the United States was behind the 2014 
Ebola outbreak in Africa, reporting of a fictional massacre at Adra during the Syrian civil 
war in 2013, and a report that accused Syrian rebels of a sarin attack in East Ghouta, 
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Damascus, using video “proof” that was date-stamped prior to the event.446 In recent 
years, Russia has continued to grow its international news empire. “In late 2013, the 
Russia Today International Agency was established by merging the Russia Today 
television, the Golos Rossii radio and the RIA Novosti news agency.”447 In November 
2014, the company’s Chief Executive Officer, Yevgeny Kiselyov, announced an 
emerging project called Sputnik that would broadcast in 30 languages on mobile and 
digital platforms. Sputnik will attempt to reach “billions of listeners the world over, who 
are tired of the aggressive propaganda promoting a unipolar world.”448 RT is an excellent 
example of Russia’s use of the media to anchor a nationalist narrative at home, while 
simultaneously projecting misinformation to discredit what it perceives to be  
Western unipolarity. 
Russia ensured that any opposition to its information dominance and ability to 
proliferate its anti-Western narrative was met with voracity. Suspicious deaths following 
Putin’s rise to power indicate covert initiatives aimed at securing internal information 
dominance. On October 7, 2006, Anna Politkovskaya, an outspoken critic of Russian 
policy in the North Caucasus, was gunned down while carrying groceries into her 
apartment. Similarly, on November 1, 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer 
who was working for the exiled media oligarch Boris Bereszovsky, died from acute 
polonium-210 poisoning, which is a radioactive substance produced almost exclusively in 
one Russian laboratory. Traces of the polonium-210 found in a plane and the London 
restaurant in which he was exposed indicate that this was an act of nuclear terrorism 
executed by foreign agents on British soil.449 These examples are yet further evidence of 
Russia’s broad spectrum of information PW. 
Russia also employed information-based methods that fell within the cyber-
warfare realm. During the 2007 “Bronze Soldier incident,” “Estonia defied Russian 
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threats and removed the so-called Bronze Soldier, the monument to the Red Army in 
Tallinn that memorializes the Soviet liberation of Estonia in World War II from the city 
center, Estonia soon experienced a full-scale information war directed against much of its 
critical telecommunications infrastructure.”450 Experts modeled that this cyber attack was 
actually planned against Estonia over a year before it occurred, indicating this was not a 
spontaneous criminal act, but a preplanned, state-sponsored initiative.451 Russia 
conducted cyber warfare once again during the 2008 invasion of Georgia. During this 
conflict, cyber attacks were conducted which “included various distributed denial of 
service (DDOS) attacks to deny/disrupt communications and information exfiltration 
activities conducted to accumulate military and political intelligence from Georgian 
networks.”452 Russia’s demonstrated proficiency in cyber war illustrates its ability to use 
a wide variety of technologies and mediums in the information arena as PW. 
Any illusions that regime change might reduce the domestic information 
stranglehold or slow the proliferation of an anti-Western narrative were dissolved on 
September 24, 2011, when President Medvedev proposed that Putin become the Russian 
president yet again.453 Protests in Russia, with crowds between 30,000 and 100,000, 
demanded that Putin go, but Putin was declared victorious in the presidential election on 
March 4, 2012.454 Upon reelection, President Putin implemented further measures to 
clamp down on civil society and to stamp out regime opposition and its foreign support. 
Russian NGOs that benefited from foreign funding were required to register as a “foreign 
agent.” As a result, USAID was closed and bilateral cooperation in law enforcement and 
narcotics was terminated.455 The Russian power brokers that surrounded and enabled 
Putin and Medvedev fundamentally viewed freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as a 
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weakness that could be exploited by Western influence.456 Their agenda to centralize 
government power and co-opt the mass media was overwhelmingly successful, in spite of 
creating a government that was less accountable to the Russian public. Increased 
domestic prosperity and external Russian influence had firmly established public support 
for “Putin’s plan” among the Russian population.457 Putin was able to label 
democratization and marketization of the near abroad as negative consequences of 
Western intervention that are contrary to Russia’s interests; moreover, this narrative 
appears to be effective in mobilizing the Russian population to a degree sufficient to 
ensure his position of power for the foreseeable future.458 
Inflated threat assessments further contributed to the Russian anti-Western 
narrative. These threat assessments self-perpetuated a cycle that intensified fears of 
Western influence. The assessments asserted that the West was attempting to exclude 
Russia from its rightful place as a global leader by weakening the former Soviet space 
and plundering Russia’s natural resources. For example, Russian military publications 
regularly promulgated the idea of “Russia under siege” from “rigorous informational-
psychological warfare [aimed] at undermining Russia’s statehood and integrity . . . by the 
adept exploitation of the national and religious contradictions within.”459 NATO 
involvement in Yugoslavia in 1999, the 2001 withdrawal of the United States from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Ukrainian 
Orange Revolution of 2004, the fifth NATO enlargement in 2004, and the 2005 Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan cemented Russia’s perception toward the West. This 
perception asserted the West intended to foment instability along Russia’s borders, 
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aggressively interfere in the Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)460 
internal life and politics, and compromise greater Russian national interests.461 By the 
closing of the decade, the United States was singularly viewed as a “unipolar hegemon” 
with the “goal of depriving Russia of its independence, interfering in its internal affairs 
and infringing on its economic and national interests” through “indirect forms of 
political, diplomatic, economic, and informational pressure, subversive activities, and 
interference in internal affairs.”462 This increasingly aggressive narrative has proliferated 
sufficiently throughout the Russian political apparatus to warrant the emergence of 
increasingly provocative Russian policy. 
Summary: Russia’s ability to use information as PW improved with the increasing 
authoritarian nature of the Russian power apparatus and the solidification of an anti-
Western narrative. The primary catalyst for this change was Vladimir Putin’s assumption 
of the Russian presidency and his subsequent media and domestic information 
crackdowns. Concurrent circulation of Western-driven ideas throughout the post-Soviet 
space contributed to the Color Revolutions, which Putin exploited to solidify an anti-
Western narrative that would enable further centralization of power and information 
control. This narrative has been proliferated domestically and internationally via Russian-
sponsored media outlets such as RT. Persistent inflated threat assessments regarding 
Western capabilities and intentions further enabled the resurgence of the anti-Western 
narrative. This helped to rally the Russian population around an anti-Western narrative 
that has been crucial to preserving the current Russian power apparatus and central to the 
justification of increasingly provocative political warfare against the West. 
D. RUSSIAN MILITARY POLITICAL WARFARE 
In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 
excelled at employing its military to secure regional objectives in spite of the degraded 
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state of its former Soviet forces. Its forward-stationed elements proved critical in 
realizing its foreign policy objectives in the Transniestria conflict, the Georgia conflict, 
and the Tajikistan civil war. In addition, Russia used its military as a force-in-being in the 
Baltics to exert influence over the issue of voting rights for its diaspora. The successful 
use of military forces during these limited conflicts, both conventionally and 
unconventionally, helped to solidify Russia’s foreign policy around a pragmatic 
nationalist political agenda that would continue to rely heavily on military forces in the 
decades to come. 
Russia first employed its military in the former Soviet space during Moldova’s 
separatist war with its Transniestria region.463 The Transniestria region contained a 
sizable Russian diaspora, which inevitably raised the question of what Russia’s position 
would be in protecting the interests of Russian speakers in the near abroad. Moreover, 
Russia’s 14th Army was stationed in Moldova, which presented concerns for Moscow 
should the conflict escalate. Before the Russian government was able to solidify a course 
of action regarding the conflict, however, the 14th Army independently began supplying 
the Transniestria separatists and training the local population.464 The inevitable escalation 
of the conflict led the Russian Parliament, in July 1992, to authorize the 14th Army as a 
Russian-dominated peacekeeping force in Moldova until a CIS peacekeeping unit could 
be assembled.465 The actions resulted in a surprising level of support from the Russian 
population, prompting Yeltsin to become even more vocal in his support of the Russian 
diaspora. “The outbreak of violence in March and the ensuing foreign policy debates led 
to a consensus among the Russian political elite that Russia should be more actively 
involved in preventing war and in protecting its diasporas—particularly those threatened 
by war.”466 Effectively, a Russian diaspora had separated itself from another state, 
enabled by support from the Russian military and Moscow. The lack of reaction from the 
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West further established this “road map” for dealing with such conflicts, given there was 
no previous precedent for how such a matter should be resolved.467 
Russia again employed its military in the post-Soviet space when war broke out in 
Georgia in 1992.468 During this conflict, Russia was less interested in protecting the 
interests of its diaspora. Rather, Russia’s primary interest in the Georgia-Abkhazia 
conflict was to prevent the dissolution of Georgia, which could initiate a domino effect 
that would embolden Chechens.469 As with the Transniestria conflict, Russia’s 
employment of military as peacekeepers was unchallenged by the West, which 
underscored the utility of using its military forces in a peacekeeping role to secure 
conflict resolution favorable to Russian interests. This further solidified the role that 
Russia and its military would play in the former Soviet space.470 
The third conflict in which Russia employed its military was the Tajikistan civil 
war. Russia had 10,200 troops stationed in Tajikistan and a diaspora of over 300,000 
ethnic Russians.471 Russia’s disjointed policy at the time led to Moscow to lean initially 
toward a Western view in support of the Tajik opposition, while the military prematurely 
involved itself with Tajikistan’s communist government.472 Eventually, concerns over the 
spreading of Islamic fundamentalism and the Russian diaspora convinced Moscow to 
support the communist Tajik regime.473 Although the Russian diaspora was of little 
objective concern during the conflict, it was used to convince the public that military 
engagement was needed and further solidified Russia’s role as a peacekeeper in support 
of the communist Tajik government.474 In 1993, the Friendship Treaty decided that 
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Russian troops and peacekeepers would remain in Tajikistan in pursuit of peace.475 The 
Tajikistan civil war was yet another example of how Russia could use its military as 
peacekeepers to conduct PW in limited regional conflicts in pursuit of foreign  
policy goals. 
In addition to involving its military directly in regional conflicts, Russia also 
leveraged its military indirectly to apply political pressure. In the summer of 1992, 
Estonia and Latvia passed controversial citizenship laws that effectively removed voting 
rights from ethnic Russians. When it was perceived that Russian minister Kozyrev would 
not be able to secure an adequate diplomatic response, President Yeltsin ordered a halt to 
the planned withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics until improved treatment of 
the Russian diaspora was evident.476 This move was widely supported domestically and 
appeased the military, which had concerns about giving up their presence in the 
Baltics.477 Russia’s successful use of its military in the former-Soviet space firmly 
established military methods in Russia’s PW arsenal and provided a model for how to 
deal with regional instability.478 
Years later, in the closing days of the Kosovo War in 1999, Russia executed a 
bold PW move using its military forces at Pristina. At the end of the war, Russian and 
U.S. forces nearly clashed when Russia violated the terms of the cease-fire agreements by 
surging their forces to the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, before NATO troops 
arrived. General Wesley Clark, the supreme allied commander in Europe, favored the 
direct confrontation of Russian soldiers at the airport, but British General Michael 
Jackson, the NATO ground force commander, staunchly resisted, claiming he was “not 
starting World War Three for you.”479 Some speculate that this was yet another example 
of the Russian military acting without authority from Moscow, but Yeltsin quickly 
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claimed he decided to give the order, proclaiming “this last gesture was a sign of our 
moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe, and the whole 
world.”480 Regardless of whether Yeltsin, in fact, issued the order to occupy the Pristina 
airport, Yeltsin’s claim of issuing the order represented Russia’s clear priority to thwart 
the West, even at the cost of appearing indifferent to atrocities like ethnic cleansing.481 
Russia’s actions at the end of the Kosovo War demonstrated that Russia was capable of 
using its military to conduct PW in direct opposition to Western interests. Prior to 
Pristina, Russia employed its military in regional conflicts that had little to no 
international involvement; however, Russia’s actions during the Kosovo War represented 
a significant leap because they directly challenged Western powers. 
Putin proved that he could use his military to further Russia’s strategic agenda by 
aligning with the West as well as against it. Putin dutifully followed up the 9/11 
diplomatic reset with a renewed effort to expand partnership in the realms of 
counterterrorism (CT) and counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Putin 
recognized that WMD proliferation was a concern for the United States and recognized 
that “for countering WMD proliferation, Russia and the United States are the two 
indispensable nations.”482 Furthermore, Putin exploited the perception that “Russians see 
Americans as their leading ally in the GWOT. Russia and the United States have suffered 
more casualties from radical Islamist-inspired terrorism [between 2000-2005] than any 
other country.”483 The result of such renewed engagement was a U.S.-Russia summit in 
Moscow in May 2002, during which Presidents Bush and Putin expanded the mandate of 
the existing Working-Group on Counterterrorism. The cooperation program resulted in 
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) arresting a British national smuggling Man-Portable Air Defense Systems 
(MANPADS) into the United States to attack civilian transportation aircraft.484 Putin 
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used these positive relations with the West on the CT and WMD fronts as a distraction to 
obscure other areas of foreign policy that were directly at odds with the West. For 
example, in July 2002, Russia signed a deal with Iran to build five civilian nuclear 
reactors that would bring in billions of dollars in exports. Also, Putin extended invitations 
to Kim Jong Il of North Korea, despite him being a known proliferator and member of 
Bush’s “Axis of Evil.”485 Putin’s willingness to align his military to parallel Western CT 
and WMD objectives during this time period allowed him to make gains at the West’s 
expense, without significant reprisal. 
Putin’s post-9/11 westward shift in military posture, however, did not endure very 
long. Russian assertiveness increased as Russia perceived an increased Western influence 
in its near abroad. This Russian assertiveness was amplified by the perception that the 
United States was exploiting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to insert Western 
influence in Russia’s periphery.486 Each successful Western alliance military operation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq was perceived as an increased potential threat to Russia.487 
Vladimir Putin toughened his discourse regarding NATO expansion and reinforced 
Russia’s perception of an unbalanced world order that was out of synch with Russia’s 
preference for a multipolar world order, in which it exercised clear influence.488 
Primakov summarized that Russia opposed NATO expansion, since it brought a military 
alliance up to Russia’s border for no purpose.489 The approved NATO expansion on 
March 29, 2004, which included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia, was viewed as provocative involvement in what Moscow considered its 
privileged area of interest.490 
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The new assertive foreign policy stance climaxed in 2008, during the Russian 
incursion into Georgia and Moscow’s subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as independent states. Georgia was not a limited crisis, but a clearly 
communicated PW message that Russia would no longer accept Western expansion into 
the former Soviet space.491 Although this operation was predominately military focused, 
it was the first occurrence where supporting PW methods from the rest of the DIME 
spectrum were synergized to produce compounded effects. On August 7, 2008, Georgia 
launched a sizable artillery strike on Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital. During the 
next five days, over 40,000 Russian troops entered Georgia and conducted an assault, 
coordinated with a massive cyber attack that crippled military, government, and financial 
operations. A cease-fire was quickly declared on August 12th and on the 25th Russia 
officially recognized the independence of the separatist states.492 This conflict portrayed 
Russia’s clear intention to play a dominant role over Western influence in its  
near abroad.493 
Summary: Russia has successfully employed its military to conduct PW with great 
frequency since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s early use of its military was 
largely enabled by Russia’s inheritance of the lion’s share of the Soviet Union’s war 
machine. Although this military apparatus was somewhat degraded after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, it was still relatively superior to that of Russia’s neighbors. This 
regional disparity in military power led to the almost obvious preference to use the 
military to conduct PW, especially given Russia’s relatively underdeveloped diplomacy, 
information, and economic elements of national power during the early 1990s. This use 
of military power in Transniestria, Georgia, and Tajikistan established a roadmap for 
regional conflict resolution that would become a significant part of Russia’s foreign 
policy in the near abroad. After successfully using its military regionally, Russia adapted 
to strategic usage, as evidenced by the capture of Pristina during the Kosovo War—a 
move that directly challenged the collective military might of NATO and the West. 
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Russia again used its military to directly take a stand against Western influence in the 
former Soviet space during the Georgian War. 
E. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC POLITICAL WARFARE 
Russia’s ability to employ economic power as PW was limited after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Initial desires to convert to Western democracy and marketization 
did not yield immediate economic results, leaving the population questioning the value of 
this Western-style plan.494 Even with staunch support from the Clinton administration, 
Russia was not able to implement marketization rapidly enough to increase the standard 
of living for the Russian population to any significant degree. In such a state of economic 
vulnerability, Russia was in no position to implement PW using economic methods. 
Despite Yeltsin’s efforts to improve the state of the Russian economy, Russia suffered a 
significant economic collapse in 1998. 
The financial crash had significant, long-term effects: “incomes took a long time 
to recover, foreign investment shied away for years, and the Russian banking system—
not in great shape before the crash—never recovered.”495 There were, however, 
significant positive effects that Putin, Yeltsin’s successor, was well-postured to benefit 
from.496 First, domestic food producers found new markets in Russia and energy 
exporters saw dramatic increases in volume. Second, oligarchs suffered significant 
economic losses, greatly reducing their influence in Moscow, which would enable Putin 
to begin centralizing power.497 Third, the Russian government implemented huge 
financial reforms and passed the first balanced budget in post-Soviet Russian history, 
positioning Putin to take credit for the eventual economic upswing.498 Then, the effects 
of the 1998 financial crisis positioned Putin to continue to swinging Russia away from 
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the West and establish the linkage between Russia’s economic recovery and Russia’s new 
foreign policy trajectory that placed it in competition with the West. 
Following the culmination of Russia’s provocative stance during the war with 
Georgia, Russia’s assertiveness marginally thawed in lieu of more economic-based 
influence measures.499 The foundation for this shift in coercive influence was Russia’s 
regional monopoly of the oil and natural gas industry.500 “Since Putin came to office, 
energy policy has exemplified Russia’s capacity to act strategically.”501 “Between 1999 
and 2008, Russia was one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. GDP grew by 7 
percent per annum, the stock market increased twentyfold, and poverty rates fell from 30 
percent of the population in 1998 to 14 percent in 2007. Real wages rose by 140 
percent.”502 During this period of growth, Russia’s ability to leverage its regional 
dominance over the oil and gas industry to influence the actions of its neighbors reached 
its peak. When Putin came to power, he initiated a state takeover of Gazprom, Russia’s 
largest gas company, and appointed Dmitri Medvedev as chairman of Gazprom, which 
enabled the Russian government to more effectively wield the economic tool of national 
power.503 Gazprom is now 50.1% owned by the state and the taxes it pays provide 15% 
of Russia’s budget and produced 80% of Russia’s gas exports.504 
Russia has used its dominance over the oil and gas sector to conduct PW against 
its neighbors on multiple occasions. Russia interrupted delivery of oil and coal to Estonia 
in 2007.505 On New Year’s Day in 2006, Russia cut off gas to Ukraine, which deprived 
parts of Europe of heat in subzero temperatures.506 In Lithuania, Russia has raised gas 
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prices over 450% in the last seven years.507 These are just a few examples of the times 
Russia has cut off energy supplies to Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic countries as a 
foreign policy tool.508 By 2009, however, it appeared that Russia’s coercive use of this 
technique may have started to lose its effectiveness as countries began to better prepare 
for this approach. Gazprom failed to reach an agreement with Ukraine in January 2009, 
which resulted in interruption in gas supply. Compared to the 2006 incident, however, 
Ukraine and Europe seemed far more prepared to mitigate the cutoff with alternative 
short-term sources of energy.509 Although Russia’s economic methods appear to have 
lost potency in recent years, its regional dominance in the oil and gas sector represent 
significant potential for PW so long as the oil and gas market remains strong. Russia has 
taken steps to secure its regional monopoly on energy by making bilateral deals with 
countries that Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline project would pass through. Russia is 
gaining support from Europe by leveraging top European energy companies such as 
Italy’s ENI, Germany’s Wintershall/BASF, and France’s EDF, who have 20%, 15%, and 
15% stakes in the project, respectively. Such support is being used to advance South 
Stream and disrupt Nabucco, the competing project aimed at reducing EU dependence on 
Russian energy.510 This strategy allows Russia to simultaneously incentivize European 
investment partners and punish dependent energy consumers in order to advance pro-
Russian policy in the international arena. 
Russia has demonstrated its ability to employ economic measures outside of the 
oil and gas sector as well. These measures range from regional tariffs and import 
restrictions to strategic partnering with other rising powers. For example, in 2013, it 
blocked $100 million in Moldovan wine imports largely believed motivated by 
Moldova’s desire to join the European Union.511 Beginning in September 2013, Russia 
imposed a series of punitive trade restrictions on Moldova in order to dissuade them from 
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signing the European Union Association Agreements, which included Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area provisions.512 These restrictions represented a direct 
attack on the Moldovan economy and included bans on imported processed pork products 
on grounds of African swine fever infections, imported canned vegetables on grounds of 
standards nonconformity, and imported fruits due to pests allegedly discovered by 
Russian agricultural experts.513 Similarly, Russia continued to bulwark its economy from 
adverse Western influence by establishing tighter economic ties with countries such as 
China. Putin visited Shanghai in May 2014 to establish a 30-year, $400 million gas deal 
and to double their trade to $200 billion by 2020.514 
Russia has also fomented instability in its neighbors through the use of economic 
warlords, Mafia, and criminals. The origins of these groups are linked to the late-Soviet-
era black market and thrived following the collapse of the USSR to a point that they 
“could not have functioned without the complicity of high-level officials and members of 
law enforcement agencies.”515 “Russian gangs, along with military personnel and 
customs and other government officials have sold assault rifles, pistols, machine guns, 
anti-aircraft weapons, explosives, and even nuclear materials to a wide variety of 
customers.”516 For example, in 1994, 25,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and 40,000 
Tokarev military handguns were “lost” in Estonia to Russian criminal networks. In 
Pechora, Latvia, three tons of aviation weapons and 347 gun parts in two railway 
carriages were found during a routine check of a train heading from Russia to Riga. In 
2002, six Lithuanians were arrested in Vilnius while attempting to conduct the sale of one 
kilogram of radioactive cesium-137 to a buyer suspected to have links to organized 
crime. Also in 2002, four Arrow antiaircraft missiles were “lost” in Poland.517 Such 
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examples indicate the presence of a robust black-market economy and associated 
underground network spanning the former Soviet space. This represents a vulnerability to 
Russia’s neighbors and a means by which Russia can apply covert economic PW 
methods with a high degree of deniability. 
Summary: Although Russia’s economy was weak immediately following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia eventually recovered and was able to use its 
economy to conduct PW when three important factors coincided around the year 2000: 
Putin’s presidency and bold economic reforms, rising oil and gas prices, and the 
nationalization of Gazprom and regional dominance over the oil and gas sector. These 
factors resulted in a resurgence of the Russian economy and the employment of less 
provocative, economic-based PW. This provided a tool that allowed Russia to assert its 
agenda in the near abroad, while simultaneously rolling back its military-based measures. 
Although Russia’s economic-based PW can be expected to wax and wane with the 
strength of its economy and the oil and gas industry, Russia is clearly taking steps to 
stabilize its economic position for the long term by establishing mutually supporting 
economic ties with rising powers, such as China. Also, Russia maintains connectivity to 
Soviet-era black market economies and criminal networks that provide ideal covert 
mechanisms to implement PW. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Russia has developed and exercised PW across DIME. As Russia emerged from 
the remnants of the Soviet Union, each of the elements of national power developed at a 
different rate. As a result, Russia’s PW capabilities in each element of DIME evolved 
separately, and were linked to particular dynamics. Russia’s diplomatic PW developed 
alongside the solidification of the post-Soviet Russian identity. Similarly, Russia’s 
information-based variations developed as Putin’s created Russia’s authoritarian power 
apparatus and firmly established an anti-Western narrative. Military methods started out 
far more developed, due to the inheritance of the bulk of the Soviet military and became 
the preferred method to culminate regional conflicts and drive favorable resolutions. 
Russia’s economic methods were the slowest to develop because they were largely tied to 
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Russia’s regional dominance of the oil and gas industry, and the global fossil fuel 
marketplace. As PW potential was realized in each of these categories, they were readily 
employed by Russia’s leaders, both overtly and covertly, in order to consolidate power 
domestically, establish dominance regionally, and ultimately challenge the unipolarity of 
the West. 
Russia’s initial applications of PW were often regionally focused and rarely 
integrated across all elements of national power; but, Russia has since expanded its use of 
PW to achieve strategic goals and has also improved its ability to synergize PW methods 
across the DIME spectrum to compound their effects. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 
represents the latest evolution of Russian PW. Russia’s evolution of PW has established it 
as a regional hegemon, with rising power capable of challenging the interests of the 
United States and the West in the PW arena. This reality suggests that the United States 
should reevaluate its relationship with Russia and accept the possibility that Russia might 
be an emerging adversary when it comes to preserving the global security status quo. 
Furthermore, Russia’s evolving ability to conduct PW suggests that the United States 
should develop concepts to counter it or, at least, degrade its effectiveness. 
The dynamics that enabled the development of Russian PW present themselves as 
potential vulnerabilities that might be exploited. For example, Russian PW effectiveness 
in the diplomatic realm could be reduced by degrading the solidarity of the Russian 
identity, particularly in the political arena. Limiting information-based measures would 
require penetrating Putin’s media crackdown and discrediting the strengthening anti-
Western narrative. Countering military-centric methods would require the reduction of 
Russia’s relative military superiority to that of its neighbors, which might be achieved 
through revitalized alliances or increased security assistance programs. Similarly, 
marginalizing the effects of economic PW might be achieved by disrupting Russia’s 
monopoly over the Eastern Europe’s fossil fuel market. Singularly or brashly 
implemented, such measures may be viewed as provocative; but if they are administered 
gradually, in accordance with a well-constructed narrative, then they might prove 
effective at containing Russian PW effects and preserving the U.S. interest of preserving 
the global security status quo. 
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G. CASE STUDY: THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008 
1. Introduction 
The 2008 war in Georgia is evidence that Russia’s ability to conduct PW has been 
reconstituted since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Russia did have regional 
goals to reestablish control in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it also aimed to accomplish 
larger goals, such as reciprocity for the NATO operation that solidified Kosovo 
independence and signaling the consequences for a post-Soviet state aspiring NATO 
membership.518 Russia intended to communicate that Western expansion into the former 
Soviet space would no longer be accepted, which made the conflict strategic in nature, 
rather than simply a regional flashpoint.519 When the 2008 conflict and its preceding 
events are analyzed through the lens of Bezmenov’s Soviet subversion model and 
organized by the elements of national power, it becomes apparent that the conflict itself 
was simply the culmination point of a protracted PW campaign against  
Western expansion. 
2. Demoralization Phase 
The demoralization phase of Bezmenov’s model extends back to 1992, when war 
broke out in Georgia during the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Conflict was largely 
based upon ethnic demographics, which translated to secessionist aspirations. For 
example, as captured in a 1989 Soviet census, of 98,000 people in South Ossetia, 66% 
were Ossetians and 29% were Georgians.520 Russia asserted a leading role for itself in 
restoring peace, both politically in conflict negotiations and militarily as a neutral 
“peacekeeper.”521 “In two separate sets of arrangements with the United Nations and the 
OSCE, respectively, the West sanctioned Russia to be the main peacekeeping force on 
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the ground in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”522 Russia leveraged these diplomatic 
arrangements to interpose Russian troops on the administrative borders separating these 
regions from the rest of Georgia to enforce a cease-fire agreement.523 Russia’s imposition 
of artificial control effective “froze” the conflict, but also provided Russia with a position 
of military strength and diplomatic credibility, sanctioned by the international 
community, from which it could foment secessionist inclinations using the information-
based measures. From 1992 through 1998, news outlets, including Izvestia, Sevodnya, 
and Kommersant, perpetuated a narrative of friction between Georgia, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia.524 By imposing military forces, securing international sanction through 
diplomacy, and proliferating a narrative of friction through the media, Russia effectively 
implemented the demoralization phase of Bezmenov’s subversion model and established 
the foundation for a PW campaign. 
3. Destabilization Phase 
The destabilization phase began with Putin’s rise to power in Russia at the end of 
1999, and includes PW activity across all elements of national power. In the diplomacy 
arena, Putin installed Eduard Koikoty as President of South Ossetia who first sabotaged 
the Baden peace plan between South Ossetia and Georgia and then began installing 
former Russian intelligence officials in key ministry positions.525 Similar programs were 
implemented in Abkhazia and, by 2004, ethnic Russian intelligence officials occupied 
positions of influence including defense minister and chief of staff positions in both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.526 Diplomatic efforts continued with Putin’s early 2008 
announcement that Russia was unilaterally withdrawing from the CIS sanctions that 
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prohibited the delivery of military equipment into Abkhazia and was unofficially 
establishing government-to-government contact with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.527 
In the information realm, Russia exploited a 2002 change to its citizenship laws to 
begin “passportisation,” which resulted in 98% of South Ossetia having Russian 
passports by August 2006.528 This was followed by the claim of a right to defend the 
interests of Russian citizens abroad, militarily if necessary, and became the cornerstone 
for Russia’s narrative to justify political warfare escalation.529 In parallel, Russian media 
continued to broadcast the anti-Georgia message, which culminated in mid-May 2008, 
with broadcasts that claimed war was imminent because Georgians were planning to 
attack Abkhazia from the Kodori Gorge and the Gali region.530 
Military measures increased most dramatically throughout 2008. On March 6, 
2008, Moscow began openly arming separatists.531 In April, Russia shot down a 
Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) over Abkhazia, which managed to capture 
footage of the Russian aircraft that destroyed it.532 In May, Russia increased its troop 
presence in Abkhazia to over 2,500 soldiers533 and sent 400 troops to fix Abkhazia’s rail 
and road infrastructure, which facilitated rapid movement of Russia’s forces later in the 
conflict.534 In July, Russia held the “Caucuses 2008” exercise, which observers described 
as a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Georgia.535 In August, Russia infiltrated advance 
elements of the 135th and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments into South Ossetia on or 
before August 7th, well before the actual fighting began.536 
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Economically, Russia routinely exploited Georgia’s energy dependence by cutting 
gas supplies, as occurred during political negotiations over Russian basing in 2001 and 
debates over price gouging in 2006. Furthermore, Russia funded the budget for the 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist administrations and imposed a full economic 
embargo in the fall of 2006 that banned trade, transport, and postal links.537 In  
March 2006, Russia banned the import of Georgian wine and deported Georgians en 
masse in early 2007.538 Although not critical to the outcome of the crisis, these economic 
measures placed considerable stress on the Georgian leadership. 
4. Crisis Phase 
Moscow exploited the lack of coherent Western response measures to Russian 
pressures by diplomatically isolating and inciting President Saakashvili, who was already 
prone to Russian provocations.539 President Bush made it clear through his Secretary of 
State, Condoleezza Rice, that the United States could not be expected to intervene 
militarily should war break out between Georgia and Russia. Presented with provocative 
Russian troops movements into South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, Tbilisi attacked against 
Tskhinvali in an attempt to protect Georgian territory, which provided Moscow the 
leverage it needed to eschew diplomacy measures in lieu of crisis measures founded on 
military and information dominance.540 
Russia quickly adapted its information management apparatus to control the 
narrative of the conflict by flying some 50 reporters to Tskhinvali several days before the 
war. These reporters propagated a central narrative throughout the Russian media that 
emphasized three themes: President Saakashvili was the aggressor, Russia was defending 
its citizens, and the West could not criticize Russia because of Western actions in 
Kosovo.541 Russia also employed cyber war and information operations in support of 
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conventional operations to great effect during the conflict. “The Russian cyber campaign 
attacked a total of 38 Georgian and Western websites upon the outbreak of the war, 
including those of the Georgian President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National 
Bank, the Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) 
embassies in Georgia.”542 They appeared to be coordinated, starting and ending within 30 
minutes of each other starting at 5:15 pm on August 8th and ending at 12:45 pm on 
August 11, when Russia declared its ceasefire.543 Russia’s integration of information-
based methods into the crisis phase of the Georgia War represents a developed PW 
methodology absent in the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Between 7 and 12 August, Moscow deployed some 40,000 forces to Georgia, 
with 20,000 through the Roki Tunnel into South Osseita and 20,000 in Abkhazia, which 
provided the military power necessary to resolve the crisis in Russia’s favor.544 By 
exploiting the Roki Tunnel, the entrance of which was outside of Georgian artillery 
range, Russia was able to quickly mass conventional combat power to South Ossetia.545 
These conventional forces were preceded by irregular Russian and separatist forces prior 
to the war, who conducted reconnaissance and advance-guard operations for the  
Russian formations.546  
By August 10th, . . . Russia had deployed the following forces to South 
Ossetia: the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments, of the 42nd 
Motorized Rifle Division; elements of the 104th and 234th Airborne 
Regiments from the 76th Air Assault Division; elements of the 45th 
Intelligence Regiment; and elements of the 10th and 22nd Special Forces 
Brigades, as well as significant armor, artillery and air defense formations. 
By this time Russia had opened a second front in Abkhazia by deploying 
units from the 7th Airborne and 76th Air Assault Divisions, the 20th 
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Motorized Rifle Division, and two battalions of Naval Infantry from the 
Black Sea Fleet.547 
Georgians generally had better equipment, training, and small-unit-based fire and 
maneuver tactics, but suffered from reactive strategic and operational plans. The Russians 
used Soviet-style tactics that emphasized speed and not deploying forces upon initial 
contact, but rather fighting with the lead of the column and pushing through with the 
main body. These tactics seemed to help mitigate their equipment and training shortfalls 
in favor of the increased strategic pressure that a deep penetration into Georgia 
provided.548 After five days of fighting, Russia had occupied Gori and Zugdidi, 
controlled the highway connecting Tbilisi with western Georgia, destroyed all of 
Georgia’s key military bases, and controlled the port of Poti.549 Russia’s deep penetration 
into Georgia presented an imminent threat to Tbilisi, which provided the necessary 
pressure to drive favorable conflict resolution conditions for Russia. 
5. Normalization Phase 
Russia reengaged its diplomatic apparatus after five days of combat operations. 
“On August 12 President Medvedev ordered Russian troops to end all military operations 
in Georgia, and the next day all the belligerent parties—Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia—accepted a peace plan proposed by the acting president of the European 
Union, French President Nicolas Sarkozy.”550 Russia agreed that by October 15th, no 
single Russian soldier would be anywhere other than where he was before August 7th, 
but this promise proved to be hollow.551 Following negotiations on August 26th, Russia’s 
official “recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was condemned by the European 
Union, the Council of Europe and most Western states.”552 This disagreement over 
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Georgia’s territorial integrity would continue to be a point of friction between Russia and 
the European Union for years to come.553 Russia’s failure to adhere to the cease-fire 
agreements and refusal to accept Georgia’s territorial integrity resulted in NATO and the 
EU calling emergency meetings to propose fundamental reviews in relations with 
Moscow. Russia, in response, suspended negotiations about World Trade Organization 
(WTO) accession, imposed sanctions on U.S. companies, and froze cooperation with 
NATO. The result of Russia’s diplomatic choices during the normalization phase resulted 
in increased isolation from the international community, which Russia’s political elite 
leveraged as a tool to further consolidate power domestically.554 
Russia’s information management apparatus shifted to emphasize a narrative that 
would resonate with the Russian population. Patriotic slogans, such as “finally, Russia 
has emerged as a force to be reckoned with” and allegations that the conflict was planned 
by U.S. President Bush to secure Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign, 
combined to shape unwavering popular support for Russian intervention and standing up 
to the West.555 The Russian leadership exploited the increased diplomatic isolation 
resulting from the conflict and translated it to galvanized popular support for Russia’s 
increasing assertiveness.556 
Although Russia formally declared it would withdraw from Georgia in October 
2009, it positioned 3,700 soldiers in South Ossetia and another 3,700 in Abkhazia. Russia 
also declared it would permanently retain warships in Abkhazia and stated that it would 
spend $400 million to open military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Military 
cooperation agreements were also formed with the separatist regions to provide joint 
protection of their borders.557 Russia retained a larger military footprint in Georgia after 
the war than before the war, effectively leaving a “force in being” that could be used as a 
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political tool and a symbol of Russia’s commitment to reject Western encroachment, by 
force if necessary. 
Russia transitioned away from military operations and favored more subtle 
economic forms of PW as the normalization phase continued. Russia continued to 
employ the punitive trade measures it put in place in 2006 and displayed no indication of 
relenting them.558 Since Georgia was an open economy, it did not take reactionary 
economic measures against Russia, which allowed for Russian investment into Georgia 
infrastructure and businesses. Gazprom continued to supply Georgia with natural gas, 
which provides Russia with an important economic leverage point until construction in 
alternative pipelines can diversify Georgia’s energy requirements.559 
6. Conclusion 
Russia independently redeveloped its elements of national power after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and slowly reintegrated PW as a central component to its 
strategy. The Georgia War of 2008, and the related series of events that enabled it, are an 
excellent example of Russia’s reevolved ability to conduct PW. When seemingly benign 
or individual interactions between Russia and Georgia are analyzed through the lens of 
Bezmenov’s model for Soviet subversion and organized across the DIME spectrum, it 
becomes evident that such interactions were actually components of a protracted PW 
strategy designed to maintain control of Georgia and preclude its migration towards the 
West. The Georgia War itself, which was merely the culminating crisis point of the 
overall campaign, was brief, violent, and effective because it capitalized on the 
conditions established during the early phases of Bezmenov’s model. 
In the demoralization phase, Russia integrated diplomatic, informational, and 
military PW methods by using a UN-approved Russian “peacekeeping” force in Georgia 
to “freeze” the 1992 conflict, which insulated the separatists and allowed Russia to scale 
up secessionist rhetoric via its media apparatus at a time of its choosing. Russia 
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synergized all elements of national power during the destabilization phase to isolate 
Georgia from external diplomatic and military support, generate a popular narrative for 
Russian intervention, mobilize relative military superiority, and apply economic pressure. 
These compounding effects essentially provoked Saakashvili to initiate the conflict, 
which “justified” Russia’s overwhelming response. During the crisis phase, Russia 
synergized its cyber, irregular, and conventional operations to drive within striking 
distance of Tbilisi in five days, while simultaneously dominating the early conflict 
narrative with pro-Russian propaganda and anti-Western messages. Lastly, during the 
normalization phase, Russia leveraged the strength of its bargaining position to rebuke its 
promises of immediate withdrawal and emplace an enduring military presence in the 
separatist regions. It also galvanized an anti-Western narrative within the Russian 
population by touting Russia’s decisive military victory and translating its diplomatic 
isolation from the international community into justification for increased nationalism. 
Russia succeeded in thwarting Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO, deposited a 
sizeable military presence in Georgia, and marginalized the unity of NATO and the West 
through the effective execution of a protracted PW campaign synergized across all 
elements of national power. 
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VI. UKRAINE: RUSSIA’S CRISIS IN THE MAKING (1991–2013) 
All of the ingredients exist to ensure that relations between Russia and 
Ukraine will continue to remain cool or worsen . . . . Russian-Ukrainian 
relations deserve a high priority for reflection within Western security 
structures and governments. However, until recently, this most certainly 
was not the case and is something that the West ignores at its own peril 
[1994].560 
This chapter’s main focus is Russia’s PW in Ukraine, from its independence in 
1991 to the Euromaidan protests in 2013. Its implementation demonstrates a steady-state, 
protracted strategy across all elements of national power designed at altering the social 
and political landscape in Ukraine. This campaign supports Russia’s vital interests and 
national objectives in Ukraine and has gone largely unchallenged by the United States 
and its European allies. As a result, Russia has tilted the balance of power in its favor to 
ensure Ukraine, or parts of it, remains under its control or frozen in conflict. Its actions 
have left the United States paralyzed in its efforts to formulate an effective 
comprehensive response beyond diplomatic condemnation and targeted economic 
sanctions. U.S. national objectives in Ukraine have lacked any measures to undermine 
Russia’s PW focusing intently on democratic and economic development. The clear 
distinction between Russia and the United States provides revealing comparative analysis 
and demonstrates key points: 
 PW encompasses the employment of all elements of national power. 
 PW is tied to national interest. 
 Uncontested, sustained PW strengthens and burgeons over time. 
This chapter examines U.S. and Russian national interests and objectives in 
Ukraine as a foundational framework for analyzing Russia’s PW in Ukraine. This 
structure illustrates how interests tied to national objectives correlate directly to PW. In 
the case of the United States, national objectives were limited, leading to the employment 
of few elements of national power with relatively low levels of intensity. Russia, in sharp 
contrast, has overarching national objectives resulting in the employment of all elements 
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of national power with high levels of intensity when applied. Interests and objectives are 
not the chief focus, but rather how PW supports them. In addition, Ukraine is an example 
of an unopposed adversarial PW strategy. Therefore, this chapter provides context for 
considerations in combating unabated PW and formulating strategy when faced with 
asymetric national interests. 
A. UNITED STATES AND UKRAINE 
U.S. interests in Ukraine are anchored in European stability and international 
order. The security alliance in Europe—NATO—is one of the strongest in the world, and 
a disruption to European stability invokes a form of automaticity for the United States. In 
addition, the United States plays a leading role in protecting and upholding international 
order including laws, treaties, and agreements, particularly those it is directly involved 
with. In relation to Ukraine, the United States has brokered and signed agreements related 
to Ukraine’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and economy. The U.S. 
relationship with Ukraine is characterized and referred to as a “strategic partnership” 
founded on shared values and interests such as expanding democracy, promoting 
nonproliferation, and supporting free-market economics. In part, Ukraine’s sovereign 
prosperity and development will lead to cooperation and partnership with other European 
nations, presumptuously promoting stability and progress on the continent as a whole. 
These interests have driven U.S. national objectives. 
U.S. national objectives in Ukraine over the last two decades have oscillated, 
depending upon the geopolitical and security environments in Europe. In general, they 
have centered on democratic, political, and economic progress, evidenced as recently as 
the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Partnership Charter through which these objectives were pursued 
mainly by diplomatic efforts and economic aid.561 U.S. engagement in Ukraine has had 
diminutive informational or military aspects other than menial broadcasting, limited 
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publications, and U.S. participation in NATO-sponsored exercises.562 563 Of note, 
Ukraine has supported the U.S. GWOT, deploying 1,600 peacekeepers to Iraq under the 
joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion and providing overflight rights and airlifts for NATO 
cargo and peacekeepers in Afghanistan.564 565 Otherwise, direct military interaction 
between the U.S. and Ukraine has been restricted. Although this approach has been far 
from comprehensive, it is conducive to the dynamic geopolitical conditions Ukraine 
presents. Both Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-European relations weigh heavily on 
U.S.-Ukrainian policy. As the former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for 
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, Sherman Garnett describes, this has been problematic 
because “Ukrainian-Russian ties are far from normal,” and “key European states and 
institutions have yet to acknowledge Ukraine’s strategic significance or to fashion 
policies which are commensurate with that significance.”566 Ukraine itself has struggled 
internally to implement reforms, both politically and economically, and this has cast a 
shadow over its prosperity and progress.567 Overall, the United States acknowledges that 
“the maintenance of Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a 
crucial factor for stability and security in Europe,” yet continues to reconcile “whether 
any U.S. vital interests are involved at all in a post-nuclear Ukraine.”568 Unquestionably, 
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the Soviet nuclear arsenal that Ukraine took custody of was of vital interest to the  
United States. 
1. U.S. Role in Ukraine’s Denuclearization 
U.S.-Ukrainian relations were dominated by nuclear weapons after Ukraine’s 
declaration of independence. Ukraine faced many challenges, similar to today, in its early 
stages of sovereignty. The centralized Soviet economic and military structures were 
difficult to break away from and even more difficult to reconsolidate. In conjunction with 
forming a new government, Ukraine was unable to facilitate a rapid transition.569 This 
resulted in economic decline, further weakening the newly formed Armed Forces of 
Ukraine, which were charged with the responsibility of its nuclear arsenal.570 571 Coupled 
with concerns of ultra-nationalism and Russia’s insistence “that Ukraine was determined 
to use the weapons to its advantage,” the United States decided to intervene.572 From 
1992 through 1997, Secretary of State James Baker orchestrated concerted negotiations 
with Ukraine and Russia that led to the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of the 
United States, Russia, and Ukraine (often referred to as the Trilateral Agreement) signed 
in January 1994 and directed at removing Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. The agreement 
affirmed to Ukraine that the United States and Russia would respect their “independence 
and sovereignty and the existing borders . . . refrain from the threat or use of force against 
territorial integrity . . . and refrain from economic coercion.”573 Also, Russia and Ukraine 
were provided economic assistance for the removal and dismantling processes. The 
agreement was followed by the Budapest Memorandum in December 1994, which mainly 
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restated the Trilateral Statement, but also added Ukraine as a member of the Treaty of 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Several scholars contend that the agreement and 
the U.S. “package” lacked the necessary mechanisms to ensure Ukraine’s security and 
future prospects.574 For instance, it has been noted that these agreements provided 
security assurances—not guarantees—to Ukraine, and “these assurances are political, not 
legally binding.”575 Additionally, as noted by Russia, the agreement states that “border 
changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means.”576 The perceived U.S. 
accomplishment was equally shared with Russia—Ukraine was now lacking a strategic 
deterrent against a far superior Russian military and defense apparatus. Apart from the 
nuclear issue, the United States has carried and continues to carry relations with Ukraine 
through economic aid and diplomatic support. 
2. U.S. Economic Efforts in Ukraine 
The United States has provided Ukraine with a substantial amount of economic 
aid that has yielded unexceptional results. Congressional Research has reported that “the 
United States obligated over $4 billion in aid to Ukraine from FY1990 to FY2012” 
through various Department of State and Department of Defense programs designed for 
humanitarian and civic assistance, internal security, economic growth, and democratic 
development.577 578 In the mid-1990s, the United States “helped Ukraine gain massive 
international assistance to reform its economy” via the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank.579 The United States “reinstated tariff preferences for Ukraine under the 
General System of Preferences” and reopened the “United States Overseas Private 
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Investment Corporation that “provides financing and political risk insurance for U.S. 
investors in foreign countries.”580 These provisions have done little in the way of 
sustainable economic progress, domestic reform, and democratic development.581 582 In 
fact, a research study conducted in 1999 revealed that a majority of Ukrainians believe 
“the United States does absolutely nothing to assist the Ukrainian economy,” and they 
were particularly resentful of the United States and “disappointed with market economics 
and its effects on their lives.”583 This same report indicated that the United States was 
viewed as “money-grubbing monsters interested in keeping Ukraine barely afloat so that 
it serves as a market for American goods and a source of cheap labor.”584 Conversely, 
economic reforms implemented in 2000, by then Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, did 
result in an economic boom; however, this was principally attributed to the reigning 
oligarch’s fear of Ukraine approaching external default and the potential that it may 
trigger a demise similar to the 1998 financial crash in Russia.585 Foreign aid had little, if 
any, role in the reformation and positive economic movement.586 Even so, Ukraine’s 
economy was devastated by the global recession and inflation reached as high as 31% in 
May 2008.587 Heavy reliance on Russian energy, corrupt oligarchs, and privatization 
issues have further stymied any progress since then.588 Democratic development in 
Ukraine has been far from exemplary, especially in terms of human rights and the rule of 
law. Free and fair elections are also viewed as a mythical phenomenon; the same study 
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indicated “near unanimity [among participants] that the November 1999 presidential 
elections, in which Leonid Kuchma was re-elected, were neither fair nor open.”589 Yet, 
there has been some measure of realization; for example, the Orange Revolution. 
3. U.S. Role in Orange Revolution 
The Orange Revolution is attributed to the fraudulent Ukrainian presidential 
political process that appointed Viktor Yanukovych. Several other galvanizing factors 
contributed, including massive corruption by political figures and Ukrainian oligarchs, 
disparity in socio-economic conditions, the ouster and arrest of Deputy Prime Minister 
Yuliya Tymoshenko, the poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko, and the cover-up and murder 
of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.590 The incumbent, Russian-backed 
Yanukovych, was challenged by the Western-oriented Leonid Yushchenko. In general, 
the population was emotionally charged and vehemently dissatisfied with the 
Yanukovych-supported incumbent Kuchma regime, and it sought change. The overt U.S. 
involvement was nominal; most Western-sponsored information mechanisms were shut 
down, including Radio Liberty and Voice of America, while local media resistance 
movements—such as Channel 5 and Ukrainska Pravda—spearheaded opposition 
messaging and communications.591 Though U.S.-sponsored NGOs allegedly were largely 
to blame for the revolution, local, grass-root movement groups—such as PORA—bear 
the lion’s share of credit.592 Lessons drawn from failures in the 2002 elections, and 
suppression of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement in 2001, led to an overhauled 
and reorganized strategy that was executed in 2004.593 Andrew Wilson, a professor at the 
School of Slavonic & East European Studies, University of London, has extensive first-
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hand experience in Ukraine, and his account dispels the notion the revolution followed  
some kind of U.S. script, he professes, “It is true that the demonstrators were highly 
organized, but they were organized by Ukrainians.”594 What’s more, these groups 
received a majority of their financing and resources from local Ukrainian businesses, 
groups, and citizens, particularly entrepreneurs.595 In fact, U.S. funding overall for 
Ukraine had declined over the previous two years because Washington believed President 
Kuchma had illicitly supplied Saddam Hussein with hi-tech radar systems.596 Estimates 
vary, but in fiscal year 2004, the United States provided $143.47 million, including 
$34.11 million for democracy assistance.597 The United States Agency for International 
Development provided $1.475 million to organizations like Development Associates,  
and Freedom House to assist in administering and monitoring the election, and other 
NGOs contributed as well, notably George Soros’s Renaissance Foundation spent $1.65 
million in the year leading up to the election.598 The activities these funds supported were 
neither conspiratorial nor nefarious and, though helpful, contributed marginally to the 
overall foundation on which the Orange Revolution was built.599 The United States did, 
however, provide strong support on the diplomatic front. 
President George W. Bush noted in a letter to Kuchma after the first round of 
fraudulent voting that “a tarnished election will lead us to review our relations with 
Ukraine.”600 The second round was as blatantly falsified as the first. In response, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “the United States cannot accept the Ukraine 
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election result as legitimate.”601 In the end, Yushchenko was eventually elected 
president, a victory for the democratic process, but not based solely or largely on U.S. 
contributions—though they did exist and were influential. In light of Russian PW 
throughout his tenure, Yushchenko’s defeat in 2010 by Yanukovych marked the end for 
the Orange movement. 
4. U.S. Diplomatic Efforts in Ukraine 
The United States has reinforced Ukraine’s democratization efforts and ambitions 
to join the international community and European/Euro-Atlantic organizations (NATO) 
through diplomatic backing, but have failed to achieve long-term, sustainable results.602 
Following the Trilateral agreement, U.S. and Ukrainian diplomats “created a binational 
commission, chaired by Vice President Al Gore and President Kuchma . . . dealing with 
foreign policy, security trade and investment and other economic issues.”603 In late 1996, 
the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship was pronounced a “strategic partnership,” and the United 
States reinforced Ukraine’s role in European security, outlining the basis of the NATO-
Ukraine Charter in 1997.604 In response to the Orange Revolution, the United States 
applauded the election of Viktor Yushchenko; he met with President Bush (see Figure 1) 
and addressed a joint session of Congress “interrupted by several standing ovations.”605 
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Figure 1.  President Bush talks with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in 
the Oval Office.606 
Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice openly 
criticized Russia, responsible for the 2006 and 2009 gas crises during Yushchenko’s 
presidency, stating they had made “politically motivated efforts to constrain energy 
supply to Ukraine.”607 The United States also offered strong support for Ukraine to 
receive a Membership Action Plan to NATO, which was denied in 2008 at a NATO 
summit in Bucharest.608 This resulted in the U.S.-Ukrainian 2008 Charter on Strategic 
Partnership that deals with a “wide range of issues, including energy security, science and 
technology, and political dialogue.”609 President Obama reiterated U.S. support for 
Ukraine after the 2010 election of Russian-favored Yanukovych. Obstinately, the U.S. 
diplomatic front has endured, yet, ultimately, its meaningful effects on Ukraine are 
inconsequential, if not futile. 
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5. Conclusion 
U.S.-Ukrainian objectives and policy have been formulated to foster and maintain 
bilateral relations, while promoting cooperation and normalization with Ukraine’s 
European neighbors. These objectives were supported primarily through diplomatic and 
economic efforts, but at levels that produced varied results, as military and informational 
elements of national power were nearly absent. U.S. engagement with Ukraine in regard 
to nuclear disarmament was effective and yet involved U.S. vital interests. Economic aid 
outside of nuclear disarmament has had a paltry influence on Ukraine’s democracy and 
economy, except for the Orange Revolution. Corruption, violation of human rights, poor 
rule of law, and poor economic conditions persistently plague Ukraine. Diplomatic 
assistance has done little in the way of paving Ukraine’s path into the international 
community, although, prior to the Euromaidan, Ukraine strived for closer ties with the 
EU vis-à-vis an Association Agreement and Eastern Partnership initiative.610 Even so, 
Western Europe regards Ukraine as a divorcee of energy powerhouse Russia, which has 
halted meaningful security and economic engagement.  
U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation endured in the year preceding the Euromaidan, but 
old problems remained. The two made agreements as indicated in a Congressional 
Research report in 2014, including the removal of Ukraine’s “entire stock of highly 
enriched uranium from its soil,” cleanup efforts at Chernobyl, and energy development 
and exploration.611 Yet, Vice President Biden voiced concerns about Ukraine’s 
democratic development, citing the “selective prosecutions of political opponents,” and 
the State Department issued reports about riot police – Berkut – using batons and other 
forms of physical force to clear hundreds of protesters in November 2013, and raised 
issues with the rule of law and human rights, including the unresolved cases involving the 
dioxin poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko and the killing of investigative journalist  
Heorhiy Gongadze.612 613 Ukraine’s economy never fully recovered from the financial 
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crisis;614 Ukrainian debt was 40% of its GDP, and its GDP decreased 2.1% in 2013.615 
Failed U.S. policy in Ukraine is not wholly responsible for these results, but the outcomes 
do correspond with the concentration of U.S. efforts. The meaningful conclusion to draw 
is the correlation between the two; that is, that the economic assistance and diplomatic 
demarche and the apparent bleak results are related. U.S. interests and corresponding 
national objectives in Ukraine led to a limited approach of commitment, centering on 
democratic development and economic progress. Both of these areas of concentration 
have struggled to achieve a considerable measure of success, and certainly not long-term, 
sustainable success. In terms of undermining Russian influence, understandably not part 
of its overt policy, U.S. efforts in Ukraine have had some unintended effects in disrupting 
Russian strategy—the Orange Revolution. Yet, again, it has not been sustainable not has 
it gained enough momentum to overcome Russia’s protracted PW. 
B. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 
Russia has vital interests in Ukraine and historical ties to Russia’s origins. 
Ukraine is the gateway to central Europe and many would claim “that without Ukraine, it 
is impossible to speak not only of a great Russia but [of] any kind of Russia at all.”616 
Ukraine is the largest and strongest former republic of the Soviet Union in possession of 
strategic Soviet infrastructure. Ukraine and Russia have an expansive shared border, 
interdependent economies, military-industrial partnerships, and large dispersions of 
citizens within each other’s borders. Ukraine’s economic ties and strategic geographic 
position are unquestionably vital to Russia and, if lost to the West, the psychological 
impact on domestic Russians and political implications for Russian leaders would be 
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detrimental. As described in Chapter IV, Russian national identity was essential for 
uniting the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; it directed 
Russia’s foreign policy, so a loss of the largest, closest former republic—virtually 
considered “Little Russia”—would be perceived as catastrophic. Among other benefits, 
Ukraine provides Russia with a protected southern flank, access to the Black Sea, a 
functional deep sea port and stationing for the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), industrial 
and mineral resources, and an energy conduit to Western Europe. For Russia, Ukraine is 
instrumental to strengthening Russia’s economy and security, but it also poses a 
challenge to Russia’s aspiring regional dominance as the most formidable former 
republic. To this end, Russia’s national objectives are designed to support its vital 
interests and dominate its former republic.  
Russian national objectives in Ukraine have shifted slightly over time, but 
primarily focus on security, economics, and geopolitics. Russia desires “perfect” 
influence, if not total control, over Ukraine and its policies to advance Russia’s own 
agenda. Equally as important, Russia seeks to marginalize Western influence in Ukraine 
and discourage Westward-leaning Ukrainian policy. Since Ukraine’s independence, 
Russia has employed and continues to employ PW across all its elements of national 
power to achieve these objectives in varying degrees. Russia’s intensity and complexity 
has only increased in parallel with its internal strength, and the stronger Russia becomes, 
the bolder it grows. Alexander Ghaleb’s analysis on Russian state power identifies 
Russia’s three demands of Ukraine following the demise of the Soviet Union, which 
provide context for Russia’s objectives and strategy:  
(1) renunciation of its claims to the Soviet nuclear stockpile in Ukraine, 
and the surrender of all nuclear warheads to Russia;  
(2) recognition of Russia as the legal inheritor of all political, economic 
and military infrastructure belonging to the Soviet Union, to include 
exclusive rights to the Ukrainian pipeline infrastructure and to the Black 
Sea fleet and the port of Sevastopol; and  
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(3) recognition of Russia as the regional hegemon.617 
Russia has pragmatically implemented PW methods to realize these demands and 
to avoid triggering unrecoverable damages—such as Yugoslavia—that would potentially 
invoke an international response. Moreover, Russia has incorporated long-standing points 
of contention into its PW campaign. The potential flash points include 
Ukrainian territorial integrity and demarcating border (especially the 
Crimea and Donbass), equity in assets and debts of the Soviet Union, the 
issue of dual citizenship and [the] large Russian minority in Ukraine, 
Russian language, nuclear weapons, Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, . . . 
[and] the price of energy and its transit on Ukrainian territory.618 
Russia has effectively exacerbated these underlying issues as part of its overall 
strategy to change the political and social landscape in Ukraine. Its former position as the 
epicenter of the Soviet Union provides Russia with significant advantages for 
implementing its PW in Ukraine. As described in Chapter V, Russian PW has evolved 
and synchronized in the post-Soviet era, and Ukraine is a testament to this reality. 
Diplomatically, Russia has immense leverage over Ukraine. It can influence international 
audiences more effectively, craft stronger policies, perpetuate Russian-favored narratives, 
and tap into the extensive network of former Soviet Union political resources such as 
proxies and the KGB. Russia’s expansion of consulates throughout Ukraine and increased 
emphasis on controlling information space has promulgated its strategy, even in areas 
with minimal ethnic-Russian populations like Odessa and Lviv.619 Russian information, a 
crucial part of Russia’s strategy and policy in Ukraine, has metamorphosed under Putin, 
effectively propagating its narrative—designed for an intended purpose, target 
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population, and overall effect.620 621 622 In Ukraine, a common narrative Russia uses is to 
label the Ukrainian government in Kiev as incompetent fascist stooges of the West, 
incapable of governance, and one that criminally discriminates against ethnic Russians 
and Russia as a whole. Russia has primacy in Ukrainian media—“some 70 percent of the 
Ukrainian population watches Russia’s Ostankino Television, which transmits the 
strongest signal inside Ukraine,” and “Russian newspapers . . . are among the most 
popular periodicals in Ukraine”—thus the effects on Russian-speaking Ukrainians are 
apparent.623 Russian military and economic elements in Ukraine are equally  
as prominent. 
Russia has applied unrelenting pressure on Ukraine through its military and 
economic means of PW. The presence of Russian service members, basing rights, and the 
division of Soviet military property in Ukraine have substantiated Russian encroachment 
into Ukrainian affairs and acted as a platform for its foreign policy. Beyond Crimea, 
Sevastopol, the BSF, and nuclear weapons, Ukraine’s Donbass region (Luhansk and 
Donetsk) was a main contributor to the Soviet defense and mining industry. Ukraine had 
“twenty-two Soviet central weapons manufacturing complexes, . . . the Southern Machine 
Building factory in Dnipropetrovsk . . . produced the intercontinental ballistic missiles of 
the Soviet nuclear arsenal and was one of four major missile plants on Ukrainian soil.”624 
Coupled with regions rich mineral resources, Russia covets control over it and uses 
disparaging economic conditions to pit East versus West, creating political turmoil for 
Kiev. Economically, Russia reigns supreme over Ukraine’s economy, yet focuses intently 
on gas and energy transmission. Ukraine has, on several occasions, experienced drastic 
energy price spikes that led to an accumulation of debt or a complete cut off. Russia then 
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uses this accumulation of debt to achieve further objectives, namely regime change or 
policy abandonment. Russian businessmen have bought Ukrainian energy companies and 
infrastructure, allowing influence and money to funnel into Ukraine through shadow 
corporate structures and ownership.625 Overall, Russia’s PW supports its preeminent 
national objective to reintegrate Ukraine into Russia’s military, political, and economic 
spheres. Russia has concentrated on enhancing its contemporary PW by “devising non-
military means of exerting greater influence on Ukraine.”626 These nonmilitary means 
include implanting pro-Russian political appointees; leveraging the infrastructure and 
clandestine-nature of transnational-criminal organizations; increasing intelligence 
penetration; and forming economic unions and trade agreements.  
Russia’s employment of nonmilitary methods is reminiscent of Soviet takeovers 
in Eastern Europe.627 In “Interpreting and Dealing with the Ukraine Crisis,” Laszlo Borhi 
captures Russia’s long-term campaign in Ukraine: 
Control over a foreign state does not necessarily entail military 
administration by the aggressor. Yet several events may bring one state 
gradually under the sway of a foreign power, including security 
agreements granting extensive stationing rights, unequal economic 
agreements and foreign trade dependency, the seizure of positions of 
power, and the infiltration of political parties by agents working for the 
intelligence services of the external power.628 
Borhi’s reference to Soviet takeovers provides context for Russia’s strategy in 
Ukraine and reveals the intent behind their “normalization” efforts by using stationing 
rights for the BSF and Russian-led organizations like the CIS, Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), and Common Economic 
Space (CES) or Single Economic Space. Russia’s intentions are entrenched in established 
national objectives, namely regional dominance. Russia’s objectives within these 
organizations lie in the belief that their main strength to influence is the result of 
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mechanically adding up the resources of its members.629 An increase in resources means 
an increase in influence and, if Russian led, this equates to an increase in Russian 
influence. In light of this, Ukraine has tenaciously refuted Russia’s initiatives and 
demands. 
Ukraine, which has always feared Russia’s desires for the “reconstitution of 
Slavic heartlands,” has consistently sought to escape the stranglehold of the previous 
head of the former Soviet Union, but to no avail.630 Other former republics—Moldova, 
Georgia, Chechnya—have taken similar approaches, unwilling to accept Russia’s 
objectives, but they have paid a heavy price for their resistance. Russia’s approach to 
Ukraine has been historically less provocative, considering its size and former ties via the 
Soviet Union. Russia’s PW leverages incentive-based and deterrence-based methods (or 
“carrots-and-sticks”) to impose its will upon Ukraine. In the end, Russia’s PW has had a 
steady-state corrosive effect—eroding Ukraine’s security and economy, fomenting 
dissidence in ethnic-Russian populations (in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine), disrupting 
internal politics to favor Russian objectives and policies, and delegitimizing the 
Ukrainian government—especially when Ukraine pursues further ties with the West.  
1. Russian Political Warfare in Ukraine 1991–2000 
Russia’s PW against Ukraine can be traced to Ukraine’s declaration of 
independence. Though declared on August 24, 1991, Russia only acknowledged and 
never genuinely accepted Ukraine’s sovereignty. Russian propaganda flooded the media 
outlets, claiming nuclear war was on the horizon.631 Russian leadership immediately 
attempted to rein in the nationalist aspirations by proposing a “new union treaty that 
would limit the political and economic sovereignty of its members.”632 Russia’s 
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intentions were clear: Ukraine’s independence was a temporary phenomenon and 
reunification with Russia was only a matter of time.633 President Yeltsin stated that “once 
Russia reduces its annual supply of oil [to Ukraine] from 50m to 15m tonnes this would 
be the final nail in its [Ukraine’s] coffin of independence.”634 Sergei Karaganov, deputy 
head of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of 
Yeltsin’s presidential council, authored the Karaganov Doctrine, with a section entitled 
“How to Work with Ukraine” stating that Russian policy “should be aimed towards 
politically isolating Ukraine, restricting its economic growth and independence. Ukraine 
should be put under international fire by creating an image of an authoritarian-nationalist 
and neo-communist regime in Ukraine.”635 Delegitimizing the government and 
disrupting the economy would allow Russia to exert ownership over Soviet property and 
infrastructure, and to “reintegrate Ukraine into a Russian-oriented CIS and Economic 
Union.”636 This policy toward Ukraine was buttressed by domestic efforts at home: 
A study that focused on the image of Ukraine and Ukrainians in the 
Russian press after the collapse of the Soviet Union found that . . . the 
prevailing trend in the ensuing years was to present a picture of Ukrainian 
independence in almost conspiratorial terms—that is, as the result of 
efforts by “nationalist” or “sovereign communist” elites ostensibly 
working against the genuine will of “the people.”637 
The study concluded that “Russian public opinion and the mass media evade 
serious discussion . . . in connection with the formation of an independent Ukraine.”638 
As early as Ukraine’s independence, evidence can be seen of PW—diplomatic, 
economic, informational—reminiscent of Soviet ideological subversion, directed at 
producing negative economic effects on the population, isolating the target state 
internationally, and demonizing and fracturing the governmental and societal fibers. 
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As mentioned, Russia has had to play a delicate hand with Ukraine, unlike with 
the Caucasus, Moldova, and Tajikistan in the early 1990s, when “brazen military 
interference—some sanctioned by the Russian authorities, others rogue operations—
helped destabilize and even topple the official authorities.”639 Instead, Ukraine’s 
sovereignty would be “chipped away in a piecemeal fashion by Moscow.”640 Russia 
began a strategy intended to draw the former republic into a Russian-led security/
economic cooperation. This would allow Russia to restore control over Ukraine and the 
Soviet procurements it inherited—nuclear weapons, the BSF, Crimea, and Eastern 
Ukraine. The organization Russia intended to use as its strategic vehicle was the CIS. 
Besides Belarus, Ukraine’s support of the CIS was instrumental as Stephen Larrabee, 
former U.S. National Security Council staff on Soviet–East European affairs, contends, 
“Ukraine is the cornerstone—the keystone in the arch—of the new European security 
architecture.”641 Russia demanded Ukraine’s participation and full membership, less it 
risk “an emasculated and truncated version” stripped of all its Soviet acquisitions, both 
“immovable and movable.”642 Much to Russia’s dismay, Ukraine viewed the CIS as a 
divorce counselor only meant to ease the transition from the Soviet Union.643  
a. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Initially, Russia tried to persuade Ukraine with “carrots,” yet, it resorted to 
“sticks” to force the defiant former republic to capitulate. Following the December 1991 
signing of the second commonwealth accord in Alma-Ata, Yeltsin promoted agreements 
of Ukraine’s sovereign territory stating, “Every state is independent and there will be no 
center; . . . borders between the states will be inviolable. . . . Russia is not seeking to 
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bring about another empire.”644 Russia offered reduced prices for gas and oil and other 
economic incentives “on the condition Ukraine makes political concessions.”645 In 
August 1992, Russia proposed an initial Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Partnership outlining a preponderance of provisions in the CIS Charter such as “dual 
citizenship, joint military and foreign policy, inability to join another alliance, and 
Russian bases in Ukraine on behalf of the CIS.”646 This essentially created a “de facto 
Ukrainian-Russian union or confederation which Kiev had no interest in joining.”647 
Ukraine’s dismissal of the treaty and refrain from full membership in the CIS infuriated 
Moscow. In the summer of 1992, Russian leaders threatened to wreak havoc on 
Ukraine’s economy by raising oil prices, and they passed two resolutions claiming 
Crimea’s transfer in 1954 as illegal and Sevastopol as a Russian territory.648 Russian 
officials warned Eastern European countries not to bother building embassies in Kiev or 
to pursue ties with Ukraine as its independence is only “transitional.”649 Russia then 
submitted to the United Nations in February 1993—without any other CIS member’s 
consent—the “Russian Monroe Doctrine” purposing that “the entire former USSR must 
be proclaimed a [Russian] ‘sphere of vital interests’ . . . where it [Russia] would play a 
special role recognized by the World community.”650 Furthermore, Russia should be 
granted “special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability” in the near abroad “to deal 
with the rise in aggressive (non-Russian) nationalism, separatism of ethnic minorities, 
economic crisis and nuclear proliferation.”651 Russia proposed regional structures, such 
as the CIS, to manage these peace-keeping operations.652  
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Consequently, this peace-keeping role would allow Russia uncontested authority 
to “stir up trouble in order then to be invited in” to quell it, which would also afford 
Russia an opportunity to build new forward bases.653 Moreover, Russia believed it would 
relegate or prevent NATO intervention and expansion in the near abroad. After Russia 
unveiled its proposal, several CIS members argued that these “police functions would 
lead it [Russia] to dictate and interfere in the internal affairs of other CIS members.”654 
Ukraine was adamantly against such powers, “concerned that Russia could stir up trouble 
in the Crimea and then, on the basis of its ‘special UN powers,’ demand to be allowed to 
place ‘peacekeeping’ forces there which could be unlikely to leave in the short to medium 
term.”655 Russia, in fact, was already operationalizing in Crimea. Crimea is a historical 
bone of contention and home of the BSF. 
b. Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet 
Russia has deemed Crimea vital to its national security and claims rightful 
ownership over the territory. In 1991, it was agreed that the BSF, a CIS force, could 
remain stationed at Sevastopol. Russia wanted all of it: Crimea, the BSF, and Sevastopol. 
The Russian Navy was recruiting BSF sailors with incentives like higher pay and 
benefits.656 In mid-1992, Yevhen Marchuk, head of Ukraine’s National Security Service, 
revealed “that influential Russian industrial interests were actively transferring 
considerable funds to support separatist and pro-Russian movements in the Crimea and 
the Donbass . . . skillfully, so that the official roots are hidden.”657 Russian political 
groups—such as the Republican Movement of Crimea—held mass rallies allegedly 
expressing the “will of the people” as favoring closer ties with Russia and warned to take 
“adequate and appropriate measures on the issue of its status.”658 Seventy percent of the 
                                                 
653 Kuzio, Russia-Crimea-Ukraine, 12.  
654 Ibid. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 78.  
657 Kuzio, Russia-Crimea-Ukraine, 12.  
658 Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 75.  
 196
population, however, felt no hostility or discrimination toward national identity, seeing 
national enmity inconsequential in comparison to economic conditions or economic peril 
at that time.659 Additionally, Moscow was offering dual citizenship to Crimean Russians 
and “promoted Crimean presidential candidates oriented towards Russia.”660 Covertly, 
several pro-Russian Cossacks, who had xenophobic sentiment toward Ukraine and had 
fought in “Bosnia, ‘Dniester Republic’ in Moldova and Abkhazia, were arrested 
transporting weapons to Crimea.”661 On the informational front, Russian television 
included Sevastopol with other major Russian cities during local and national weather 
forecasts.662 The level of Russian PW in Crimea alone is of epic proportion and illustrates 
a micro-level overarching approach in Ukraine. Russia proceeded similarly in ensuring 
Ukraine’s denuclearization. 
c. Russia’s Role in Ukraine’s Denuclearization 
Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal challenged Russia and created a significant hurdle in 
terms of coercing Ukraine to become a full member of the CIS. In 1993, tensions 
between Russia and Ukraine were at an all-time high, and Moscow wanted “to undermine 
the West’s confidence in Ukraine by accusing Kiev of maintaining unsafe facilities for 
the storage of the nuclear warheads. Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk 
dismissed these accusations as false and as examples of Russian pressure on Ukraine.”663 
Moscow’s insistence and influence on Ukraine’s denuclearization was framed within a 
narrative that painted Russia as a steward of nonproliferation, protecting the interests of 
the international community, while Ukraine was a state on the verge of chaos. Adrian 
Karatnycky describes Russian strategy in pursuit of Ukraine’s denuclearization:  
Russia had sought also to exploit international concern about Ukraine’s 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons by skillfully portraying the new 
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Ukrainian state as an unreliable member of the international community, 
led by a president who was a neo-communist turned nationalist. . . . 
Russian officials sought to muster Western pressure on Ukraine to . . . 
isolate the new Ukrainian state . . . to weaken its hand vis-à-vis Moscow. 
Ironically, such Western pressure was exerted according to Russian—not 
Western— strategic priorities. For Ukraine was pressed first to rid itself of 
its tactical nuclear weapons—which could be deployed as a deterrent 
against Russia—and not the strategic nuclear arsenal, which was targeted 
originally at the United States [emphasis added].664 
Russia reinforced its strategy through diplomatic and military channels, and 
incessant informational campaigns. Russian political leaders traveled to densely 
populated, pro-Russian regions, rallying against the fabricated anti-Russian policies of 
the Ukrainian government that fomented dissent and political instability for Kiev.665 The 
Russian Foreign Ministry Press and Information Department issued a plethora of reports, 
statements, and findings all bent on defacing Ukraine’s nuclear program.666 The 
Ukrainian newspaper Pravda and Russian television ramped up propaganda on Ukrainian 
ultra-nationalism and the incompetency of the government in Kiev and created hysteria 
about the state of the nuclear arsenal and the potential of nuclear war. Fiona Hill and 
Pamela Jewett’s research on Russian intervention in former Soviet republics expounds on 
Russia’s information campaign in support of denuclearizing Ukraine, stating, “Moscow 
raised the phantom of an accidental Ukrainian nuclear strike on the United States . . . 
suggesting the catastrophic deterioration of improperly-maintained Ukrainian weapons—
each one a Chernobyl waiting to happen.”667 They also assert that the Russian defense 
ministry chief director, Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin, claimed that Ukraine lacked 
the ability to maintain its nuclear hardware and storage facilities, which were “becoming 
increasingly dangerous to itself, Russia, and the international community.”668 In the end, 
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Russia’s most influential element of national power against Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, 
and Ukraine in general, was economic. 
d. Russian Economic Political Warfare 
Russia engineered economics into a weapon and, as Ukraine’s economy was and 
is heavily dependent on Russia—particularly Russian gas and energy transmission—
Russia has used this interdependency to hold Ukraine hostage. The former Russian 
minister of CIS relations, Igor Tuliev, pointed out that “Ukraine is economically 
dependent on Russia and . . . Russia’s economic levers should be utilized in dealing with 
Ukraine.”669 Ukraine’s defiance to Russian demands in the 1990s led to Moscow’s 
economic warfare. This included drastic energy price hikes; expulsion of Ukraine from 
the ruble zone; suspension of fuel supplies during important state visits, such as that of 
German chancellor Helmut Kohl in June 1993; interruption of “resources such as gas, oil, 
precious metals for the electronics industry and fertilizer components”; freezing Russian 
Central Bank transactions with Ukraine; and imposing tariff’s and taxes on Ukrainian 
imports.670 Most notably, Russian energy has been the vanguard of economic coercion. 
Russia controls the energy terms and conditions to support its political and foreign policy 
goals in Ukraine. Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and expert 
on Ukraine and Russia, explains the energy coercion: 
In July 1993, Russia began to restrict gas and energy supplies to Ukraine 
and to charge near-world market prices. As a result, Ukraine began to 
accumulate debts it could not service. . . . For a one-month period Russia 
even shut off gas and oil deliveries to Ukraine for non-payment. In 
September 1993, Russia followed with a diplomatic demarche, signing an 
agreement with Poland to construct a gas pipeline that would travel 
through Belarus and Poland, bypassing Ukraine.671 
Beyond the accumulation of debt, the lack of energy has detrimental effects on 
Ukraine’s economy. Due to the energy shortfalls, the 1993 harvesting season was 
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crippled and the agricultural industry destroyed, leaving crops to rot in the fields.672 In 
addition to overt economic coercion, covertly, the Russian FIS was preventing Ukraine 
from exploiting large oil and gas deposits on the Black Sea coast near Odessa through 
active measures.673 The economic pressure was fueling internal political pressure; 
Moscow “trumpeted the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s eastern 
provinces, particularly miners in the Donetsk region” resulting in “a new wave of 
strikes.”674 675 Combined with the diplomatic, military, and informational fronts, the 
pressure was overwhelming and led to a series of agreements at Massandra, Crimea in 
September 1993. 
e. Kremlin Victories 
At Massandra, Ukraine initially agreed to sell its share of the BSF to pay off the 
estimated $2.5 billion debt from Russian fuel imports and to allow Russia to lease 
Sevastopol.676 This precursor agreement led to the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Partnership, which divided the BSF in half between Ukraine and 
Russia. In November 1993, Ukraine committed to a phased nuclear disarmament program 
that eventually led to the Trilateral Agreement. The pro-Russian political parties coalition 
claimed victory in the Crimean peninsula, “a presage political warfare over regional 
authority.”677 Russia continued its PW practices to manipulate Ukrainian internal 
politics. 
In 1994, on the eve of a new political season with March elections for parliament 
and June-July elections for the presidency, Russia, which in 1993 had drastically reduced 
the supplies of energy to Ukraine, exerted no similar pressure on Ukraine when its 
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delinquencies of payments climbed in the winter of 1993-1994. This decision was 
calculated; any effort to heighten tension between the two states might strengthen the 
hand of anti-Russian forces and weaken the hand of the candidate Moscow felt was 
clearly preferable—Leonid Kuchma—who campaigned on improving relations with 
Russia.678 Kuchma won the presidency in 1994 and continued to reap support from 
Moscow throughout his tenure. Economic conditions remained poor, but Russia’s PW 
machine was able to blame the “West’s market economy” for its performance and, 
combined with NATO operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia, approval ratings for 
Russia soared, while opinions of the United States and NATO plummeted.679 Preceding 
the 1999 Ukrainian election, Yeltsin eased the value-added tax (VAT) imposed on 
Ukrainian goods and, in February 1998, stated, “If you [Ukraine] change Presidents 
[Kuchma], you may be in for a change of relations,” essentially directing the Russian-
speaking population in eastern and southern Ukraine to support Kuchma.680 Kuchma also 
took a cue from Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential election, as prior to the 1999 election, several 
people were murdered, including investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and Vadim 
Hetman, who was Viktor Yushchenko’s confidant and potential campaign leader. After 
Hetman’s murder, Yushchenko abandoned campaigning altogether.681 The state-
controlled media dominated and heralded Kuchma; Ukrainians were “forced from 
factories, schools, and even hospitals to go to polls and vote for Kuchma.”682 Kuchma 
claimed victory, and Russia remained well positioned to dominate and control Ukraine. 
f. Conclusion 
Russia’s PW in Ukraine, from Ukraine’s independence in 1991 until the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, supported Russia’s vital interests and national 
objectives. Russia was never able to achieve Ukraine’s full membership in the CIS, but it 
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was able to accomplish a majority of the goals that the CIS was intended for. Russia 
demonstrated an ability to affect Ukraine’s internal politics and governance, dissuade 
anti-Russian policies or agendas, and implant pro-Russian leaders into positions of 
power. The Soviet infrastructure and materials Ukraine possessed—the BSF, energy 
infrastructure, nuclear weapons, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine—fell under Russian 
influence, ownership, or control. Ukraine dismantled its nuclear arsenal, ratified the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, permitted the 
stationing of the Russian BSF, afforded leasing rights on Sevastopol for 20 years, and 
agreed to Russian economic terms and conditions on energy transmission.683 Russian 
influence and popularity in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine gained primacy and aggravated 
Ukraine’s internal politics and foreign policy. Ukraine became an associate member of 
the CIS Economic Union and joined the CIS Joint Air Defense Agreement and Industrial-
Financial Groups.684 Russia’s synchronized PW across all elements of national power 
was successful in achieving these strategic milestones. Entering the twenty-first century, 
Russia aptly held Ukraine within its sphere of influence commensurate with Russian 
national objectives. 
2. Russian Political Warfare in Ukraine 2000-2014 
The Twenty-First Century ushered in a transition in Russia’s leadership:  
Vladimir Putin. Putin’s Russia has had intense, direct impacts on Ukraine. As described 
in Chapter V, shortly after his election in 2000, Putin went to work reconstructing Russia 
by reigning in the power ministries and oligarchs, and establishing the internal 
mechanisms needed to support his rule and foreign policy agenda.685 He also eliminated 
any political opposition, consumed and state-institutionalized Russia’s economic 
resources, revitalized Russia’s military and informational elements of national power, and 
reinvigorated the intelligence and covert apparatuses. His aggressive new vision of 
foreign policy was designed to resurrect the once great Soviet empire, now a Eurasian 
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empire. Putin’s expansionist, revisionist aims would solidify Russia’s supremacy over the 
former Soviet republics, creating a new Russian civilization and community.686 Ukraine 
was to be a vital part of this new civilization; a Eurasian civilization.  
At home, Putin was paranoid about external threats, internal dissent, and political 
process manipulation, and in 2000 began “rebuilding a regime of repression” that would 
allow Russia to pursue its foreign policy goals much more aggressively.687 Putin’s 
paranoia was fueled by his belief that outside powers were trying to take control over 
Russia’s natural resources “by weakening its state institutions, defense capability, and 
independence.”688 To dissolve these threats, Putin used tactics known as policing the 
opposition that included using the police to block roads, tear-gassing anti-Putin 
protestors, seizing radio stations by force, and contracting enforcers from outside areas to 
break up opposition gatherings.689 These tactics were a portent to events in Ukraine. 
Putin also “built [global energy company] Gazprom into a main instrument of Russia’s 
new state capitalism,” appointing allies to top positions and in effect structuring 
“Gazprom as a tool of foreign policy.”690 Gazprom was now Putin’s sword to strike 
Ukraine at will, a tactic that would prove useful in “Putin’s new grand alternative project, 
the Eurasian Union.”691 Under Putin, Russia replenished its ailing Ministry of Defense 
and reenergized its information warfare in the near abroad with a revamped compatriot 
policy constructing a “virtual Russian supra-state populated with ‘compatriots.’”692 This 
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provided Moscow with renewed legitimacy with regard to Russian-speaking populations 
living in the near abroad.693 
Russia’s newly engineered policy has a twenty-first century flavor: funding and 
enhancing NGOs, increasing its media reach to disseminate Russian propaganda, funding 
political parties and leaders with pro-Russian agendas, and strengthening the Russian 
Orthodox Church.694 This transcendence includes new political technologies such as 
“arraying an army of interferers, whose techniques are much more post-modern: party 
managers and financiers, official script writers, Kremlin bloggers, trolls and so-called 
web-brigady.”695 Putin’s consolidation and control over Russian media has increased its 
potency, both domestically and internationally.696 Organizations like RT are able to bury 
Russia’s Kremlin line “in a post-modern mélange of ‘alternative’ views,” perturbing or 
outright confusing audiences.697 Modern Russian information warfare distorts the truth or 
fabricates outright lies to cause psychological impotence or lack of clarity. If needed, 
violent repression also plays its role and has historical roots in Russian history. Of the 
1,055 journalists killed worldwide from 1992 through 2014, 80 were in Russia.698 In all, 
Putin’s Russia has synchronized and strengthened its PW capability to achieve its 
national objectives, to include, most importantly, subordinating Ukraine. 
The seething nature and brutality of Russia’s contemporary PW in Ukraine has no 
bounds, even to the extent of collaborating with transnational-criminal organizations. Dr. 
Lada Roslycky research in Crimea has revealed Russia’s “political-criminal nexus” as an 
effective foreign policy instrument designed to “impede the rule of law and the state’s de 
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facto control over its territory and population.”699 700 Roslycky’s work on Crimea 
concludes Russia’s strategy in Ukraine aims to promote pro-Russian separatism to 
challenge Ukraine’s governmental legitimacy and desires for Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Russia’s strategy has been supported “by a Russia-centered, post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus made up of intelligence services, government executives and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s).”701 In Crimea, this nexus includes “Russian Community of 
Choice and Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia Group (which includes over 100 NGOs), Moscow 
State University, the FSB (the successor to the KGB), the GRU (Russian military 
intelligence), former Moscow mayor Luzhkov, Konstantyn Zatulin and the Russian 
Orthodox Church.”702 The SBU (Ukrainian intelligence) has also been linked to 
Gazprom.703 The variety and complexity of these actors reflects the intensity of Russia’s 
PW; their coordinated efforts include the 
use of NGO’s to promote anti-Western/anti-NATO and anti-democratic 
sentiment; casting Crimean territoriality into doubt; use of language/
education as a political instrument—book and school burning; publishing 
of “free” anti-state newspapers; (forced) dispersal of passports/
passportization; renaming of streets/towns, cultural centers; hanging 
Russian flags and plaques, Nazi graffiti on Ukrainian buildings, separatist 
calls from Russian politicians, use of religion as political instrument—
promotion of Russian Orthodox Church and Tatar tensions, and 
modification of shared common memory.704 
The subversive nature of these acts is akin to classic Soviet active measures 
engineered to aggravate the political and social landscape in Ukraine. William Varettoni, 
a former Ukraine and NATO analyst with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
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Intelligence and Research whose dissertation focused on security and instability in 
Crimea, professes, “The Russian press and television dominate Crimea. . . . The Black 
Sea Fleet, businessmen, and NGOs with Russian affinities sponsor a number of local 
publications and television stations” fervidly delegitimizing the Ukrainian 
government.705 These groups were inflaming the Crimea issue, suggesting it is a grand 
plan of NATO to expand its foothold in the region and rob the Slavs of a “powerful 
shield against the West.”706 The messaging is relevant, well crafted, and attractive to the 
end user, both at home and abroad.  
Putin’s actions are similar to Stalin’s in resurrecting the fifth column, and the 
2004 presidential election in Ukraine became the leviathan of Russian PW.  
a. Russian Role in the Orange Revolution 
Russian involvement in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was industrial in 
scale and ubiquitous in nature; however, it resulted in what is also “widely viewed as the 
Kremlin’s greatest foreign relations blunder since 1991.”707 Notwithstanding, the 2004 
election exemplifies Russia’s twenty-first century PW in Ukraine. The election became 
the “clash of civilizations between two political cultures: Eurasian and European”—
Yanukovych and Yushchenko.708 Or, more narrowly speaking, it was a struggle between 
pro-Western and pro-Russian orientations.709 Geographically this translates to a 
confrontation between the Russian-friendly eastern region and the nationalistic western 
region; the Kremlin believed Yanukovych’s victory required convincing the latter that 
Russia-Ukraine cooperation was instrumental for Ukrainian prosperity.710 This strategy 
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was implemented by Russian political technologists and funded by the Russian state.711 
The historical East-versus-West platform was constructed and lent to demonizing 
Yushchenko and his coalition, Our Ukraine, as evil fascists—Nazis—and stooges of the 
West, particularly of the U.S., nicknaming Yushchenko as “Bushchenko.”712 Meanwhile, 
Yanukovych’s Russophone Party of Regions and Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 
(SDPU) were pro-Russian stewards of Ukraine, seeking prosperity through stronger 
relations with Russia. 
(1) Russian Diplomatic and Economic Political Warfare 
Among others, Putin’s geopolitical concerns in Ukraine revolved around halting 
EU and NATO expansion, securing the southern flank, solidifying the Single Economic 
Space, and securing Moldova and the South Caucasus.713 He gambled on Yanukovych 
and Russian political technologists. Yanukovych, in turn, committed to making Russian 
an official language, allowing dual citizenship, and abandoning all moves toward 
NATO.714 Russian diplomatic support for Yanukovych came from Putin and Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev in the form of official state visits, public declarations, and 
presidential endorsements.715 “Putin received extensive coverage on official Ukrainian 
TV, including a ninety-minute phone-in broadcast, live on national channels . . . which 
was unprecedented in Ukraine.”716 In the summer of 2004, “Putin agreed to remove VAT 
on oil exports to Ukraine reducing the cost of Ukrainian petrol by 16 percent” and petrol 
remained at those prices even as crude oil costs soared later in the year.717 Russia 
announced Ukrainians would be allowed to stay for up to 90 days in Russia without 
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registering and granted freedom of entry with only domestic documentation.718 Putin 
congratulated Yanukovych on his “victory” after the second round; then, once it was 
declared null and void, Putin pushed for a complete rerun in an attempt to reinsert 
Kuchma into power.719 
(2) Russian Political Technologists 
Unscrupulous Russian political technologists (techs) unemployed at home (Putin 
essentially eliminated any need for them) were aligned in full force with Viktor 
Medvedchuk, leader of the SDPU and Ukraine’s most pro-Russian oligarch, and Gleb 
Pavlovski, owner of The Russian Club in Kiev, as well as several others.720 The Moscow 
linkage is blatant and inescapable. Medvedchuk was Kuchma’s chief of staff (1994-2005) 
and his daughter’s godfather is Vladimir Putin.721 Moscow bankrolled these techs and 
Yanukovych with an estimated $600-$900 million “including a $200 million payment 
from the Kremlin-controlled energy giant Gazprom”; these funds were funneled through 
shadowy companies and structures such as Donechchyna.722  
The techs consider themselves “political metaprogrammers, masters of the local 
political universe.”723 They shape the direction of the favored political party or authority 
and manipulate the election to achieve victory. Their tactics are often crude and 
corrosive; they stop at nothing to win. In Ukraine, the techs orchestrated and led the PW 
to include covertly financed fake candidates or parties, bribed and intimidated state-
administrated resources and personnel (state-owned media), hacking into the fiber optics 
of the Central Election Commission in Kiev, manipulated voting results through various 
methods like electoral tourism, hired agent provocateurs to incite anti-Western sentiment, 
and stage-managed events—directed conflict—to charge the political atmosphere or 
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destabilize regions.724 725 726 They organized social movements in eastern and southern 
Ukraine against Yushchenko, falsified voter turnouts, fabricated fake ballots printed in 
Russia, and used proxies to distribute crude anti-Western propaganda.727 Additionally, 
they “created a network of websites, each which reprinted news from the others” creating 
a cyclical metastasizing effect over the Internet by concealing the initial source and 
providing “other media (television or newspaper) to use the information (usually 
disinformation).”728 Their PW arsenal seems to have no end. 
The techs’ assault was levied generally through six mechanisms: television, anti-
American propaganda, state-administrative resources, violence, encouragement of 
extremist groups, and the assassination of Yushchenko.729 Yanukovych received 80% 
more television time than Yushchenko and, since Yushchenko’s wife was American, the 
Brezhnev-era, anti-American campaign characterized Yushchenko as an American stooge 
(see Figure 2). Employees of state institutions were forced to demonstrate in support of 
Yanukovych or risk losing their jobs. Organized-crime “skinheads” started appearing at 
protests; fascist propaganda followed suit (see Figure 3), and then Yushchenko was 
poisoned with dioxin allegedly originating from laboratories in Russia (see Figure 4).730 
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Figure 2.  “Yes! For Bushchenko.” Poster of Yushchenko portrayed as a 
puppet of the Bush administration.731 
 
Figure 3.  Poster depicting Yushchenko as the fanatical fascist Hitler. “Does 
the Nation need a new FURER?” “National Liberation Front for 
YUSHENKO” “Cleanse Donbass – Cleanse Ukraine.”732 
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Figure 4.  Yushchenko before and after dioxin poisoning.733 
In an attempt to thwart the efforts of NGOs like PORA, the techs tried to spin 
these organizations in Soviet-style language as “destructive forces, extremists, and 
fascists.”734 PORA offices were raided and explosives were planted to further the 
terrorists’ claim. Moreover, PORA was deemed a U.S.-led group importing Westernism 
into Ukraine; a notion that was well established and widely accepted in Russia.735 Other 
efforts similar to Soviet active measures included 
 airing pro-Yanukovych advertisements on government-controlled 
television networks,  
 using roadblocks and the denying airplane landing rights to prevent the 
Yuschenko-Tymoshenko campaign from reaching major rallies,  
 arresting coalition activists on false charges,  
 threatening to evict students involved in the campaign from their dorms,  
 using disappearing ink in the pens being used to cast votes in pro-
Yushchenko districts.736 
Religious institutions also played a role. “The Orthodox Church of Moscow 
Patriarchate was still technically part of the Russian Church, and the most easily available 
institutional channel for Russian influence in Ukraine.”737 Leaders of the Moscow 
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Patriarchate in Ukraine blessed Yanukovych and publicly endorsed him in the media. 
Priests politicized their sermons and the Church’s opaque finances helped fund several 
covert operations for Yanukovych.738 “In November a typical stash of unsigned leaflets 
was found in a church near the Moldovan border attacking Yushchenko as ‘a partisan of 
the schismatics and an enemy of Orthodox’ and calling his wife a ‘CIA agent.’”739 The 
Church also supported Yanukovych with propaganda; some endorsed by the Archangel 
Michael himself, the patron saint of Kiev.740 The massive, in-depth orchestration of PW 
seemed unbeatable and incomparable in scale; but, the results would soon shock 
Moscow. 
(3) Yushchenko Wins 
The international recognition and social movement fueled by Ukrainian 
dissatisfaction and dissent defied Russia’s PW. The international electoral monitors and 
attention on Ukraine attenuated further Russian intervention. In addition, certain events 
fueled contempt for Yanukovych and his rigged victory. Defection aided in mobilizing 
the populace, especially Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who condemned 
the stolen runoff election. The confirmed results of Yushchenko’s poisoning and illicit 
cover-up emboldened the opposition. Falsified medical reports leaked to the media 
claiming no evidence of poisoning and propaganda claiming Yushchenko’s physical 
appearance was due to a hangover or a botched Botox injection only bolstered the 
opposition’s discord.741 Then, another attempt was made at Yushchenko’s life. On the 
eve of the second round of elections, the police arrested two Russian men traveling with 
false passports outside of Yushchenko’s headquarters in a car packed with two kilograms 
of plastic explosives and a remote-control detonator.742 Allegedly, the men confessed to 
the police “that unnamed officials in Moscow promised them $200,000 to assassinate 
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Yushchenko.”743 This was either a legitimate second assassination attempt or the SBU 
was trying to distance itself from its involvement in the dioxin poisoning. Nonetheless, 
after Ukraine’s parliament denounced the second round of elections, Yanukovych  
was finished. 
In the wake of Yushchenko’s victory, damage control commenced. The railways 
minister, Hryhorii Kirpa, whose trains aided in electoral tourism and carried huge 
amounts of anti-Yushchenko propaganda, was found dead in his sauna in Kiev. He had 
been paid through regional branches of Yanukovych’s party, Russian Orthodox 
associations, and various other enterprises.744 He apparently had threatened to expose the 
scandal and, on the night of his alleged suicide, his neighbors reported hearing several 
shots.745 Yurii Liakh, head of Ukrainian Credit Bank, a key source of illicit campaign 
finance, allegedly committed suicide by repeatedly stabbing himself in the neck with a 
letter opener.746 Yanukovych and the Russian political technologists were guarding 
against any backlash that could damage Yanukovych’s role in the new government. In the 
end, Russia’s PW in Ukraine was defeated in 2004, but the loss and victory would be 
short-lived. 
b. Putin Prepares 
The Orange Revolution provoked Putin’s paranoia and intensified the 
conspiratorial mindset pervasive in the Kremlin. The protests were a direct threat to 
Russia and a challenge to its regional dominance. Paradoxically, Kremlin officials and 
advisers interpreted the Orange Revolution as an orchestration by foreign governments, 
foundations, and NGOs.747 Before long, Russia began preparing for the Ukrainian 2006 
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parliamentary and 2010 presidential elections, planning to use the same tactics  
(see Figure 5), but adapting to avoid the mistakes made in 2004.748 
 
Figure 5.  Poster displayed in Ukraine’s parliament in Kiev prior to the 2010 
presidential election depicting President Yushchenko as Uncle Sam.749 
Putin became prime minister and the newly appointed Russian president, Dmitry 
Medvedev, proclaimed Russia’s main tasks in Ukraine were to discredit Yushchenko, the 
American marionette, and disgrace the Orange Revolution’s ideals.750 On the 
informational front, the strategy was successful in leading to a radical transformation of 
Ukrainian opinion.751 In 2006, the “For Yanukovych Bloc” took control of the Crimean 
parliament and incited anti-U.S. and anti-NATO demonstrations that led to the first 
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cancellation of NATO joint military exercises in Crimea.752 The economic element of 
national power was employed with the carrots-and-sticks strategy. 
(1) Russian Economic Political Warfare 
With total control over Gazprom, Russia was well-positioned to influence and 
manipulate Ukraine’s economy. Russia cut off gas supplies in 2006 and 2009 during the 
winter gas wars, which led to the demise of Yushchenko’s government and the Orange 
movement, and, in conjunction with the global recession, the collapse of Ukraine’s 
economy.753 In 2010, Yanukovych returned to power. Russia negotiated a 20-year 
renewal of the Sevastopol port agreement and basing rights for the Russian BSF in 
exchange for a 30% discount on gas prices and a reduction of the amount of gas that 
Ukraine was obligated to purchase.754 Russian procurements and investments increased 
in Ukraine,755 including a proposed merger between Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz. 
756 In 2010, a ban prohibiting foreign companies from running Ukrainian gas pipelines 
was lifted and a bill was initiated “that could allow Russian companies to control 
them.”757 To sway Ukrainian oligarchs to move against the planned association 
agreement with the EU and leverage its media resources to influence public opinion 
against the agreement, Russia emphasized the money-making opportunities that existed 
within Russia and the consequences of signing the agreement. Russia constrained 
Ukrainian imports, not with provocative methods of embargoes or tariffs, but instead by 
instructing customs officials to intensify “carpet” inspections, effectively bringing the 
flow of Ukrainian goods to a halt.758 The oligarchs got the message. In conjunction with 
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economics, several analysts and experts attest that 2006 was the year that Moscow—
Putin—began preparing for a takeover of Crimea when he offered to guarantee  
Crimea’s territory.759 760 
(2) Guaranteeing Crimea 
To delegitimize and invalidate Ukraine’s ownership of Crimea, Russia enhanced 
its use of intelligence, military, informational, ideological, and other forms of penetration 
of the Crimea.761 Military aspects included augmenting Russia’s conventional 
capabilities with Russian special operations forces for “both covert and overt subversion 
of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea; giving Russian military passports to soldiers and 
officers in the Transnistrian Russian ‘Army’ that occupies part of Moldova; and rotating 
these soldiers through the elite Russian officer training courses at Solnechegorsk.”762 The 
contingency planning would allow these Transnistrian forces to aid the potential 
operation in Crimea and “bisect Ukraine capturing all of southern Ukraine.”763 The 
covert and clandestine nature of the plans speaks to Putin’s historical past and modern 
aggressive initiatives in Ukraine. 
(3) Intelligence Penetration 
Russian security service penetration and its active role in Ukraine is omnipresent 
and has strengthened under Yanukovych.  
Russian operatives, most commonly working for the Russian Federal 
Security Service (FSB), the KGB’s successor, permeate Ukrainian police 
and intelligence agencies. Russia sympathizers and agents, many of whom 
belong to the GRU, Russia’s resurgent military intelligence agency, fill the 
Ukrainian army ranks. Equipped with an array of tools—from embedded 
spies to communications intercepts—the GRU is tasked with locating 
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Ukrainian military units, uncovering their plans, and conducting 
paramilitary operations against them. The Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs, likewise, have also built 
extensive networks in the country. In particular, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs has allowed the agency to easily identify Ukrainian counterparts 
amenable to FSB recruitment. Under the Yanukovych regime, deep 
Russian involvement in the SBU had been an open secret. The 
organization’s former deputy head, for example, admitted in 2010 that not 
only were there Russian agents among the SBU’s ranks, but the 
organization had an official agreement with the FSB, spelled out in a 2010 
cooperation protocol, that allowed Moscow to recruit agents from within 
the Ukrainian government.764 
Russia was preparing for operations in Ukraine, and its military methods—
intelligence, clandestine, and covert—would be incorporated to reinforce its nonmilitary 
methods of PW. 
(4) Maidan 2.0 
By late 2013, Russia had regained control over Ukraine. The pro-Russian 
Yanukovych was Moscow’s implanted man in power. He maintained a European facade 
to garner support from the West, but it quickly dissipated when he could no longer keep 
his deception concealed. In November 2013, the government decided not to sign an 
association agreement aimed at stronger ties with the EU, instead opting for a $15 billion 
Russian economic package. The decision sparked antigovernment demonstrations in 
Kiev’s Independence Square, referred to as Euromaidan or Maidan 2.0. The government 
responded by having riot police attempt to clear the square, along with violent 
crackdowns on protestors by hired “roving gangs of street thugs.”765 Eventually, the 
protestors seized key government buildings, causing Yanukovych and his supporters to 
flee. Russia responded quickly and with veracity, but in line with its overall strategy. The 
PW methods Russia had employed to this point failed to produce the desired results, so 
Russia escalated to the next phase, incorporating a stronger military role in conjunction 
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with a nonmilitary political campaign directed at appealing to the domestic population in 
Russia and deterring the international community’s involvement. 
3. Conclusion: Success or Failure 
Russia’s PW in the twenty-first century grew in conjunction to its internal 
strength. Putin increased its PW potency with massive improvements across all elements 
of national power. Twenty-first century advancements analogous with globalization have 
been incorporated into Russia’s PW in Ukraine: informational, criminal, clandestine, and 
intelligence. The employment of PW demonstrates an overarching, comprehensive 
strategy aimed at reeling Ukraine back under the total control of Moscow. Arguably, 
some scholars and analysts suggest that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have been largely 
unsuccessful.766 In addition to the Orange Revolution, since Ukraine’s independence, 
Russia has been unable to gain Ukrainian compliance or partnership in terms of 
geopolitics, economics, and security. Ukraine’s defiant tendencies and aspirations for 
European integration have gained momentum in opposition to the Eurasian option that 
Russia advocates. Viewed from a different vantage point, however, Russia has succeeded 
in that it has fomented dissent and unrest among an otherwise content populace, repelled 
foreign investment, disrupted political processes and economic stability, prevented 
Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership, and showcased Ukraine’s undeniable reliance on 
Russia in regard to geopolitics, economics, security, and internal politics. What’s more, 
Russia has strengthened its hand in the southern and eastern regions, particularly Crimea. 
Control over a majority of Soviet military resources or infrastructure were restored to 
Russia. The BSF and Sevastopol remain Russian military strongholds, providing access 
to the Black Sea and thus allowing Russia to project military might into the region. 
Russia has also moved closer to controlling Ukrainian gas pipelines and infrastructure 
through investment and shadowy business deals. Whether Russia has prevailed or failed 
is debatable or yet to be seen. Irrefutably, Russia has and continues to employ PW in 
Ukraine, and the West continues to ignore it at its own peril. 
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VII. RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE GERASIMOV DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION IN 
UKRAINE 
Russia’s new doctrinal model for “inter-governmental conflict” is a direct product 
of the Kremlin’s and, by extension, the Russian General Staff’s view of geopolitical 
reality. The model, implemented with remarkable effectiveness in the Crimean and 
Donbass operations in 2014, combines Soviet-era subversion doctrine with a perceived 
Western style of waging war in the twenty-first century, where opposition movements 
such as “color revolutions” are understood to have been perpetrated by the U.S. to 
undermine and isolate Russia. This analysis demonstrates that Russia’s actions in Crimea 
and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 should not be interpreted as a radical doctrinal experiment, 
but as a systemic restoration of proven Soviet PW methods adapted to exploit a new 
geopolitical reality. 
This chapter is an explanation of General Valery Gerasimov’s 2013 model for the 
“role of non-military methods in resolving intergovernmental conflicts,” and establishes 
the KGB subversion model as a progenitor for the Gerasimov doctrine. The section 
concludes with a detailed analysis of the Ukraine conflict, from November 2013 to March 
2015, demonstrating the application of the Gerasimov model in both the Crimean and 
Donbass campaigns. 
A. RUSSIA’S “NEW GENERATION WARFARE” 
Russia’s perception of geopolitical reality is a critical component of 
understanding Moscow’s strategy. The last decade has seen a resurgence of Cold War 
paranoia over an externally generated “existential threat” from the West to the Russian 
Federation. By the middle of the last decade, NATO and EU expansion fueled 
increasingly conspiratorial rhetoric and hyper-inflated threat assessments throughout the 
Russian political and military cultures. This intensified existing fears of Western attempts 
to keep Russia marginalized from global leadership through absorbing, weakening, or 
destabilizing the former Soviet space and plundering Russia’s natural resources. 
Perceived use of PW by the West precipitated Moscow’s response in kind. 
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Gerasimov’s viewpoint is reflected in his 2013 article in the Military Industrial 
Courier outlining the future focus of the Russian military. Gerasimov, building on earlier 
concepts developed by his predecessor in the CGS, Nikolai Makarov, presented a phased 
model describing the “role of non-military methods in resolving intergovernmental 
conflicts.”767 Gerasimov’s model (see Figure 6) underscores the integration of military 
and nonmilitary measures, especially early in conflict generation, and provides a 
framework for initiating and fostering disequilibrium and “contradiction” within an 
opponent’s “military-political leadership” structure, then moving into later phases of 
crisis generation, and eventual resolution by either military or nonmilitary means. 
Gerasimov stated: 
The trend in the 21st century is to erase the line between war and peace… 
The role of non-military methods of achieving political and strategic 
goals, in some cases, has far exceeded the force of arms in terms of 
effectiveness. The emphasis of the methods of confrontation has shifted 
towards widespread use of political, economic, information, humanitarian 
and other non-military measures, implemented by taking advantage of the 
protest potential of the population. All this is complemented by covert 
military measures including information warfare and activities conducted 
by special operations forces . . . . Widespread asymmetrical actions allow 
for the neutralization of an enemy’s superiority, and include the use of 
special operations forces and internal opposition to creating a permanent 
front throughout the opposing state, as well as informational influence, 
forms and methods which are constantly being improved.768 
                                                 
767 Valery Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require Rethinking Forms and 
Methods of Warfare,” Military-Industrial Courier, February 27, 2013. 
768 Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight.” 
 221
 
Figure 6.  Gerasimov Model – 2013.769 
Gerasimov’s comments hint at a much broader transformation in strategic 
thinking. Colonel S.G. Chekinov and Lieutenant General S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.), writing 
for the leading Russian military theory and strategy journal in 2013, echo Gerasimov’s 
ideas in describing “new-generation warfare” as involving “a combination of political, 
economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns in the form of indirect 
actions and nonmilitary measures.” They go on to describe conflict initiation occurring 
far in advance of actual new generation war through a series of distributed measures 
across informational, cultural, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic 
means. Chekinov and Bogdanov describe the initiating side of a conflict by using 
methods of intimidation, deception, bribery, and blackmail of military and political 
officials, “mass scale propaganda to drag the target country deeper into chaos and further 
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out of control,” as well as the use of “agents” externally supplied with funds, weapons, 
and material to initiate discontent and criminal activity in order to “stoke up chaos, panic, 
and disobedience.” They close with a key statement that pervades both current and 
historic Russian thinking: “a country preaching a defensive doctrine may get the short 
end of the deal in the face of a surprise attack by an aggressor.”770 
Both the Gerasimov and Chekinov documents have to be taken in context, as they 
do not overtly define Russian doctrine, but suggest that warfare has transformed and that 
their peer competitors, namely the United States, China, and the EU, have all adopted 
these methods as a fundamental maxim in conflict management. The underlying 
conclusion is that Russia must transform according to these principles in order to be 
competitive in future conflict. This view on the nature of twenty-first century warfare is a 
form of “mirror imaging,” reflecting long-standing Soviet and Russian preconceptions on 
the nature of Western subversion, rooted in their very own state subversion models 
implemented by the KGB during the Cold War. The implementation of these concepts in 
formulating contemporary Russian PW doctrine is unremarkable, as this approach has 
permeated Soviet and Russian strategic thinking for generations. However, the 
transcendence of this framework from the intelligence services to the historically 
conventional-minded General Staff, and the adoption of this new model as a vanguard of 
Russian military strategy, demonstrates progressive military thought on  
Twenty-First Century warfare (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  Transformation of Armed Conflict, Gerasimov – 2013.771 
This “new” form of warfare is hardly new, but a reinterpretation of classic, 
Soviet-era PW. It is framed by a transformed geopolitical global system and 
technological change, but based firmly in the lessons from successful Soviet interventions 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the ill-considered Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, and 
the disastrous failure to suppress the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s. The 
KGB model for subversion, and its implementation during the Crushing of the Prague 
Spring in 1968, bears a striking similarity to the Gerasimov model and Russia’s actions 
within Ukraine during the 2014 crisis.772 Russia has rapidly adopted this new 
transformation out of necessity, due to an inability to control events on her periphery 
through overt economic and diplomatic measures alone. The Western world, not faced 
with the same shortcomings, has forgotten the lessons of the Cold War and has been slow 
to recognize and react to Russia’s transformation. 
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B. “NOT-SO-NEW GENERATION WARFARE” 
The Gerasimov model has clear origins in Bezmenov’s Soviet subversion 
doctrine.773 Gerasimov’s covert generation phase is a long-term preparation of the 
environment (PE) approach that generates the underlying causes of conflict through what 
are, in essence, “active measures.”774 This is Bezmenov’s demoralization phase. The 
second phase in both models is nearly identical, with Gerasimov even reaching back into 
the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism and pulling out phrases like “transforming 
differences intro contradictions (see Figure 8).”775 
 
Figure 8.  KGB and Gerasimov Model Comparison. 
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The crisis phase in Bezmenov’s model is where the two structures begin to 
diverge. Gerasimov breaks Bezmenov’s crisis phase into three sub-phases: Initiation of 
Conflict Actions, Crisis, and Resolution. The core content in each sub-phase, however, is 
consistent with Bezmenov’s crisis phase, with the only substantive difference being 
Gerasimov’s emphasis on the use of civilians to initiate the crisis. This seemingly minor 
variance has deep-seated roots in successful U.S. covert actions using the Solidarity trade 
union movement in Poland to destabilize the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s,776 as well as 
current Russian perceptions that color revolutions are a form of military action by  
the West. 
It is not surprising that Russian military doctrine has assimilated the lessons of 
color revolutions and adopted them as a cornerstone of twenty-first century conflict. 
Soviet subversion doctrine utilized these principles throughout the Cold War period; 
using state-sponsored front organizations and communist parties as a vanguard for 
revolutionary transition against democratic societies. Emerging political technologies, the 
prevalence of social and mass media, and the exponential growth of NGOs and 
multinational organizations has truncated the time required to effect political change. 
Destabilization and exacerbation can be achieved in months, not years as was originally 
envisioned in Bezmenov’s second phase. Gerasimov’s initiation of conflict actions, crisis, 
and resolution phases stress a 4:1 nonmilitary to military ratio of activities, hallmarked by 
both violent and nonviolent civilian action. The final phase in both the Bezmenov and 
Gerasimov models is, once again, identical, presenting the reduction of tensions and 
peacekeeping operations as key components. 
The overall similarity of the two models is striking, especially considering that a 
KGB model has such influence on a contemporary-conventional doctrine within the 
General Staff. Then again, the fact that the president of the Russian Federation is a 
former KGB officer himself gives more credence to the link. An analysis of the Russo-
Ukrainian conflict in 2014 offers a strong indication that Russian operations in Crimea 
and the Donbass were consistent with the Gerasimov and Bezmenov models. 
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C. THE WAR IN UKRAINE 
“Jets, artillery, multiple launch systems and tanks . . . . If these are today’s 
European values—I’m gravely disappointed.” 
–Vladimir Putin, August 27, 2014777 
Russian actions on the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine were mutually 
supporting and interdependent operations within a single campaign. Each was executed at 
its own pace within a phased sequence and, together, designed to achieve overall Russian 
strategic objectives. The pro-Western revolution in Kiev that started in late November 
2013 directly challenged a vital Russian interest of “security through influence.” For the 
Kremlin, these events fit the pattern of Western subversion directed at Russia. A 
successful Euromaidan meant the Westward slide of Kiev, potential EU and NATO 
membership, the likely loss of Sevastopol, and the near certainty of similar social 
movements rising inside Russia. The operation to seize Crimea had to occur rapidly to 
capitalize on the confusion within Kiev following the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych in 
February.778 Once Crimea was secured and Kiev could no longer leverage Sevastopol 
against Moscow, the main effort in Eastern Ukraine could begin. This took the form of 
what American doctrine refers to as unconventional warfare (UW) with the aim of 
creating Russian zones of influence outside of Kiev’s control. Though not officially 
confirmed by Moscow, this is the most likely scenario for Russian objectives in Ukraine, 
with the Kremlin attempting to create a “politically immobilized opposition and a corrupt 
political elite that mascarades [sic] behind ethnic nationalism.”779 Applying the 
Gerasimov model to both the Crimea and Donbass operations in sequence demonstrates 
the application of the model in contemporary conflict. 
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D. PHASE I: COVERT GENERATION (1991–2013) 
Russia maintained the Soviet tradition of manipulating and subverting the social, 
economic, political, and cultural landscapes in its core periphery between 1991 and 2013. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, Moscow initiated an 
intensive covert generation (demoralization in the Bezmenov model) phase in Ukraine, 
described in detail in Chapter VI. Russian actions and strategy coincide nearly flawlessly 
with Phase I actions: create differences/diverging interests, formation of unions, 
formation of political opposition, information warfare, and military strategic containment. 
All these actions lead up to what has yet to be examined: Phase II: Exacerbation. 
E. PHASE II: EXACERBATION (NOVEMBER 21 TO FEBRUARY 22, 2013–
2014) 
Gerasimov’s exacerbation phase occurred concurrently in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine. Following Yanukovych’s announcement, on November 21, 2013, of the 
suspension of EU trade and association talks, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took 
to the streets and occupied Independence Square in Kiev. What followed was a series of 
violent crackdowns by hired “roving gangs of street thugs”780 and Ukrainian security 
forces loyal to the embattled president, and by early December, the opposition movement 
grew to some 800,000 protesters demanding that Yanukovych resign. On December 17, 
2013, Moscow attempted to flex its economic muscle, agreeing to cut the price of gas 
supplied to Ukraine and offering to buy $15 billion in Ukrainian debt.781 
The protests subsided in late December, only to be reignited again in January and 
February 2014. Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, the current head of the Ukrainian Security 
Services (SSB), reported that Russian agents were present during the protests and 
actively assisted Ukrainian law enforcement. In the book, Ukraine Crisis, Nalyvaichenko 
states that “somewhere around January 20th, two military cargo aircraft from Chkalovsk, 
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Russia, landed in Hostomel and Zhulyany airports near Kiev . . . delivered 5,100kg of 
explosives, impact munitions and additional weapons . . . twenty-six FSB were involved 
in planning the crackdown.”782 Furthermore, Nalyvaichenko acknowledged that once the 
agents were in Kiev, his organization was responsible for housing and providing 
sustenance to the Russian.783 
While the situation in Kiev was developing, Russia intensified its information 
war. Social and mass media was targeted at the Russian-speaking population in Crimea 
and the Donbass, and bolstered the existing societal divisions and conspiratorial 
complexion of the population to a level that mirrored and even surpassed similar Soviet 
actions in Czechoslovakia during the destabilization phase of suppressing the Prague 
Spring in ‘68. In effect, Moscow appeared to have executed a preemptive exacerbation 
phase designed to counteract Euromaidan and, in the event of a pro-Western victory, to 
create the necessary conditions on the ground for the escalation of the conflict to the 
crisis phase. 
By early February 2014, the Kremlin viewed Yanukovych’s ouster as imminent 
and began to develop options, including the legitimate annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula and the establishment of federated regions in Eastern Ukraine through a 
nonmilitary approach using propaganda, social movements, contractual obligations, and 
international legal precedent to gradually federate and align these regions to Russia.784 A 
more aggressive course of action was eventually selected. On February 7, Moscow, true 
to its Soviet heritage, publically accused the United States of engineering a coup in 
Kiev785 and, by February 14, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s personal advisor and the 
Kremlin’s chief ideologue, was on the ground in Crimea.786 On February 22, the situation 
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climaxed with the Ukrainian Parliament voting to remove Yanukovych from office.787 
The actual start date for the Russian military campaign in Crimea is subject to debate. A 
strong indication may be the printing of the Russian Ministry of Defense campaign 
medals for the “Return of Crimea,” with a start date of 20 February 2014 engraved on the 
back, two days prior to Yanukovych’s actual ouster (see Figure 9).788 For the purposes of 
this study, the date of February 22 is used. 
 
Figure 9.  Crimea Campaign Medal, 2014.789 
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F. THE CRIMEA CAMPAIGN: PHASES III-V, INITIATION OF CONFLICT 
ACTIONS TO RESOLUTION (FEBRUARY 22–MARCH 18, 2014) 
Russian military actions in Crimea are a vivid example of Gerasimov’s vision of 
Twenty-First Century warfare in action. In a matter of weeks, Russia moved through 
Gerasimov’s phases III-V using nonviolent civil resistance, special operations forces, 
economic and diplomatic leverage, aggressive information warfare, and the strategic 
deployment of conventional forces to annex the peninsula and add its two million 
inhabitants to the Russian Federation. The annexation secured a key geostrategic position 
for the Russian Navy and added a substantive, long-term economic advantage by 
securing a key transit location between China and Europe. 
What immediately followed the ouster of Yanukovych was the swift 
implementation of Gerasimov’s phase III, initiation of conflict actions.790 On February 
24, 2014, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement accusing the West of 
engineering the takeover of Ukraine though “terrorists” and “extremists,” and setting the 
groundwork for Russian intervention by declaring that the ethnic Russian minority was 
being persecuted, that the new government was illegitimate, and that the Ukrainian 
parliament was “imposing decisions and laws aimed at repressing the human rights of 
Russian and other national minorities,” to include a ban on the Russian language.791 
On February 26, Russia initiated its Strategic Military Deployment, placing 
150,000 troops on high alert. The initiation of conflict actions on the Crimean Peninsula 
was marked by a deception operation (maskirovka) that initially confused the Ukrainian 
government and paralyzed the international community from taking action. Russia 
conducted a massive military exercise, involving some 50,000 troops on Ukraine’s 
eastern border, designed to distract neighbors and the international community.792 While 
the focus was on eastern Ukraine, Russia executed a rapid “exercise” in the Black Sea 
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involving 36 naval vessels and some 7,000 troops. The movement of large conventional 
forces throughout the theater took focus away from the smaller, more surgical, operations 
by elite forces on the Crimean Peninsula, which limited any reaction from Ukraine to 
defend its territory. Shortly after the exercise was initiated, pro-Russian rebels started 
appearing throughout all of Crimea and, at 0400 on February 27, approximately 50 
Russian special operations personnel occupied governmental buildings on the peninsula, 
including the Crimean parliament.793 Despite clear evidence to the contrary, Russia 
strongly denied any involvement and stated that the soldiers were part of an anti-Ukraine 
separatist group and not Russian military. The men were armed with new Russian rifles, 
night vision sights, and grenades launchers that were beyond the equipment capabilities 
organic to any military or civil force in Crimea.794 Ukrainian officials had difficulty 
crafting a cohesive response, mainly due to the irregular techniques of the Russian forces 
being employed and the inability to differentiate between Russian forces and local, pro-
Russian militias. Following a nearly identical pattern to the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, Russian special forces seized Belbek airfield in Sevastopol and 
facilitated the air landing of a 2,000-man Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (VDV) airborne 
force. Ukrainian forces, fearing a Czechoslovakian-style invasion of mainland Ukraine, 
were postured against the Russian diversionary exercise force and could not respond to 
actions in Crimea.795 
By 27 February, Russia was already in Gerasimov’s phase IV of the Crimean 
operation—Crisis. Russia seized key areas with special forces and then focused on 
information operations. The special forces started injecting rebellious sentiment, 
fomenting a false sense of civil unrest that eventually led to the request for the Russian 
Federation to intervene. Russian forces met minimal resistance and worked to recruit and 
integrate Ukrainian forces to the Russian military through the offering of citizenship and 
seize key infrastructure throughout the peninsula to include the airport and naval 
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facilities.796 On 1 March, the Crimean Council of Ministers officially requested that 
Moscow intervene and “restore order.” The Russian Federation upper house voted 
unanimously to send forces into Ukraine and, on 2 March, Russian naval forces began a 
blockade and siege of Ukrainian military bases under the “guise of a civilian action,” and 
“on 3 March, Russian forces also took over the port of Kerch. The military victory was 
clinched. The Ukrainian leadership and the rest of the world had been presented a  
fait accompli.”797 
Following the initial seizure of Crimea, the new Ukrainian government provided 
Russia with the opportunity to continue to point out contradictions that brought further 
support for Russian interests in pro-Russian areas of Ukraine. The new Ukrainian 
government, with the support of the international community, appointed an intermediate 
president aligned with the popular sentiment of economic cooperation with Western 
Europe and an unfavorable opinion of Russia.798 Russia rejected the new Ukrainian 
government and reaffirmed Moscow’s position “that the US and the EU had connived in 
the illegal overthrow of President Yanukovych.”799 Shortly thereafter, the replacement 
parliament voted to make Ukrainian the sole language at all levels of the government, 
which led to widespread protests in the ethnic Russian areas of Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine.800 The vote further provided Russia with the narrative necessary to justify their 
military actions under the banner of ethnic Russian protection.801 
                                                 
796 William Booth, “Armed Men Take Control of Crimean Airport,” The Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/pro-russia-separatists-flex-muscle-in-ukraines-crimean-
peninsula/2014/02/27/dac10d54-9ff0-11e3-878c-65222df220eb_story.html. And Lavrov, Brothers Armed, 
178. 
797 Booth, “Armed Men Take Control of Crimean Airport,” 2. 
798 David M. Herszenhorn, “Ukraine Rushes to Shift Power and Mend Rifts,” The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/world/europe/ukraine.html?ref=world&_r=1. 
799 Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management,” Survival 56, no. 3 (2014): 20. 
800 Ian Traynor, “Russia Denounces Ukraine ‘Terrorists,’” The Guardian, February 24, 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich. 
801 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in 
Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27, no. 3 (2014): 370. 
 233
In one swift action, Russia deprived Kiev of a key leverage point; the lease of the 
Russian naval base in Sevastopol. Concurrent to Moscow’s actions in Crimea, and 
coinciding with Putin gaining parliamentary approval to invade Ukraine on March 1, 
scores of pro-Russian demonstrations erupted across the southeastern portion of Ukraine, 
primarily in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.802 
The Kremlin moved swiftly to consolidate its gains in Crimea. Russian forces 
prevented the entry of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
monitors onto the peninsula, conducted a naval blockade of the Crimean Strait on March 
4, and executed a “directed military threat” by a second massing of troops on the 
Ukrainian border on March 12. Taking advantage of Ukrainian and international 
vacillation, Moscow set the conditions for victory with a 16 March referendum on 
Crimean independence. This referendum won, with 95% of the vote, under the security 
blanket provided by thousands of Russian conventional troops. Two days later, on March 
18, Vladimir Putin signed a bill absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation.803 Russia 
immediately transitioned the television stations to Russian-based media outlets, and 
began to “normalize” the peninsula.804 This transition to phase VI of the Gerasimov 
model saw the first signs of Moscow attempting to “reduce tensions” and establish a 
“postconflict settlement” through the return of over one billion USD worth of seized 
military equipment to Kiev.805 On March 18, phase V, the seizure of Crimea, was 
complete and subsequent action was initiated in Eastern Ukraine. 
G. THE DONBASS CAMPAIGN: PHASES III-VI, INITIATION OF 
CONFLICT ACTIONS AND CRISIS (APRIL-AUGUST 2014) 
In line with Gerasimov’s model of using the population’s protest potential as a 
vanguard of new generation warfare, pro-Russian protests continued to intensify in 
Eastern Ukraine following the Crimea Referendum. On April 6, 2014, well-organized and 
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armed separatists stormed government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Karkiv, 
ushering in a new phase in the conflict that closely resembled the traditional Western 
model of UW. In the initial stages of the operation, the resistance pattern of action 
seemed to indicate a nonmilitary approach using local referenda to bring the regions 
closer to Russia. Moscow followed the Crimean pattern and attempted to use paid 
protestors to incite anti-Ukrainian sentiment through the region; however, the local elites 
and civilians had a wider array of choices than their Crimean counterparts.806 Several 
factors combined to signal the start of a protracted and violent conflict: the inherent lack 
of speed and surprise that made the Crimean operation so successful; Eastern Ukraine’s 
more heterogeneous population; the prevalence of organized crime; clear lack of 
organization and chaotic, factional infighting among the opposition; and Kiev’s necessity 
to retain the economic and industrial potential of the Donbas at all costs. For the Russian 
Federation, establishing pseudo-control over the Donbas was a strategic necessity to 
prevent Kiev from moving Westward, and Moscow made the decision to militarize the 
conflict. By late April, Ukrainian counterintelligence identified upwards of 300 Russian 
Spetsnaz and GRU troops operating in the Donbass, “recruiting paramilitary fighters in 
exchange for cash handouts and waging a sophisticated propaganda war.”807 Amid the 
growing insurgency campaign, by mid-June Russia intensified pressure on Kiev by 
cutting off natural gas supplies to Ukraine. The Ukrainian counterinsurgency campaign 
began making some headway in the midsummer months with the retaking of Slovyansk 
on 6 July, precipitating a significant increase in the flow of heavy military equipment 
from Russia to its proxy forces and an escalation of operations, most notably  
in Novoazovsk.808 
The downing of Flight MH-17 on July 17, with 298 people on board, by a 
reported Buk radar-guided, surface-to-air system that had been brought over from Russia 
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at the Sukhodolk border crossing, should have been a watershed moment.809 It was not. 
The Kremlin unleashed a wave of counternarrative deception and propaganda, effectively 
turning the incident into a conspiracy-laden spectacle that ultimately worked in Russia’s 
favor. Russia executed an “ambiguity” deception, pushing multiple false narratives across 
Russian-controlled media channels. Accusations ranged from CIA involvement, an 
attempted Ukrainian shoot down of Vladimir Putin’s personal jet, to a plane filled with 
cadavers. These accusations and counterblaming effectively planted the seeds of 
conspiratorial doubt.810 Following the incident, the Russian military campaign 
intensified. 
The Novoazovsk operation effectively opened up a second front in the fighting 
and secured a new Russian border crossing and southern resupply route for the 
separatists.811 In early August, Russia declared that it would be sending humanitarian aid 
convoys to support the people of Eastern Ukraine.812 The humanitarian convoys were 
used to cover the movement of other convoys. “In late August, Russia poured in enough 
men, tanks and armoured [sic] personnel carriers to support a counter-offensive.”813 The 
convoys coincided with the Ukrainian military’s offensive against the separatist-held 
cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.814 The Ukrainian military achieved some initial success, 
but the assaults stalled under heavy Russian artillery, reportedly fired from Russia as well 
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as from within Ukraine.815 While the use of conventional Russian military formations 
through mid-August is speculative, the use of Russian contracted paramilitary forces is 
well documented. Vladimir Yefimov, a former Spetsnaz officer and current head of the 
Sverdlovsk Oblast Fund for Special Forces Veterans, described the recruitment process 
for Russian “volunteers.” Yefimov stated that the recruits were paid between $1,000 and 
$4,000 per month and sent into Ukraine on Red Cross trucks and “humanitarian aid” 
convoys. They were issued a “volunteer’s pass” to avoid Russian and international 
mercenary laws. Most men were selected based on previous military experience.816 Some 
estimates place the total number of recruited “volunteers” from Russia at 12,000 fighters 
in 2014.817 While the tactical situation in Eastern Ukraine remained precarious through 
the beginning of August, a series of Russian-led offensives in mid-to-late August tilted 
the balance of power in favor of the separatists. The introduction of conventional Russian 
forces signified the transition to Gerasimov’s resolution phase.818 
H. THE DONBAS CAMPAIGN: PHASE V-RESOLUTION (AUGUST–
SEPTEMBER 5, 2014) 
Gerasimov’ resolution phase is hallmarked by the intensification of conflict for a 
decisive military operation. The injection of Russian conventional troops into the conflict 
during August was a decisive point in the campaign, reversing any gains made by 
Ukrainian forces and forcing Kiev to agree to a settlement on Russia’s terms. A Russian-
led offensive on August 23-24 broke the sieges of Donetsk and Luhansk, and made a 
thrust along the Azov coast towards Mariupol.819 On August 31, President Putin called 
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for “substantive, meaningful negotiations, and not on technical issues, but on the political 
organization of society and statehood in the southeast of Ukraine” and proposing a cease-
fire plan calling for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces outside of indirect-fire range of 
rebel-held positions.820 Gerasimov’s resolution phase involves both military 
intensification and negotiations (referred to in the model as the “search for ways to settle 
the conflict”)821 to bring about the final establishment of peace. Following a phone 
conversation between Putin and Ukrainian President Poroshenko, Kiev submitted to the 
proposal. After the implementation of the tenuous cease-fire on September 5, the 
exchange of prisoners, and the redeployment of a large number of Russian conventional 
forces out of Eastern Ukraine, Russia extracted further demands from Kiev by 
threatening to ban all Ukrainian imports if the EU association agreement were to go 
through. On September 12, the Ukrainian government capitulated to Russian pressure and 
announced the postponement of the EU association agreement until 2015, agreed to give 
special status to the Donbass region for three years, and the creation of a  
30-kilometer demilitarized zone.822 
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE-“NORMALIZATION” (SEPTEMBER 5, 
2014–PRESENT) 
The last phase is a protracted process of escalation and deescalation, negotiation 
and the consolidation of gains, and the continuous application of all aspects of Russian 
national power to ensure a favorable end state. It is difficult to delineate between this 
phase and the one that precedes it, primarily because protracted conflicts tend to slip back 
and forth in intensity from an agreed upon resolution, depending on the progress of 
achieving a desirable end state. This pattern was clearly evident with Moscow-backed 
offensives in November 2014 and January/February 2015 to consolidate gains and create 
a more favorable solution for the Kremlin, complementing the Minsk II accords on 
February 12, 2015. The current state of the conflict will invariably derail EU integration 
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for Ukraine, create a frozen and lingering conflict, and will likely allow for the creation 
of a federated system in Ukraine that will effectively give Russia, through its proxy-
controlled Eastern Ukrainian regions, a veto over all major decisions in Kiev.823 Crimea 
is now part of Russia and will not return to Ukraine. National reconciliation in Eastern 
Ukraine is highly unlikely, as periodic fighting in the Donbass will continue as long as 
Kiev does not embrace a degree of Russian interference in their internal politics. The 
establishment of peace, similar to normalization in Czechoslovakia from 1968 to 1970, 
and Georgia in 2008, will involve overtures to the West, attempting to curtail the massive 
economic effects of Western sanctions and the slumping price of oil. This idea was 
clearly expressed by Russian diplomats as early as September 27, 2014, with Sergey 
Lavrov declaring in the UN General Assembly that Russia is actively pursuing 
“normalizing” relations with Washington over the Ukraine crisis and that “now what’s 
needed is something that the Americans will call a ‘reset.’”824 The last phase of 
Gerasimov’s model does not signal an end to the conflict. The natural transition from 
normalization is back to the first phase of the model and to the process of long-duration 
PW and state subversion. The cyclic nature of the model has significant implications for 
potential future confrontations with the West. Once an acceptable state of normalization 
can be achieved in one conflict (Ukraine and the West), the Russian Federation will 
likely engage in other peripheral actions, though the nature of these future conflicts will 
be different. Russia will adjust its approach to reflect new geopolitical realities and 
lessons learned from the Ukrainian conflict, and find novel means to operate below the 
Western provocation threshold to realize its ultimate strategic aims. 
J. CONCLUSION 
The campaign in Ukraine is a clear reflection of progressive Russian military 
thinking on twenty-first century conflict, but is deeply rooted in Soviet-era PW doctrine. 
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The new Russian doctrine is a confluence of Soviet subversion doctrine practiced by the 
KGB during the Cold War, the application of nonviolent resistance techniques that 
played a pivotal role in the collapse of the Soviet empire and during the color revolutions 
in the post-Soviet space, and the evolution of Russian UW and counter-UW (c-UW) at 
the turn of the century. The latter developed out of hard lessons learned from the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and Russia’s poor performance during the First Chechen 
War. In 1997, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), in collaboration with the 
Russian Defense Ministry, conducted a comprehensive study on insurgency and 
counterinsurgency.825 Russia’s performance in the decade-long Second Chechen War, 
beginning in 1999, was much improved. The contemporary application of Russian UW in 
Ukraine is largely based on this progression. The Gerasimov doctrine has taken the 
conceptual framework of the various lessons from UW and c-UW, civil resistance, state 
subversion, and the application of DIME elements of national power, and melded them 
into a comprehensive PW mechanism that functions in concert with Russia’s strategic 
policy aims. 
As Russia enters the establishment of peace phase in the Ukrainian conflict, this 
analysis of Gerasimov’s model suggests that a number of European and Central Asian 
nations are likely to be targeted. These include NATO members in the Baltic States, due 
to their large Russian diaspora, and Bulgaria, due to its poor economic outlook, endemic 
corruption, and strong historic ties to Russia. Long-term Russian subversive efforts are 
also emerging in Georgia, channeling anti-Russian sentiment into a proconservative 
dogmatic version of Putinism and gradually introducing the concept of a Eurasian Union 
as a viable alternative to the West.826 Russian goals will not involve annexation or 
federalization of these countries, but gradual subversion and intimidation to shift 
orientation and set conditions favoring Russia in both bilateral and multinational 
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arrangements. Russian military and economic supremacy on the European continent will 
remain a principal objective of Russian foreign policy. This can only be achieved by 
fracturing the EU and NATO consensus. An unconventional challenge to Article 5, below 
a calculated provocation threshold, is not out of the question. The application of 
Gerasimov’s early stages to a number of NATO countries can present SACEUR with a 
Hobson’s choice. In a best-case scenario for the Kremlin, the image of a NATO-flagged 
armored vehicle going up against Molotov-throwing, anti-Western protestors is circulated 
in social media and spun out of control by the Russian press, further tilting the regional 
narrative in Russia’s favor.  
On the other side of the dilemma is inaction, demonstrating NATO’s lack of 
response to twenty-first-century models of conflict, and questioning the foundational 
principle of the alliance. To Westerners, the Cold War may have ended two decades ago, 
but to the current Russian leadership, the chess game against the “principal enemy” was 
put on hold, while the emerging Russian Federation reconstituted and reinvented itself. 
Russia is at war with the United States and the West, but it is a form of warfare that 
Western leaders are slow to grasp and counteract. Only by embracing this new form of 
conflict and resurrecting Western PW, can Russian revisionism be combated. 
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VIII. HYPOTHESIS VALIDATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This work organized an extensive empirical and case study review of Soviet and 
Russian political warfare into chapters designed to test one primary and five supporting 
hypotheses. The supporting hypotheses are the foundation upon which the primary 
hypothesis is based. The primary hypothesis, which proposes a role for USSOF in U.S. 
PW and countering Russian PW, is presented in the final chapter as an operational 
concept. 
The supporting hypotheses are revisited below, along with key research findings, 
arguments, and conclusions that validate the hypotheses.   
Supporting hypotheses:  
1. George Kennan’s 1948 Definition of PW is Valid for use in Today’s 
Geopolitical Reality, as it is Prevalent and is Being Employed in the 
World Today 
In May 1948, in the context of the early days of the Cold War, the  
State Department’s director of policy planning, George Kennan, defined political  
warfare as: 
The employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to 
achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. 
They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic 
measures (as ERP [Economic Recovery Plan; i.e., the Marshall Plan], and 
“white” propaganda, to such covert operations as clandestine support of 
“friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even 
encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.827 
Political warfare is the integration of all of the instruments, levers, or tools of 
national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means —to obtain 
national objectives, while simultaneously avoiding war. Therefore, PW is separate from 
other forms of warfare because it is a deliberate effort to achieve strategic goals using 
                                                 
827 State Department Policy Planning Staff, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” April 
30, 1948. Box 11A, Lot File 64 D 563, Record Group 59, National Archives & Records Administration, 
College Park, Maryland. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269. 
 242
less direct means. Peace and war exist on a theoretical continuum. On one end is 
complete utopian peace; on the other, total nuclear conflagration. On this continuum, PW 
occupies the space in between contentious diplomacy and conventional war; it is political 
because it is a strategy that deliberately avoids open war, but it is warfare because it is 
implicitly violent and adversarial in nature. PW is an attempt to conceptualize and 
operationalize the gray area between peace and war, or counter those that are doing so. 
Rather than create neologisms or attempt to modify a concept that is firmly rooted in 
American academic discourse and foreign policy practice, George Kennan’s 
conceptualization of PW is used throughout this study: political warfare is the adversarial 
employment of overt and covert national power with the specific goals of attaining 
national interests while avoiding war. Furthermore, Kennan’s definition accurately 
describes strategies currently being employed by China, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, and 
should, therefore, be used throughout the interagency to simplify discourse on this topic. 
2. The Soviet Union Conducted PW During the Cold War in Support of 
Its Strategic Objectives, as did the United States in an Attempt to 
Counter Soviet Efforts and Secure its Own Strategic Goals 
Shortly following the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks developed a PW 
apparatus in order to export the communist revolution to capitalist countries. Following 
the establishment of the USSR, PW also served to obfuscate the privations and mass 
deaths that were the result of forced collectivization and industrialization. After World 
War II, Russian PW doctrine was typified by the Sovietization of Eastern Europe. 
Though PW infrastructure had been in development for years, the societal upheaval 
wrought by the war’s destruction and the presence of the victorious Red Army 
throughout Eastern Europe provided the opportunities necessary for a truncated PW 
strategy to Sovietize vulnerable countries. 
It is important to note that no form of written PW doctrine was recorded; 
however, the methods employed to install Communist regimes throughout Eastern 
Europe bear a remarkable similarity. This, in conjunction with the extreme level of 
governmental control exercised by Stalin and a high level of coordination between 
Moscow and the respective communist parties in Eastern Europe, indicates that a doctrine 
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was implemented. “Sovietization” of communist parties created a cadre that was capable 
of implementing effective PW.828 Communist ideology and Soviet national interests 
demanded that states under the administrative control of the USSR become communist. 
The Soviets “had the advantages of geographical proximity, experience in running a 
police state, and the disorientation that the war had left behind.”829 Therefore, we see a 
process that is drastically quicker than later PW efforts. The transformation of 
independent states into Soviet satellites took place in four phases: infrastructure 
development, destabilization, conflict, and consolidation. 
After the death of Stalin, Soviet PW doctrine shifted focus from expansion of 
communist states to the primary goal of state security through internal control and 
external threat management. Yuri Bezmenov, following his defection from the USSR in 
the 1970s, identified the four updated phases of Soviet PW: demoralization, 
destabilization, crisis, and normalization. The USSR implemented internal and external 
PW strategies, both designed to make target populations susceptible to Soviet influence 
across the DIME spectrum, while undermining the influence and power of adversarial 
states, namely the United States. The Bezmenov model factored in short-, intermediate-, 
and long-term (generational) effects and used relatively unrestrained subversion to alter 
the global geopolitical balance. The primary mechanisms for achieving these objectives 
were bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to gain influence, economic 
interdependence measures, support for communist and socialist parties, active military 
intimidation, and advantageous arms control agreements that asserted Soviet 
conventional dominance. 
Given the contentious environment throughout the Cold War, these overt policies 
were inadequate on their own and required the critical support mechanism of Soviet 
active measures (activnyye meropriatia), i.e., covert operations ranging from basic 
intelligence collection and analysis to political assassinations. Active measures were 
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designed to frustrate opposition strategies by undermining a target country’s social and 
leadership structure, straining bilateral and multilateral relationships between nations, 
preventing the successful posturing and modernization of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (INF), and manipulating prices in Western markets. Soviet PW strategy also relied 
on the concept of zerstzung, or the splitting of the social and political structure of a state 
by targeting the tension control mechanisms in a society, be they democratic consensus or 
authoritarian governance. 
In Europe, the USSR pursued an aggressive policy of gaining security dominance 
over the continent through the expulsion of American influence and the establishment of 
a new geopolitical defense and economic structure. It implemented this policy through 
overt and covert influencing of the population and the internal politics of European 
nations. Covertly, the USSR implemented internal PW campaigns using ideological, 
structural, and cultural subjugation to maintain what the Soviet bloc gained following the 
Second World War. In the mid-Cold War, attempts to separate or deviate from Soviet 
norms were met with brutal internal suppression and large-scale Soviet military 
interventions. In facing both internal and external security threats, PW served as the 
vanguard of Soviet policy. 
During the Cold War, the United States engaged in its own robust PW, providing 
a critical counterweight to Soviet policy. The defensive posturing of NATO conventional 
forces, combined with a mutual nuclear threat, provided an element of military stability 
for the duration of the Cold War. As a result, “both sides pursued an alternative and 
complementary policy of keeping the opponent off balance by means of political 
warfare.”830 The developing Cold War became the context for the dynamic interaction of 
U.S. and Soviet policy, evolving strategic goals, and the interaction of PW measures 
within the contested space in Europe. 
U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be divided into 
four distinct phases. The first phase was the early Cold War period from 1947-1953, 
                                                 
830 Paul W. Blackstone, The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations 
(Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 301. 
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hallmarked by idealistic and aggressive actions by the Truman and early Eisenhower 
administrations to contain the spread of Communist influence and careless attempts to 
pry Eastern Europe from Moscow’s control. The developing nuclear stalemate between 
the superpowers and the death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in the next phase. This second 
period, from 1953 to 1969, was true “containment” designed to halt the spread of Soviet 
influence in the Third World, while accepting the status quo in the Second World. This 
was followed by a decade of détente in the Nixon, Ford, and early Carter White Houses 
and was complemented by the loss of domestic U.S. consensus and substantive 
disengagement by the United States from previous Cold War policies, including PW. The 
United States began to reverse this trend in the late 1970s in the second half of Carter’s 
term in office and into the Reagan years. The last phase of the Cold War, from 1979 to 
1991, was a relentless ideological campaign against the USSR, pushing back Soviet gains 
in the Third World and directly targeting the Soviet Union through overt and covert 
measures. U.S. PW vacillated with each phase shift; from early growing pains and 
relative freedom of action in the first two periods, to near total incoherence as a policy 
tool in the third period, to a final resurrection and ascendancy in the 1980s, as 
indispensable to a successful foreign policy. 
Full-spectrum PW, with covert action at its core, maintained the geopolitical 
balance for nearly two decades after World War II, stagnated in the 1970s, and decidedly 
tipped the Cold War balance in favor of the United States in the 1980s. The pressure 
generated on the Soviet system by a synchronized PW campaign across the DIME levers 
of national power, in support of a singular overt national policy objective of the United 
States, was a major contributing factor to the collapse of USSR’s domination of Eastern 
Europe and the eventual failure of the 74-year experiment in Soviet communism. 
3. Russia has Renewed its Ability to Conduct PW Since the Collapse of 
the Soviet Union and is using it to Consolidate Power Domestically, 
Establish Dominance Regionally, and, Ultimately, Challenge the 
Unipolarity of the West 
From the collapse of the Soviet Union to 2014, Russia has evolved from a nation 
struggling to solidify its identity to a rising power that is capable of exerting strategic 
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influence through the proficient use of PW. As Russia emerged from the remnants of the 
Soviet Union, each of the elements of national power developed at a different rate. As a 
result, Russia’s PW capabilities in each element of DIME evolved separately, but were 
largely correlated with some key factors. Russia’s diplomatic PW capabilities developed 
alongside the solidification of the post-Soviet Russian identity. Similarly, Russia’s 
information-based capabilities developed as Putin created Russia’s authoritarian power 
apparatus and firmly established an anti-Western narrative through media and domestic 
information crackdowns. Military methods were far more developed due to the Russian 
Federation’s inheritance of the bulk of the Soviet military personnel and equipment. 
Thus, the military became the preferred method of addressing regional conflicts and 
achieving favorable resolutions. Russia’s economic methods were the slowest to develop 
because they were largely chained to Russia’s regional dominance of the oil and gas 
industry, which was guided by the vagaries of the global fossil fuel market. As the overt 
and covert potential for effective PW developed in each of these categories, they were 
readily employed by Russia’s leaders in order to consolidate power domestically, 
establish dominance regionally, and ultimately challenge the unipolarity of the West. 
Russia’s initial implementations of PW were regionally focused and rarely synergized; 
but, Russia has since expanded its employment of PW to achieve strategic goals by 
improving its ability to synergize PW methods across all elements of national power. The 
Georgian War of 2008 is an excellent example of Russia’s re-evolved PW capacity. 
During this conflict there are clear examples of PW activity across the entire DIME 
spectrum, utilizing the demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization phases of 
the Bezmenov model. 
4. Russia has Engaged in and Enhanced its PW Activities in Ukraine 
Since 1991 to Secure its National Objectives and Vital Interests 
This hypothesis was tested in Chapter VI by analyzing U.S. and Russian actions 
and policies in Ukraine from 1991 through 2013. The comparative analysis focused on 
both U.S. and Russian national interests, national objectives, and the employment of 
DIME in Ukraine. Principally, the analysis validates the hypothesis that Russia has 
engaged in, and continues to engage in, PW in Ukraine to secure its national objectives 
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and vital interests. Russia’s policy and strategy has synchronized the employment of 
DIME and, as its strength developed internally, Russia’s PW in Ukraine developed in 
parallel. In addition, the comparative analysis revealed three important facets related to 
Russia’s PW in Ukraine: (1) PW encompasses the employment of all elements of national 
power; (2) PW is tied to national interests; and (3) Uncontested, sustained PW 
strengthens and burgeons over time. Finally, the analysis concludes that U.S. national 
objectives and interests in Ukraine guided a limited-approach strategy, in sharp contrast 
to Russia’s PW. This strategy resulted in short-term, unsustainable achievements. 
Between 1991 and 2013, Russia’s PW in Ukraine demonstrated an ability to 
adversely affect Ukraine through all aspects of DIME. Ukraine’s internal politics and 
governance, economic viability, and national security were manipulated and degraded by 
Russia’s PW. The highly-contested Soviet remnants inherited by Ukraine—the Black Sea 
Fleet, energy infrastructure, nuclear weapons, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine—fell under 
Russian influence, ownership, or control. President Putin’s rise to power in 2000 and his 
newly energized Eurasian policy resulted in enhanced Russian PW activity in Ukraine, to 
include an increased emphasis on informational, criminal, clandestine, and intelligence 
activities. Russia’s calamity during the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution was quickly 
remediated through its PW apparatus and resulted in the appointment of a pro-Russian 
President (Viktor Yanukovych), abandonment of an EU Association Agreement, and 
containment of NATO expansion. Russian PW in Ukraine eventually matured to enable a 
comprehensive strategy aimed at reeling Ukraine back under the total control of Moscow. 
5. Russia’s Activity in Ukraine in 2014 is PW, Rather than Crisis 
Activity Because it is Part of a Phased Plan Encompassing 
Nonmilitary and Military Methods to Secure Russia’s Goals as 
Outlined in Gerasimov’s New Generation Warfare Doctrine 
The 2014 Ukrainian conflict marks the culmination of a protracted PW strategy 
by the Russian Federation and the adoption of a systematic and phased approach to crisis 
generation and management by the Russian military. Since the early Cold-War period, 
PW has been the vanguard of Moscow’s foreign policy; with every measure of coercive 
national power devoted to furthering the Kremlin’s relative influence in regional and 
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global affairs. Given this perspective, Russia’s actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 
2014 should not be interpreted as a radical doctrinal experiment, but a systemic 
restoration of proven Soviet PW methods adapted to exploit a new geopolitical reality. 
Russia’s new model for the conduct of PW is expressed in the views of the Chief of the 
Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov in 2013. This model, effectively implemented 
in the Ukrainian campaign, is a clear reflection of progressive Russian military thinking 
on twenty-first century conflict, but is deeply rooted in Soviet-era PW doctrine. The new 
Russian doctrine is a confluence of Soviet subversion doctrine practiced by the KGB 
during the Cold War, the application of nonviolent resistance techniques that played a 
pivotal role in the collapse of the Soviet empire and during the color revolutions in the 
post-Soviet space, and the evolution of Russian UW and counter-UW at the turn of the 
century. The Gerasimov doctrine has taken the conceptual framework of the various 
lessons from UW and counter-UW, civil resistance, state subversion, and the application 
of DIME elements of national power, and melded them into a comprehensive PW 
mechanism that functions in concert with Russia’s strategic policy aims. 
The model presented by Gerasimov depicts the Russian military’s views on the 
changing nature of twenty-first century warfare. Gerasimov lays out a six phase approach 
to “intergovernmental conflict”: covert generation, exacerbation, initiation of conflict 
action, crisis, resolution, and establishment of peace.831 This model bears a striking 
similarity to the KGB state subversion approach implemented by the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War, but unlike the Soviet-era model, this puts emphasis on the use of civilian 
proxies versus conventional military force to initiate a conflict. When the Gerasimov 
model is applied to the conflict in Ukraine, a clear, phased pattern emerges. 
Arguably, the Russian Federation has conducted the initial phase in Ukraine, 
covert generation, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This consisted of the 
use of the Russian diaspora to nurture ethnic and linguistic divisions, economic coercion 
through resource denial and extortion, election tampering, the bribery of Ukrainian 
                                                 
831 Valery Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Foresight: New Challenges Require Rethinking Forms and 
Methods of Warfare,” Military-Industrial Courier, February 27, 2013. 
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officials, and other soft power methods.832 833 834 With the outbreak of the Euromaidan 
protests late in 2013, the Russian Federation moved to the second phase, exacerbation. 
This phase consisted of both overt and covert support to then president Viktor 
Yanukovych and his pro-Russian bloc, as well as the intensification of the information 
war designed to deepen ethnic divisions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Gerasimov 
model refers to this process as the “intensification of contradictions,” a term borrowed 
from Soviet dialectical materialism. By early February 2014, the ouster of Yanukovych 
seemed imminent and Moscow began laying the groundwork to annex the  
Crimean Peninsula and ostensibly gain control of the Russian-speaking regions of 
Eastern Ukraine. While the first two phases were concurrent in Crimea and the Donbass, 
the military operations occurred sequentially. 
The Crimean operation moved from the Initiation of Conflict Action to Resolution 
in a matter of weeks. Starting with the Ukrainian parliament voting Yanukovych out of 
office on February 22, pro-Russian separatists and Russian Special Operations Forces 
seized key government buildings, isolated Ukrainian military bases, and secured key 
infrastructure on the peninsula. This was supported by a massing of Russian conventional 
troops on the Ukrainian border as a diversionary force, and a blockade of the Ukrainian 
fleet by the Russian Navy. These actions were coupled with sophisticated Information 
and Cyber campaigns, and set the conditions for Crimea’s vote to secede from Ukraine 
on March 16 and its absorption by the Russian Federation on  March 18. 
The initiation of conflict action in the Donbass followed a pattern similar to that 
in Crimea. On April 6, pro-Russian separatists seized key government buildings in 
Donetsk, Luhansk, and Karkiv. In the initial stages of the operation, the resistance pattern 
of action seemed to indicate a nonmilitary approach using local referenda to bring the 
regions closer to Russia. However, the inherent lack of speed and surprise that made the 
                                                 
832 Marlie Maigre, “Crimea – The Achilles’ Heel of Ukraine,” International Center for Defense Studies, 
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833 Jakob Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia’s Management of the Stability and 
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834 Richard B. Andres and Michael Kofman,  “European Energy Security: Reducing Volatility of 
Ukraine-Russia Natural Gas Pricing Disputes,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 264 (2011): 6. 
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Crimean operation so successful—Eastern Ukraine’s more heterogeneous population, the 
prevalence of organized crime, and the clear lack of organization and chaotic factional 
infighting among the opposition—necessitated Russia to “militarize” the conflict. By late 
April, Russian special operations forces began “recruiting paramilitary fighters in 
exchange for cash handouts and waging a sophisticated propaganda war.”835 This was the 
start of a prolonged UW campaign and the initiation of Gerasimov’s crisis phase. The 
flow of Russian “volunteers” and military equipment into Eastern Ukraine from late April 
to early August, as well as Russian antiaircraft and indirect fire support, stalled the 
Ukrainian counterinsurgency campaign. In early August, Russia used humanitarian 
convoys to cover a buildup of forces in the Donbass for a decisive resolution phase. “In 
late August, Russia poured in enough men, tanks and armoured [sic] personnel carriers to 
support a counter-offensive.”836 The introduction of conventional Russian troops tilted 
the balance. A series of Russian led offensives in mid-to-late August rolled back the 
Ukrainian forces and set conditions for Moscow to extract favorable terms to a negotiated 
peace, including a postponement of the EU association agreement until 2015, special 
status to the Donbass region for three years, and the creation of a 30-kilometer 
demilitarized zone.837 A ceasefire was signed on  September 5, 2014 and marked the 
transition to the last phase of Gerasimov’s model. This last phase is a protracted process 
of escalation and deescalation, negotiation and the consolidation of gains, and the 
continuous application of all aspects of Russian national power to ensure a favorable end 
state. According to the model, this phase does not signal the stop of actual fighting. This 
was demonstrated by a series of separatist offensives in November 2014 and January/
February 2015, leading to further territorial gains and culminating in the Minsk II 
agreement in February. The Russian Federation has successfully established a frozen 
conflict in Ukraine that can be leveraged against Kiev to influence Ukrainian foreign and 
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836 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, 142. 
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domestic policy. The Gerasimov model is cyclical in nature. The transition from the last 
phase is back into the first, with the process of PW and subversion continuing indefinitely 
until the next escalation. 
The validated supporting hypotheses underscore the importance for the United 
States to adopt a PW strategy capable of offensively preempting or countering the PW 
practices of emerging or rising powers such as Russia. Building on the validated 
supporting hypotheses presented above, this work proposes as a primary hypothesis that 
USSOF, synchronized with other elements of national power, provide a functional 
platform for the U.S. Department of Defense to support USG efforts to conduct U.S. PW 
and undermine or counter Russian PW. This concept will be developed further in the 
following operational concept. 
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IX. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONSAND ROLE OF USSOF 
The 2014 Ukraine crisis, which some have suggested presaged the emergence of 
Russian hybrid warfare or new generation warfare, was actually a culminating point, or 
window of opportunity, for Russia to execute a provocative military-methods-based 
phase in a protracted political warfare campaign. Russia has conducted PW in Ukraine 
since its independence in 1991, with especially high degrees of intensity following the 
Orange Revolution. This PW campaign demonstrates a steady-state, protracted strategy 
across all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic—or DIME) designed to alter the social and political landscape in Ukraine. 
Russian PW has resulted in prolonged degradation of the Ukrainian economy and internal 
security. Russia has fomented dissidence in ethnic-Russian populations (Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine), disrupted internal politics to favor Russian objectives and policies, and 
delegitimized the Ukrainian government—especially when it has sought further ties with 
the West. As a result, Russia has tilted the balance of power in its favor by ensuring that 
Ukraine, or parts of it, remains under Moscow’s control or frozen in conflict. Russian 
actions have left the United States unable to formulate a comprehensive response beyond 
diplomatic condemnation and targeted economic sanctions. Western solutions have been 
ineffective because analysis has been focused on only a portion of the problem—the 
immediate violence—rather than the entirety of Russia’s protracted PW strategy. 
The Ukraine crisis demonstrates the need for a U.S.-led strategy to counter 
Russian PW or execute U.S. PW. This operational concept first presents the definition of 
PW and summarizes its evolution through the Soviet era into the form that Russia is 
employing today. Next, a conceptual framework is presented to assist strategists in 
organizing and establishing linkage between activities throughout the DIME spectrum, 
which are often mistaken as disparate and unrelated, and reframing them more accurately 
as components of modern PW. Then, policy recommendations are presented that outline 
interagency contributions and responsibilities that would enable the United States to 
counter PW or implement its PW strategies, in support of national objectives. As PW is 
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synchronized across the elements of national power, policy recommendations include 
complete interagency involvement, with the Department of State in the lead, and prolific 
utilization of organizations capable of operating broadly across the DIME spectrum, such 
as U.S. country teams working out of U.S. embassies and United States Special 
Operations Forces (USSOF). Finally, further recommendations are presented to optimize 
the USSOF contribution to PW and expedite the development of an effective strategy to 
counter Russian PW. 
A. POLITICAL WARFARE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The interaction of PW methodologies creates four natural categories that emerge 
from the nexus between covert and overt, and direct and indirect means (see Figure 10). 
Covert-direct PW involves “unilateral covert action” against a nation-state. Overt-direct 
PW is the expression of “overt direct influence” by one nation against another.  
Covert-indirect PW is the interaction between irregular warfare and PW through  
“non-unilateral covert action,” and is essentially the covert use of proxy non-state 
elements to influence a state actor. The final category of overt-indirect PW is essentially 
the “overt influence through a third party non-state actor” on a nation-state. 
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Figure 10.  Categories of Political Warfare. 
Elements of national power (DIME) are distinctly expressed within each PW 
category along the covert-overt and direct-indirect nexus. This conceptual framework 
serves as a tool to visualize and interpret PW in the broader context of foreign policy. 
Though this model can serve as an instrument for practitioners to determine measures and 
countermeasures for PW, careful consideration must be made of national and 
international statutory restrictions on specific PW actions to achieve national aims. 
Successful PW requires the close coordination of overt foreign policy and covert PW. 
Although instances of success without such coordination exist, such as the Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, by and large, disparate covert and overt PW 
measures usually fail to achieve the desired effects. 
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. POLITICAL 
WARFARE 
Recent Russian actions in Ukraine, as well as the recognition of ongoing 
subversive activities by other adversarial state and nonstate actors, have sparked the 
reemergence of the PW concept in U.S. foreign policy. Two principal documents form 
the basis of this discussion. The 2015 draft of the United States Political Warfare Policy, 
prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee made up of representatives from the 
Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Treasury 
(DoT), CIA, and the USAID, provides broad recommendations for the conduct of U.S. 
PW.838 The United States Army Speical Operations Command (USASOC) white paper, 
SOF Support to Political Warfare, published in March 2015, proposes establishing 
USSOF as the lead DOD element supporting broader U.S. PW initiatives. These two 
documents are discussed in this section and form the framework for developing 
operational SOF concepts and further recommendations for establishing the Defense 
Department’s role in PW. 
The proposed U.S. PW policy identifies the necessity to build a broader 
framework for the conducting U.S. UW as part of a larger PW strategy incorporating 
“political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure variables.” This 
conclusion emerges from the analysis that the U.S. concept of UW is “tactical, limited, 
and focused on special operations forces,” while adversarial nation states—namely 
Russia, China, and Iran—employ strategic UW concepts that incorporate a wide range of 
DIME instruments. These include concepts in which U.S. UW doctrine is lacking such as 
commodity and trade warfare, state subversion through cyber and electronic warfare, 
deception and propaganda, use of organized criminal networks and NGOs, armed and 
nonviolent civil resistance, and a variety of other measures.839 
To counteract adversarial PW, the United States needs to develop both robust 
offensive and defensive capacities. In this regard, the objective of U.S. PW “is to isolate, 
                                                 
838 United States Political Warfare Policy (draft), January 2015, Policy draft prepared by 
Interdepartmental Committee (DoS, DOD, DoT, CIA, USAID), drafted by D. Robert Worley. 
839 Ibid., 8–12. 
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erode, manipulate, exhaust, wear down, attrit, overthrow, reduce, replace, or create the 
conditions to coerce a belligerent government or regime to acquiesce to our national 
objectives, without going to war.”840 The policy identifies a number of critical methods 
in formulating a comprehensive U.S. PW program, including the use of information 
mediums to expose and discredit opposition elements and advocate U.S. positions, overt 
diplomacy to build international support, assistance to indigenous opposition forces 
acting against an external power or oppressive regime, covert action, and economic 
leverage. The policy also stresses the need to “minimize the risk of escalation to . . . civil, 
conventional, or nuclear war,” and “minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military 
involvement” by relying on diverse instruments of national power and integrating proxy 
actors such as third country states and NGOs into the PW campaign.841 
Influence has a prominent role in PW. The policy proposes the design of “a 
coordinated influence campaign,” with either the CIA or DoS in the lead, that includes 
counterpropaganda efforts, public diplomacy, assistance and training to “preferred state 
and non-state actors” in the conduct of targeted psychological and information 
operations, collaboration with preferred actors in the development and distribution of 
“informational and educational” material, and the development and maintenance of 
information infrastructure.842 In addition, DOD, though subordinate to CIA and DoS 
efforts in this realm, has robust organic capability to conduct psychological warfare and 
information operations in support of lead agency initiatives during peacetime.  
The draft policy designates the DoS as the lead agency for U.S. PW. The DoS is 
tasked with providing “policy guidance and coordination of political warfare programs.” 
Each agency (DoS, DOD, DoT, USAID, and CIA) is further tasked with designating 
elements responsible for “continuing attention to political warfare activities.” In the event 
of a crisis, an interagency task force may be established, “under the chairmanship of the 
Assistant Secretary of State for the region in which the crisis country is located,” and 
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including senior representatives from all applicable agencies to coordinate PW efforts.843 
The NSC, through the Board for Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), will “assure unity of 
effort and use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in waging all forms 
of low-intensity conflict, including political warfare”844 The NSC Deputies Committee 
will review issues and recommendations raised by the LIC Board, ensuring consistency 
with U.S. policy; stand up and monitor the progress of interagency working groups and 
task forces; and make recommendations to the NSC Principals Committee.845 
1. The Role of the Department of State 
The country team and Chief of Mission are the lead elements in U.S. PW abroad. 
The DoS is tasked with ensuring continued attention to foreign subversive efforts, as well 
as the broader PW problem set, with partner nations and international organizations. 
Additional tasks include intelligence collection and analysis of political, economic, and 
social developments; national and regional stability; and prevailing attitudes; developing 
plans, training, and leading assessments of PW programs; and encouraging foreign 
entities and U.S. private interests to support U.S. programs and policy. Finally, each 
country team is tasked to develop a PW plan consolidating input from various 
participating agencies.846 
2. The Role of USAID 
The policy document gives a substantial role to USAID in conducting PW 
programs. USAID is well suited to address many of the underlying conditions making 
states susceptible to external or internal subversion. USAID is tasked to develop 
programs within a target nation designed to respond to, cope with, and deter subversion, 
develop counterinsurgency programs, and support military-civic action. These efforts 
require close coordination with the Defense Department, especially in building host 
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government capacity through technical assistance and training, supporting information 
programs, strengthening police and paramilitary organizations to counter and make the 
nation more resilient against subversion and insurgency, and in conducting a variety of 
military-civic projects.847 
3. The Role of the Department of Defense 
The military’s role in PW centers on special warfare (SW)848 and surgical 
strike.849 Special warfare includes UW and counter-UW, and can contain diverse lethal 
and nonlethal methods ranging from capacity building and intelligence support, 
psychological and information operations, up to armed revolt, guerilla warfare, and 
revolution. The draft policy assigns a number of tasks to the Defense Department (see 
below) these will be developed further when discussing USASOC support to PW.  
In fulfilling its special warfare role, the DOD will: 
(a) Develop U.S. military forces trained for employment in 
unconventional warfare, counter-unconventional warfare, and other 
military guerilla-warfare operations. 
(b) Develop, test, and maintain transportation, communications, and 
logistic systems to support these forces, and be prepared to provide 
logistic support to indigenous forces in remote, contested areas. 
(c) Develop military doctrine for special warfare operations to provide 
guidance for the employment of U.S. forces and for the training of U.S. 
and friendly foreign military personnel. 
(d) Develop strategy and prepare contingency plans, in accordance with 
U.S. foreign policy objectives and commitments, to provide operational 
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assistance or reinforcement with U.S. tactical units to friendly state and 
non-state actors. 
(e) Provide research and development activities in support of special 
warfare operations. 
(f) Conduct military intelligence operations to provide intelligence on 
foreign military and paramilitary forces. 
(g) Be prepared to execute military operations in support of national 
objectives as directed, including land/sea/air interdiction and strikes and 
raids in support of proxy forces. 
(h) Plan, develop, and implement civilian unconventional and counter-
unconventional warfare programs where appropriate with AID and CIA. 
(i) Assess the adequacy of its part of the overall political warfare program 
in relation to those of other U.S. agencies.  
(j) Develop language-capable and area-oriented U.S. forces for possible 
employment in training or providing operational advice or operational 
support to indigenous forces. 
(k) Provide, in coordination with other interested governmental agencies, 
training and advisory assistance in all aspects of military intelligence. 
(l) Maintain continuous surveillance of foreign military and paramilitary 
forces potentially available for political warfare, evaluating their state of 
effectiveness and readiness, and making appropriate recommendations for 
their support and improvement or for their subversion. 
(m) Develop the military sections of Country political warfare Plans. 
(n) Support the psychological operations of CIA in political warfare 
situations.  
Through the Military Assistance Program the Department of Defense will: 
(a) Provide, in collaboration with AID, military weapons and material 
within available resources to friendly indigenous military and paramilitary 
forces and training in the fields of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and 
counterinsurgency. 
(b) Encourage and support, in collaboration with AID where appropriate, 
the use of indigenous military and paramilitary forces of vulnerable states 
in military civic action programs, including such projects as public works, 
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sanitation, transportation, communications, and other activities helpful to 
economic development.850 
4. The Role of the Department of Treasury 
The draft policy assigns a very narrow role to the Treasury Department in 
conducting PW. The limited role of “monitoring and, when appropriate, interdicting 
money flows that support non-state actors whose actions are inimical to U.S. interests”851 
is only a small aspect of the Treasury Department’s capacity for PW. The policy paper 
does not discuss the critical role played by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) in developing comprehensive or selective sanctions, or The International 
Affairs Department in crafting global economic stability measures.852 
5. The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency 
The CIA, throughout its history, has played a prominent role in U.S. PW. The 
draft policy emphasizes CIA covert actions programs that encourage the “formation of 
coalitions of state and non-state actors,” the planning and conduct of “false flag 
operations and support pseudo operations,” and “interventions into foreign political 
processes.” In coordination with the Defense Department, the CIA is further tasked to 
fund, train, equip, and advise proxy military and paramilitary forces, as well as to conduct 
psychological and informational influence operations to further U.S. interests.853 
6. SOF Support to Political Warfare 
While the draft policy document assigns broad roles to various agencies in the 
conduct of a PW program, the USASOC white paper proposes establishing USSOF as the 
principal DOD element in this area. The USASOC document describes the military 
aspects of PW as “counter-unconventional warfare (C-UW) and unconventional warfare 
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(UW), foreign internal defense (FID), Security Sector Assistance (SSA), and Information 
and Influence Activities (IIA), closely calibrated with and in support of those of other 
government departments.”854 The document argues that inherent SOF capabilities are 
well suited to facilitate and synchronize PW efforts by acting as the joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) “connective tissue” though existing foreign 
military and interagency partnerships.855 
The USASOC paper complements the broader U.S. policy document by 
identifying two critical areas for U.S. PW: counter-UW and deterrence. First, to 
“comprehensively mitigate the effect of subversion, UW, and delegitimizing narratives in 
partner countries targeted by adversaries,” U.S. policy requires the capability to 
strengthen the “capabilities, capacity, and legitimacy of partners.” Second, a deterrence 
mechanism must be established to “dissuade adversaries from conducting hybrid warfare 
by increasing the cost of such activities to the point that they become unsustainable.” 
This latter approach must proactively employ “coercive diplomacy, legal-economic 
measures, and UW against adversaries, and aggressively [prosecute] a battle of narratives 
to undermine adversary legitimacy among critical populations.” By establishing 
escalation dominance along the PW spectrum, and demonstrating both the capacity and 
willingness to engage in such activity, the United States can institute an effective 
deterrent against state-sponsored subversion efforts.856 
Five general categories form the framework for a comprehensive PW approach. 
They are persuasive and coercive diplomacy; economic aid and coercion; security sector 
assistance (SSA); UW; and information and influence activities (IIA). While the first 
category, diplomacy, has a role for the military component through the establishment of 
the credible use of force, primarily special warfare and surgical strike, SOF plays a 
prominent role in the latter three categories: SSA, UW, and IIA.  
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7. Security Sector Assistance 
Security sector assistance (SSA) is defined by the Executive Branch as  
policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: engage with 
foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security 
sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and 
effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and 
justice for their people; and, enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts 
that address common security challenges.857 
The USASOC document breaks down SSA into three categories: security sector reform 
(SSR), building partner nation capacity (BPC), and foreign internal defense (FID). 
SSR occurs at the top national levels and focuses on “defense and armed forces 
reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; corrections; intelligence 
reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed 
violence.”858 Comprehensive SSR strategies require both robust interagency activites and 
high-level DOD involvement beyond traditional military partnership engagements, with 
the latter focused on the “promotion of the establishment of a civilian led defense 
ministry.”859SOF plays a far more prominent role in BPC and FID. 
While no joint definition of BPC exists, and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review mentions “building partnership capacity” in broad terms,860 BPC can be 
classified as “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of 
the DoD and its partners,” through “training, equipping, exercises, and education 
designed to enhance a partner country’s ability to improve its own internal security 
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situation and make valuable contributions to coalition operations.”861 SOF has a key role 
in BPC though participation in the security cooperation and assistance programs under 
the combatant command’s (COCOM) theatre security cooperation plan (TSCP) and in 
line with U.S. Embassy mission strategy and resource plans (MSRPs); the DoS-USAID 
Joint Strategic Plan (JSP); and DoS’s Joint Regional Strategies (JRS).862 SOF activities 
under Section 1206 (building foreign military capacity) of the FY 2006 NDAA, joint 
combined exchange training (JCET), joint planning and assistance teams (JPAT), military 
liaison elements (MLE), special operations liaison officers (SOLO), partnership 
development teams (PDT), and SOF representatives form the basis of SOF BPC 
programs.863 These SOF programs complement other DOD and interagency initiatives 
under Section 1207 (transfer of defense articles and funding to DoS for reconstruction, 
security or stabilization assistance), the defense coalition support fund (DCSF) that 
authorizes the stockpile of defense articles such as helmets, body armor, and night vision 
devices for potential use by partner nations through operations and maintenance (O&M) 
funds, and the combatant commander initiative fund (CCIF) consisting of short-term, 
low-cost projects that meet the requirements of unforeseen situations.864 
FID is U.S. support to “action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats,”865 including “organized crime and cyber.”866 
FID is a core SOF mission, often requiring a small footprint and minimal resources to 
achieve disproportionate effects in support of host-nation programs. U.S. FID falls under 
SSA and is distinct from BPC. FID primarily deals with supporting host-nation programs 
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under the framework of internal defense and development (IDAD) through active 
participation and training. BPC is a broader range of programs tailored to both internal 
and external threats, and does not include active U.S. involvement in operations  
and planning.867 
8. Unconventional Warfare 
SOF support to PW requires a broadening of the U.S. definition of UW. The 
USOSOC document frames UW under the full spectrum of conflict, from nonviolent 
resistance up to insurgency and revolution, and delineates three areas of focus: traditional 
UW, C-UW, and UW in a proactive fashion (Pr-UW).868 Traditional UW is defined as 
“activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 
overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”869 Traditional UW was the 
founding concept of U.S. Special Operations, and remains a core competency of Army 
Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) today. Since the end of the Cold War, technological 
and geopolitical change has made traditional forms of UW—direct support to guerilla 
forces—far more complex and difficult to apply as a U.S. foreign policy tool. Novel 
approaches, incorporating civil-resistance and the protest potential of a population, third 
nation proxy forces with U.S. support to disassociate U.S. direct involvement, social 
media, and cyber, must be fused with traditional methods to move U.S. UW doctrine into 
the twenty-first century. Our geopolitical rivals have incorporated these methods into 
their SOF and conventional military doctrines, and the U.S. must present viable response 
measures against these types of threats. 
The concept of C-UW is a necessary step forward and presents policy makers 
with additional options outside of the SSA framework to deal with external state or 
nonstate actor subversion against allies and partner nations. C-UW can be offensive or 
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defensive. Offensive UW can be used to either coerce or deter an adversary engaged in 
UW through a “SOF-led or SOF-supported C-UW campaign” and entails “UW 
conducted within the territory of the state (or nonstate/parastatal entity) aiding an 
insurgency or separatist movement in another country—threatening the adversary’s 
‘home front’ or rear area.”870 The ally or partner nation targeted by external subversion 
can provide the principal force to conduct this type of campaign. Defensive C-UW 
complements U.S. SSA and FID efforts in a targeted country and involves a 
comprehensive program across the DIME spectrum including “law enforcement, rule of 
law (ROL), governance . . . conventional force posturing, regional and global IIA, 
diplomatic engagements, economic aid and sanctions—or any combination of the 
above.”871 Complex twenty-first century deterrence problems require the United States to 
develop and maintain a robust C-UW capability and demonstrate a willingness to employ 
that capability. 
Finally, the concept of Pr-UW has long been neglected by U.S. foreign policy. In 
recent history, the United States has been unwilling to risk setting up the infrastructure 
necessary to run a UW or C-UW operation in either allied, neutral, or adversarial states; 
instead defaulting to a crisis response model (Poland 1982, Georgia 2008, Syria 2011, 
Ukraine 2014) that significantly limits U.S. options. The USASOC document advocates 
long-term, preemptive UW infrastructure development  
through small footprint, scaled application of force campaigns in order to 
develop persistent influence among potential UW constituencies; deepen 
understanding of significant individuals, groups and populations in the 
Human Domain of the potential UW operational area; and build trust with 
SOF’s likely UW partners in regions before U.S. leaders are constrained to 
react to crises.872 
The application of extensive preparation of the environment (PE) programs well in 
advance of a crisis would not only expand the options available to the National Command 
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Authority, but serve as a deterrent against potential adversaries seeking to engage in PW 
or UW that are inimical to U.S. interests. 
9. Information and Influence Activities 
While the State Department and the CIA play a leading role in information and 
influence activities (IIA), DOD and USSOF have extensive capability to support those 
lead agencies. IIA is defined as “the integration of designated information related 
capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to 
inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect 
adversary and enemy decision making.”873 U.S. foreign policy has significant limitations 
in this critical aspect of PW, as adversarial nations have put a premium on information 
and excel at controlling both the domestic and international information environments. 
As an example, Russia has established tight domestic controls on both social and mass 
media. It uses these mediums to drive anti-Western, nationalistic, and ethno-centric 
narratives, relying heavily on deception and misinformation as a means to control and 
suppress dissent. Moscow has also expanded its capacity to conduct their own external 
IIA, buying up the majority of mass media programming in the Baltic States,874 and 
expanding its foreign propaganda wing (RT) across Europe.875 The United States must 
aggressively conduct IIA in order to compete in the battle for the narrative. 
The USASOC paper delineates three categories of IIA: public affairs (PA), public 
diplomacy, and cognitive joint force entry (CJFE), and military information support 
operations (MISO). PA primarily targets the domestic American audience and members 
of the uniformed services, and is designed to inform them about U.S. and DOD 
“activities, initiatives, and operations” by interfacing with both U.S. and international 
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media. Public diplomacy promotes “United States foreign policy objectives to 
understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers.”876 Public 
diplomacy is a critical component of U.S. PW, and ARSOF organic assets can enhance 
DoS efforts in the planning and execution of a PW program. This requires continuous 
integration of ARSOF Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) 
elements into DoS regional initiatives and specific country team programs. CJFE is 
defined as “information and influence activities to shape the environment beginning in 
pre-conflict stages.”877 This concept is not simply the application of psychological 
operations to shape the “perceptions, beliefs, opinions, and attitudes” of a target 
population through print, broadcast, and social media. CJFE also involves targeted 
influence operations on government and military individuals, often through individual 
interaction, to shape opinions within a target regime and set conditions for future actions. 
SOF’s forward posture and habitual interaction with foreign military and law 
enforcement leadership provide a natural mechanism for execution. Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO), defined as “planned operations to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 
groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives”878 is a 
principal tool to affect CJFE from a DOD and SOF perspective, but must be in concert 
with broader State Department and CIA programs. A critical recommendation from the 
USASOC white paper is the reestablishment of an independent United States Information 
Agency (USIA) to coordinate both overt and covert IIA programs abroad.879 
10. Centrality of SOF to Political Warfare 
The primary aim of PW is “to assist the destruction of the foundations’ of the 
adversary state’s capacity to obstruct U.S. and partnered interests, in order to ‘break the 
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will to’ sustain actions contrary to U.S. desires.”880 SOF is ideally suited to lead DOD 
efforts in support of broader PW initiatives. USSOF elements are well integrated both 
within the interagency and multinational communities, and can serve as a natural DOD 
synchronization and coordination component for PW. SOF is integrated at all levels of 
foreign military and civilian institutions, have established relationships with interagency 
and NGOs, and “avoid creating large footprints, disrupting local economic and civil 
conditions, and causing damage to their partners’ narratives.” The Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC), with its multinational networked structure and established 
“non-governmental, commercial, and academic” relationships, is positioned to function 
as a principal geographic node to coordinate regional PW efforts.881 Further applications 
of SOF in PW are discussed in the following section. 
C. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS: COUNTERING RUSSIAN 
POLITICAL WARFARE 
In addition to the broader policy recommendations captured in the USASOC 
white paper: SOF Support to Political Warfare and the draft United States Political 
Warfare Policy, there are specific recommendations that can be implemented to expedite 
the development of a strategy to counter Russian PW and optimize the integration of 
USSOF into that strategy. These recommendations include acknowledgement of PW 
activity by rising powers, maintaining a persistent presence through SOF engagements, 
expanding PW education programs, the establishment of European Combatant Command 
(EUCOM) and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) regional PW cells, and 
establishing country team billets for PW SOLOs. 
1. Acknowledgement of PW Activity by Rising Powers 
First and foremost, the leadership of the United States must acknowledge that 
political warfare strategies are being implemented by regional powers, including Russia, 
that seek to shift the current balance of geopolitical power in their favor. PW, however, is 
not a unilateral issue and countries conducting active PW must still be engaged on other 
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regional and global issues; but, there needs to be an overt acceptance that rising regional 
powers are actively pursuing interests that may not align with those of the United States 
and its allies. More importantly, it must be acknowledged that PW is being used to 
circumvent the relative military superiority of the United States and the West. 
Acknowledgement of the PW activity of other states necessitates and justifies a robust 
national policy to drive counter-PW initiatives and, perhaps, preemptive PW strategies.  
Without acknowledging PW’s relevance to the contemporary geopolitical environment, 
there will be no acceptable or effective response to actions such as the Russian 
annexation of Crimea and its subsequent UW campaign in the Donbass. The most 
dangerous consequence of refusing to acknowledge the proliferation of PW, however, 
will be increasingly provocative, foreign PW programs designed to erode U.S. national 
interests throughout the world. 
2. Maintaining a Persistent Presence through SOF Engagements 
Early stages of PW activity are subtle and difficult to detect, and Russian PW is 
no exception. The U.S. country teams form the foundation for effective PW detection 
capability, but may lack the “bandwidth” in their information collection apparatus to 
focus efforts specifically on Russian PW. Fortunately, USSOF have the training, 
equipment, reporting channels, and experience to monitor Russian PW initiatives and 
effects, while conducting routine military engagements. USSOF practitioners also 
augment the PW detection and intelligence collection architecture that is centered on the 
U.S. country teams. The demand from our Eastern European partners for SOF partnership 
is high, and these demands should be supported as often as possible to sustain a strategy 
of persistent engagement and presence. Also, persistent engagement promotes cultural, 
lingual, and geographical familiarization within the SOF community, which enables 
expanded PW campaign potential. Also, a persistent SOF presence signals to the 
international community that the United States is committed to preserving the 
sovereignty of our allies and mitigating external influence. This signal, as opposed to a 
conventional military presence, is relatively inexpensive, less provocative, and can be 
sustained for a longer period of time. Finally, SOF force structures are highly scalable 
and modular. This means that their presence can be optimized to fit within the tolerances 
 271
of the host nation, the strategic vision of the country team, the financial constraints of the 
U.S. Government, and any other unique circumstances. This presence can be further 
scaled or modulated to include specific SOF capabilities and assets, as required by the 
country team’s resident PW strategy. 
3. Expanding PW Education Programs 
 Specialized education focusing on PW theory and application for service 
members occupying key billets would positively impact the implementation of the 
nation’s PW strategy. Quality academic programs specific to the individual requirements 
of agencies conducting PW must be expanded for American PW efforts to be successful. 
Executive courses tailored to the schedules and expertise of decision makers must also be 
implemented. Within DOD, emphasis must be placed on educating U.S. and partner 
nation SOF on key elements of twenty-first century PW, including civil and nonviolent 
resistance, social media, social network analysis, cyber warfare, and NGO coordination. 
In addition, education on PW activity indicators across the DIME spectrum would 
improve SOF contribution to the intelligence collection activities required to detect and 
counter Russian PW.  This education should be interdisciplinary and holistic. Currently, 
programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) offered by the Defense Analysis (DA) 
department are ideal for providing PW practitioners and planners with relevant and 
applicable education.   The Defense Analysis Department also provides limited off-site 
education to military units that request support.   
 
4. Establishment of EUCOM Regional PW Cell 
The EUCOM Commander will play a pivotal leadership role in any strategy to 
counter Russian PW. Because the EUCOM Commander is dual-hatted as the NATO 
SACEUR, he plays an even more critical role than would be expected for another 
Combatant Commander. Fortunately, EUCOM is equipped with interagency advisors in 
the joint staff to assist the commander in synergizing strategic and operational efforts 
with other agencies. It is recommended that the joint staff be augmented with a regional 
PW cell to be the focal point for all of EUCOM’s DOD contributions to PW strategies. 
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This cell will lead interagency coordination efforts for PW in the EUCOM area of 
responsibility. It will also establish itself as a nexus to synergize regional strategies 
developed by the Board for LIC, regional strategies developed by the interagency, 
regional DOD strategies developed by EUCOM, country specific strategies developed by 
country teams, and SOF-oriented strategies developed by SOCEUR. The EUCOM 
regional PW cell will be optimally run by an officer in the grade of O-6 and assigned a 
staff of officers and Non-Commissioned Officers commensurate to the manpower 
required to synergize PW strategies as they are directed and developed by the Board for 
LIC. As more countries in the EUCOM AOR are nominated for PW programs, the 
EUCOM regional PW cell should be appropriately equipped with relevant subject matter 
experts and PW practitioners. 
5. Establishment of SOCEUR Regional PW Cell 
A SOCEUR regional PW cell should be developed to augment the SOCEUR J3. 
Because SOF are particularly well-suited for involvement in PW strategies, it can be 
expected that most, if not all, regional SOF engagements can be tailored to have PW 
effects. SOCEUR will require a dedicated cell to be the focal point for all SOF-based 
initiatives that support the broader PW strategy. This cell will coordinate heavily with 
joint command and staff sections to optimize the contributions of SOF engagements and 
preparation of the environment initiatives for integration into national PW strategies. 
Actions taken by the cell to maximize PW outputs can range anywhere from simply 
providing forward operational elements with specific intelligence requirements to detect 
PW activity, to designing SOF-centric PW campaign plans to be injected into the 
planning cycles of EUCOM, the interagency, or even the Board for LIC. Moreover, the 
SOCEUR regional PW cell will facilitate the appropriate allocation of SOF resources to 
PW initiatives by participating in the annual Requests For Forces (RFF), 1206/7 
programs, and all other relevant sourcing processes. The SOCEUR regional PW cell will 
be optimally run by an officer in the grade of O-5 and assigned a staff of officers and 
NCOs commensurate to the manpower required to develop and implement SOF-centric 
PW strategies. As more countries in the SOCEUR AOR are nominated for PW programs, 
the SOCEUR regional PW cell should be appropriately enabled with relevant subject 
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matter experts and PW practitioners. If adequately enabled by appropriate manpower and 
talent, the SOCEUR regional PW cell represents an ideal foundation for a SOC-Forward 
element to be deployed in support of matured PW strategies that require high levels of 
SOF involvement. 
6. Establishment of Country Team Billets for PW SOLO 
Both of the leading policy papers agree that the country team will be the primary 
focal point for country-specific PW strategies. Despite the wide variety of country team 
organizational constructs, the senior DOD representative is usually the Senior Defense 
Offical (SDO). As such, the SDO will be the proponent for all DOD interests and 
contributions to the country’s PW strategy. Unfortunately, there is no telling what 
background or formal training that an individual SDO may have in the area of PW, which 
represents a potential chokepoint for the flow of coherent PW strategy from the DOD 
community writ large into the country-specific PW campaign, its governing documents, 
and planning processes. In order to mitigate this potential shortfall of PW expertise, each 
SDO should minimally have reach-back to a EUCOM and  
SOCEUR-based regional PW cells, but should ideally be assigned a PW SOLO to 
augment the SDO on PW strategy and its implementation. Once the Board for LIC 
nominates countries for PW programs, a PW SOLO should be selected through a 
nominative assignment process and co-located with the senior defense official in the 
embassy. The PW SOLO should be a post-Intermediate Level Education (ILE) O-4 or 
above, with regional experience and familiarity with PW. This will be considered a joint 
broadening assignment and will require an assignment of two to three years. Ideally, the 
position will be added as an NSDD-38 supported billet and become a part of the country 
team organizational structure. Since PW strategies span years or decades, the billet 
should be stabilized as much as possible once the Board for LIC has identified a country 
for a PW program. Alternatively, the PW SOLO could be sourced from SOCOM or 
SOCEUR, but this comes at the expense of reducing organizational PW talent in these 
staff elements. As a worst case, the billet can be sourced annually through a formal RFF. 
In this case, the primary SOF force provider for the region, 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), will likely attempt to support the billet by requisitioning additional officer 
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manpower from Human Resources Command (HRC) on an annual basis. This sourcing 
strategy for the PW SOLO is the least desired due to its lack of billet stability, reliance on 
annual RFFs, and reliance on officer assignments from HRC above the authorized 
amount. However, until additional billets can be codified in the country team itself, in 
SOCOM or in SOCEUR, the informal assignment of PW SOLOs might be best 
accomplished through the RFF process. 
These recommendations go beyond the policy-based recommendations of the 
USASOC white paper: SOF Support to Political Warfare and the draft United States 
Political Warfare Policy, and represent the first critical steps that must be undertaken to 
enable a coherent strategy to counter Russian PW. Although the DoS will be the 
proponent for national PW strategies, the DOD and, more specifically, the SOF 
community, will play a substantial role in countering Russian PW through unilateral 
programs, multinational partnerships, and supporting operations that complement other 
PW programs led by the U.S. interagency. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The events in Ukraine since 2014 have sparked a renewed interest in Russian 
activity within the former Soviet space, with policy makers and academics alike 
theorizing as to whether Russia’s actions mark an emerging form of hybrid-war, 
asymmetric warfare, or “new-generation warfare.” This work proposes that Russia’s 
activity in Ukraine is, instead, part of a decades-long and continent-spanning Russian 
political warfare campaign reminiscent of those that the Soviet Union employed during 
the Cold War era. The United States and the West have placed a myopic focus on the 
violent events in Ukraine. As a result, they have incorrectly framed the problem as an 
isolated crisis event, rather than the culmination point of a protracted PW strategy. By 
incorrectly identifying the problem, which precludes an effective solution strategy, the 
United States has promulgated the perception that it is incapable of leading a 
multinational effort to counter PW strategies of rising regional powers. In order to 
mitigate this perception, and the proliferation of increasingly provocative PW strategies 
from other regional powers, the United States must demonstrate that it is capable of 
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properly framing the problem of Russian PW and developing full-spectrum, multinational 
strategies to counter it. 
This operational concept provides the necessary tools to initiate the development 
of an effective strategy to counter Russian PW. A detailed historical analysis reveals that 
Russian PW doctrine has its roots in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and has continued to 
adapt throughout the Soviet era and post-Cold War period into the form that the Russian 
Federation is employing today, the Gerasimov doctrine. The doctrinal templates for 
Russian PW provide an essential lens through which Russia’s seemingly isolated actions 
can be viewed as linked components of a larger PW strategy. 
Furthermore, this document proposes a conceptual framework and supporting 
visual models for foreign policy makers, planners, and practitioners to better understand 
PW. This framework is a helpful tool for categorizing seemingly disparate, and DIME 
spectrum-spanning actions of adversarial powers as components and indicators of PW. 
Using these models to categorize PW activity across the DIME spectrum also assists in 
identifying AORs for the interagency and multinational community, which is essential for 
developing and synchronizing counter PW strategy. 
Policy recommendations are proposed that optimize the current interagency 
structure for dealing with PW activity globally, as well Russian PW specifically. These 
policy recommendations acknowledge that the DoS and its country teams will play a 
primary role in leading the nation’s PW campaigns. These recommendations, however, 
are also founded on the knowledge that USSOF are particularly well-suited for PW and 
are capable of augmenting the interagency in a variety of initiatives that will be led by 
agencies other than the DOD. 
Geographic Combatant Commanders maintain operational control over a 
specialized toolset for countering PW in the form of its regionally aligned Theater 
Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).882 These TSOCs, in turn, implement the 
primary SOF action arm, which is comprised of approximately 660 Army Special Forces 
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Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams and their equivalents; Navy Sea, Air, Land 
(SEAL) platoons.883 Other SOF forces, such as Army civil affairs, Army military 
information support operations, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics 
teams, and operational aviation detachments round out the core ODA and SEAL teams 
with additional capabilities across the DIME spectrum.884 
These tactical-level SOF teams are particularly proficient at conducting and 
countering PW because of their regional expertise, language capability, advanced 
training, adaptability, and interagency experience. They can be employed in a modular, 
scalable, and nonkinetic manner throughout the world as part of military-to-military 
training programs, military exercises, train-and-equip programs, or humanitarian aid 
missions, during which they double as sensors capable of detecting early indicators of 
PW threat activity. They can subsequently be employed to lay the groundwork for a 
deliberate campaign to counter PW by conducting detailed area assessments and network 
development. As the counter PW campaign matures, appropriate interagency assets can 
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